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ABSTRACT 
Mergers and acquisitions represent a dynamic process of corporate culture and strategy. 
Empirical evidence indicates a high rate offailure ofM&A's to create valuefor the 
shareholders of thefirms. On the other hand, internal audit has evolved dramatically 
during the last yearsfrom its traditional role of control orientation to a more proactive, 
risk based and consultancy role. But despite this evolution, empirical evidence showed 
that internal auditfunction has no effective contribution during the M&A activity. This 
study analyzes the present level of involvement of internal auditfunction during the M&A 
activity and compare it with the preferred and ideal (normative) level. Yhis comparison 
leads to the identification ofpossible gaps between these three different models. This gap 
analysis identifies the possible reasons of this low level of involvement, as well as, 
possible means and actions in order to participate more actively to the specialized M&A 
projects. Finally, weformulated and validated a best practices model ofa more expanded 
level of internal audit involvement at the different stages ofM&A's, as well as, a list of 
potential prerequisites and actionsfor this expansion. 
Cfiapter 1: Introduction 
1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background information 
When two companies come together through a merger or acquisition, they enter a new 
world: the world of M&A. Every year, thousands of companies large and small, public 
and private, join forces through merger or acquisition, hoping to accomplish together 
what they could not accomplish separately. Also, dramatic events in mergers, 
acquisitions, restructuring and corporate control fill the newspapers headlines almost 
daily and have become central public and corporate policy. 
Mergers and acquisitions are transactions of great significance, not only to the companies 
themselves but also in many other constituencies such as workers, managers, competitorsý 
communities and the economy. Their success or failure has enormous consequences for 
shareholders and lenders as well as the above constituencies. Also, shareholders may 
lose their investment because of the imprudent acquisitions made by their companies. 
Acquiring companies are often motivated by the need to make efficiency savings in 
production and other activities. These are often achieved in considerable cost to workers 
in the form of job losses and communities in the form of terminated economic activity 
that plants and factories being shut down represent (Sudarsanam, 2003). 
Mergers and acquisitions rank among the topics most heavily researched by scholars in 
virtually all management fields. From strategy to corporate finance, from organizational 
behaviour and human resources management to operations management, marketing and 
accounting, all the way to antitrust studies, academic work looking at the merger 
phenomenon to all possible angles could suffice to fill a reasonably-sized library. A 
general guidance can be summarized in the statements that M&A are risky, there must be 
a strategic logic behind the purchasing impetus, it is important not to overpay and post- 
merger integration is hard to manage because of the sheer complexity of the process and 
the difficulty in handling people issues (Zollo, 2003). 
1.2 Worldwide and European Union M&A activity 
One of the striking aspects of mergers and acquisitions as a phenomenon is that they 
occur in bursts interspersed with relative inactivity. This pattern is called the wave 
pattern of mergers and has been observed worldwide. What triggers these waves and 
why they subside are not fully understood, although several possible contextual 
explanatory factors have been identified. 
Merger activity continued at a fervor pitch in the first quarter of 2005, announced 
worldwide mergers and acquisitions exceeded $589bn in the opening quarter. Also 
global announced M&A volume with a value up to $500 million reached $684,8bn in the 
fourth quarter of 2005, a 15.8% increase from last year. In total 29,603 deals were 
announced in 2005 indicating an increase compared with 28,479 deals announced in 
2004. That marks the strongest pace of merger volume during a six-month period since 
the second half of 2000. Also, United States M&A activity helped drive this growth with 
$226,8bn and a 15.1 % increase from 2004 (Thomson Financial, February 2006 report). 
On the other hand, European Union business environment is bewilderingly complex, a 
mosaic of national markets with different languages and commercial cultures each with 
its own set of company laws, commercial cultures, corporate tax structures, accounting 
standards and takeover regulations. It is also an environment undergoing rapid evolution, 
as for example the economic and political changes in the former Communist countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe. Some countries like Poland or the Czech Republic joined 
European Union in 2004 and Bulgaria and Romania will follow in 2007, transforming a 
large European Union and a single market with millions of customers. 
For deals valued up to $500million, UK companies were the most targeted in Europe 
accounting for 2,291 deals valued at $78.9bn or 33.3% of the European market. Strong 
growth of 15.5% in Italy and 25.7% of Spain comparing with the volume of 2004 helped 
drive European M&A volume higher. In terms of industry, the greatest increase 
compared with the figures in 2004 was in the real estate, media & entertainment and in 
financial sector. The trend is showing that 2006 is likely to be a record year for M&A 
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activity, despite the slowdown of takeover activity in the fourth quarter of 2005 
(CNNmoney. com, March 2006). These figures are also illustrated at the following tables 
and figures: 
Table I. I: Announced M&A deals by selected target nation 
01/01/2005 
- 
31/12/2005 01/01/2004 
- 
31/12/2004 
Rank Value Rank Value % Change in 
Region/Nation No. Deals No. Deals (US$M) (US$m) Rank Value 
Worldwide 684,283.3 29,603 590,818.7 28,479 15.8 
United States 226,771.5 8,502 197,0865 7,995 15.1 
Europe 237,2860 8,961 210,4862 8,757 12.7 
UK 78,944.8 2,291 66,409.2 2,442 18.9 
Italy 21,899.7 587 18,955.7 518 15.5 
Spain 13,401.9 414 10,658.7 483 25.7 
Source: Thomson Financial [http: //banker. thomson. com, February 2,2006] 
II 
Figure 1.1: Mid-Market M&A (by industry) 
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1.3 The internal audit role during M&A Activity 
With the current high volume of mergers and acquisitions, companies need an effective 
integration strategy to ensure that mergers and acquisitions objectives are achieved. Not 
all mergers and acquisitions, however, are successful in achieving their initial objectives. 
A survey conducted by IBM of twenty Fortune 100 companies found that sixteen of these 
companies felt that their integration strategy for new subsidiaries over the past years had 
been either 'only somewhat successful' or 'not successful'. Contributing factors to their 
lack of success appeared to include the fact that most of these companies did not require 
the completion of a post acquisition integration strategy before approval of the merger 
and did not include their internal audit staff as part of the integration team. 
Internal auditing is an independent, objective assurance and consulting activity designed 
to add value and improve an organization's operations. It assists an organization in 
accomplishing its objectives by bringing a systematic and disciplined approach to 
evaluate and improve the effectiveness of the organization's risk management, control, 
and governance processes (www. theiia. org, Institute of Internal Auditors, Internal 
Auditing definition, 2000). Also, internal auditors are grounded in professionalism, 
integrity, and efficiency. They make objective assessments of operations and share ideas 
for best practices; provide counsel for improving controls, processes and procedures, 
performance, and risk management; suggest ways for reducing costs, enhancing 
revenues, and improving profits; and deliver competent consulting, assurance and 
facilitation services. 
Internal audit can ideally position to assist mergers and acquisitions strategy and 
integration. In addition to conducting both pre- and post-acquisition due diligence, 
internal auditors can provide needed expertise in business process integration. Also, by 
assuming an integral role in merger and acquisition integration, internal audit can 
enhance its image as a value provider within the organization. We can also add that the 
internal audit function is potentially in a strong position to improve the quality of 
management throughout the acquisition process, and provide a service, which can affect 
the organization's profitability. 
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1.4 Purpose of the study 
As mentioned, mergers and acquisitions represent a dynamic phenomenon with a large 
number of organisations that are joining forces in order to gain competitive advantage, 
new markets and customers and create possible synergies. This means that these 
organisations are planning to accomplish certain strategic objectives and add value to the 
merged organisation. But as such strategic move, M&A activity incorporates a number 
of risks for the bidder or target company and the shareholders. These risks are 
encountered during the various stages of an M&A (pre-acquisition or post-acquisition) 
and often fail to achieve planned objectives. 
It is also a well-known fact that the internal audit profession faces many challenges as we 
march in this new millennium. Internal auditors have seen their role evolve from 
performing traditional internal audit functions (such as observing and counting and 
functioned as assistants to the independent accounting profession in order to attest to the 
accuracy of financial matters), to more of a risk based and consultancy role. 
The topic of my research is concerned with the internal audit role during mergers and 
acquisitions with specific reference to the European Union companies. As evidenced by 
the new definition of internal auditing (as adopted by the Institute of Internal Auditors), 
the work performed by internal auditors is not limited to the area of assurance services 
but it can also include consulting activities. Unfortunately, even though internal audit has 
expanded its role in many business processes throughout organizations, merger and 
acquisition activity does not seem to be an area that it has effective contribution. 
This trend is also evidenced in a survey published in 1998 by the Institute of Internal 
Auditors (Davison, 2001), indicating that a great number of auditors stated that they only 
performed due diligence testing in regard to new mergers and acquisitions activity and 
felt that more value could be added to the M&A process if their roles were allowed to 
expand. On the other hand, for those internal audit departments involved in the merger 
and acquisition activity, "specialized" auditors were usually taking the lead rather than a 
team of auditors from the internal auditing department and also participants noted that 
14 
they needed more training in mergers and acquisitions in order to sit at the same table 
with the planning and implementation team. Also, another international study (Selim et 
al, 2002) evidenced the low to moderate involvement of internal audit departments to the 
M&A process and especially at the pre-acquisition stages. 
We can conclude that although internal audit profession has evolved during the years and 
internal auditors have the motivation for an evolution to a more pro-active and risk based 
role, top management often perceives they cannot participate effectively in specialised 
projects such as M&A's. This study will try to decipher this trend by selecting a number 
of organisations in the European Union area and analysing current and preferred situation 
in order to identify possible gaps and explore the reasons for this low level of 
involvement, especially at the pre-acquisition stages. 
1.5 Research objectives 
The main objectives of this research are to: 
1. Describe and understand the role internal audit function currently plays in the 
European Union companies that pursue mergers and acquisitions. 
2. Examine the relative contribution of internal audit function to the various stages of 
M&A's. 
3. Describe and analyse the preferred role internal auditors would like to play in 
European Union mergers and acquisitions. 
4. Develop a normative model based on the extensive literature review. 
5. Identify and analyse the gaps between the current, preferred and ideal situation. 
6. Develop a best practices model valid for internal auditing departments in the 
European Union mergers and acquisitions. 
7. Provide a list of desired prerequisites that are essential for internal audit function in 
order to play a more active role in the M&A process. 
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1.6 Research methodology 
Research methodology for collecting and analyze data in order to finally suggest a best 
practices model is described thoroughly in Chapter 3. Briefly, research was conducted as 
follows: 
The first stage includes the literature review. From the literature review we have more 
easily explored and developed a normative model indicating best practices applied in 
different stages of the merger and acquisition process. The literature review included the 
following: 
e Reference texts on mergers and acquisitions, internal auditing and risk management. 
*A wide range of articles and papers published in a variety of journals (Journal of 
Finance, Strategic Management Journal, Journal of Auditing, etc. ). 
Also, useful data was derived using: 
9 The university's collection of books and articles. 
eA wide range of available databases (e. g. ABI Research Inform, Thomson Financial) 
to search for publications in the area of internal auditing in the case of mergers and 
acquisitions, written by academics as well as practitioners. 
* The Internet, in order to source other books and articles, official publications, current 
publications and books on related topics. 
From the careful review we gained a 'rich' picture and composed a postal questionnaire, 
carefully formed and applied for internal auditors. Then we selected 120 European 
Union companies merged in the period 0 1/0 1/2000-31/12/2003 and sent it to the Chief 
Audit Executives of the bidder companies. This questionnaire was accompanied by an 
explanation letter and a follow up mail questionnaire was also sent after three weeks. 
The second stage included the descriptive data analysis of the returned questionnaires. 34 
out of 120 questionnaires were replied (28% response rate). This analysis helped us to 
explore current situation (level of involvement of internal auditors in various stages of 
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M&A projects) that was then linked and compared with the preferred (preferred level of 
internal audit involvement) and best practice (derived from the literature review) 
situation. 
In the third stage this comparison leaded to a number of gaps and a preliminary analysis 
and formulation of conclusions and assumptions for the internal audit role in the 
European Union mergers and acquisitions. 
In thefourth andfinal stage we conducted semi-structured interviews with ten internal 
audit managers and practitioners (with their organisations also experienced and 
participated in M&A projects) in order to validate previous preliminary results, gain 
understanding on the reasons for the gaps identified and useful conclusions derived at the 
previous stage. These key findings and analysis formulated the best practices model and 
the action plan and recommendations for a more effective internal audit contribution to 
M&A projects in the European Union area. 
1.7 Limitations of the study 
9 The literature review has revealed that mergers and acquisitions are an area with 
enormous research potential. Unfortunately, mainly due to time constraints this 
research cannot be stretched over an infinite period of time. 
* This research concentrates and the sample was selected from bidder organisations that 
pursued mergers and acquisitions and were based in the European Union area, apart 
from the ten new countries incorporated during the latest enlargement. Also, the 
researcher believes that this thesis can be a benchmark for academics as well as 
practitioners for future research in the area. 
eA further limitation is that, because of the nature of the European Union merged 
companies from all countries could not be included to the sample of the companies 
being researched. Thus, the researcher will include the European Union deals 
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completed or unconditional on the period 0 1/0 1/2000-31/12/2003 and will not include 
the ten new members of the European Union. 
* The issue of corporate divestments, although mentioned and analysed in the literature 
review, will not be included in this study. 
1.8 Summary 
This chapter tried to set the main issues and objectives that will be analyzed and explored 
in this research. Although M&A activity increases during the years and internal auditing 
has evolved from a "post-mortem" and "after the evenf' to a more consulting activity, 
evidence has showed that internal auditors are not quite involved through the M&A 
process. 
This research will try to highlight and explore, through a quantitative and qualitative 
methodology, current, preferred and normative situation setting also important issues 
such as gap identification and analysis, possible prerequisites and best practices valid for 
internal audit departments and practitioners. 
Apart from the limitations set at this chapter, this research has also as a primary objective 
valid and reliable descriptive and empirical data in order to improve general isabil ity of 
the main conclusions. 
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SUPPLEMENT OF CHAPTER 1 
Merger and acquisition terminology 
The term's mergers and acquisitions are frequently used but sometimes there are various 
types and distinctions between them. Below are the primary legal transactions utilized to 
bring two or more companies together (Weston et al, 2001): 
Merger 
- 
In a merger, two separate companies combine and only one survives. In other 
words, the merged firm goes out of existence, leaving its assets and liabilities to the 
acquiring company. The firm that is being acquired is often times called "target" 
company. 
Acquisition 
- 
Legal transactions by which all or part of the ownership or assets of a 
business are acquired through purchase or exchange. Acquisitions usually involve a 
transfer either of stock, assets, membership or other evidence of ownership. The term is 
used in a much broader sense in the bibliography but is broadly used to mean the 
purchase of assets or companies in the merger process. 
Consofidation 
-A consolidation is a combination of two or more firms in which an 
entirely new corporation is formed and all merging companies ceased to exist. Two 
similarly sized firms usually consolidate than merge. 
Leveraged Buyout (LBO) 
-A leveraged buyout is a type of acquisition that occurs 
when a group of investors, often led by the management of a company, borrows funds to 
purchase the company. The assets and future earnings of the company are used to secure 
the financing required to purchase the company. 
Joint Ventures 
- 
An operating joint venture may be defined as a separate entity 
(partnership or corporation) that has two or more companies as owners. The partners 
contribute capital to the joint venture in the form of cash, inventory, distribution 
networks, manufacturing processes, fixed assets or intellectual property such as 
technology patents and trademarks. 
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Spin-Off Divestiture 
-A spin off is the opposite of an acquisition. Accomplished 
voluntarily, a spin off is the sale or exchange of a division, subsidiary or other provider 
for various tactical reasons. An involuntary spin-off, called a divestiture, is sometimes 
required by a federal antitrust enforcement as a condition to clearance of a merger. 
Takeover 
- 
This term has been used almost synonymously with the terms merger and 
acquisition. It was used only when one company acquired control of another company, 
but its use has been broadened to include the acquisition of a company that will be 
operated as a subsidiary. 
Equity carve-out 
-A transaction in which a parent firm offers some of a subsidiary's 
common stock to the general public to bring in a cash infusion to the parent without loss 
of control. 
Tender Offers 
-A tender offer is a proposal by a corporation that is seeking controlling 
interest of another company to buy the stock of that company at a specified price from 
any stockholder who will submit, or "tender" shares. 
Often, economists and managers group mergers based on whether they take place at the 
same level of economic activity-exploration, production or manufacturing, distribution. 
The element of relatedness is also important in defining economic categories of mergers. 
Thus, we can group mergers on horizontal, vertical and conglomerate. 
Horizontal mergers 
A horizontal merger involves two firms that operate and compete in the same kind of 
business activity. Forming a larger firm may have the benefit of economies of scale. The 
argument that horizontal mergers occur to realize economies of scale cannot be sufficient 
to be a theory of horizontal mergers. 
Horizontal mergers are regulated by the government for possible negative effects on 
competition. They decrease the number of firms in an industry, possibly making it easier 
for the industry members to collude for monopoly profits. 
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Vertical mergers 
Vertical mergers occur between firms in different stages of production operation. It is in 
the oil industry, for example, that distinctions are made between exploration and 
production, refining and marketing. There are many reasons why firms might want to be 
vertically integrated. There are technological economies, elimination of the transaction 
costs, planning for inventory and production may be improved due to more efficient 
information flow within a single firm. 
The efficiency and affirmative rationale of vertical integration rests primarily on the 
costliness of market exchange and contracting. The argument, for instance, that 
uncertainty over input supply is avoided by backward integration reduces to the fact that 
long term contracts are difficult to write and execute. 
Conglomerate mergers 
Conglomerate mergers involve firms engaged in unrelated types of business activity. We 
can distinguish three types of conglomerate mergers, financial, managerial and 
concentric. This type of merger is not aim explicitly at shared resources, technologies or 
synergies but the focus is on how the acquired entity can enhance the overall stability and 
balance of the firm's total portfolio, in terms of better use and generation of resources. 
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Chapter 2: Literature 
Review 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter will mainly focus on the theoretical aspects and empirical evidence 
surrounding the whole issue of mergers and acquisitions. It will explain and document 
the various types of mergers and acquisitions and the empirical evidence provided from 
the literature review. 
The first part will focus on merger motives and prescriptions, providing a review on the 
various theories and the empirical evidence. 
The secondpart will mainly focus in the various types of mergers and acquisitions (e. g. 
corporate divestments and sell-off s, equity carve-out's, cross-border acquisitions), and 
will try to provide evidence based on research and literature about issues like valuation, 
bid process, shareholder wealth and perfonnance. 
The thirdpart will have an analysis of the different stages of a merger, like corporate and 
acquisition strategy, due diligence, post-acquisition integration and post-acquisition audit, 
providing also useful evidence about these stages and the linkages to the research. 
Finally, the last two parts will contain the regulatory framework in Europe, U. S. and U. K. 
and the internal audit role during the various stages of mergers and acquisitions. This 
analysis and the literature review will lead to the research questions and research 
hypotheses presented at the next chapter. 
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2.2 Merger motives and prescriptions 
The wave of mergers and reverse mergers during recent years has drawn widespread 
attention, but most of the academic and public discussion has been devoted to the 
mergers' consequences. The motives behind these mergers have received only modest 
attention although they ultimately decide whether a merger is attempted or not. 
Most observers agree that mergers are driven by a complex pattern of motives, and that 
no single approach can render a full account (e. g. Ravenscraft and Scherer, 1987; 
Steiner, 1975). Merger motives have triggered far less theoretical efforts than merger 
consequences. At the most general level, those motive theories that regard merger 
consequences as the moving cause behind mergers can distinguish from those that do not. 
Mergers motives can be distinguished as follows (Trautwein, 1990): 
Efficiency theory 
This theory views mergers as being planned and executed to achieve synergies, in general 
three types of synergies can be distinguished. 
1. Financial synergies result in lower costs of capital. One way to achieve this is by 
lowering the systematic risk of a company's investment portfolio by investing in 
unrelated businesses. Another way is increasing the company's size, which may give 
it access to cheaper capital and a third way is establishing an internal capital market. 
2. Operational synergies can stem from combining operations, for example a joint sales 
force, or from knowledge transfers (Porter, 1985). 
3. Managerial synergies are realised when the bidder's managers possess superior 
planning and monitoring abilities that benefit the target's performance. The positive 
motivation effects ascribed to leveraged buyouts (Jensen and Murphy, 1988). 
Monopoly theory 
This theory views mergers as being planned and executed to achieve market power. 
From this point of view the company could act as following: 
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1. The firm can cross-subsidise products. Profits from the position in one market are 
used, for example, to sustain a fight for market share in another market. 
2. The firm can aim at simultaneously limiting competition in more than one market. 
Edwards (1955) developed this theory of mutual forbearance. A practical example is 
building a foothold in a competitor's main market who in turn posses such a foothold 
position in the firm's main market (Porter, 1985). 
3. The firm can aim at deterring potential entrants from its markets. 
These kinds of advantages have been referred to as collusive synergies (Chatterjee, 1986) 
or competitor interrelationships (Porter, 1985). Collusive synergies represent no 
efficiency gains but wealth transfers from the firm's customers. The efficiency gains 
sometimes accruing to monopolistic competition do not occur in non horizontal mergers 
(Scherer, 1980). 
Valuation theory 
This approach argues that mergers are planned and executed by managers who have 
better information about the target's value than the stock market (Steiner, 1975; 
Holderness and Sheenan, 1985). Bidders' managers may have unique information about 
possible advantages to be derived from combining the target's businesses with their own. 
The difference between the valuation theory and other merger explanations is its 
recognition of the role which genuine uncertainty plays in strategic decisions such as 
mergers. Capital market participants cannot fully evaluate the information on which a 
bid is based. 
Empire-building theory 
According to this theory, mergers are planned and executed by managers who thereby 
maximise their own utility instead of their shareholders' value. This approach has its 
roots in the studies of separation of ownership and control in a corporation (Berle and 
Means, 1933). Its underlying idea was contained in various managerial theories of the 
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firm (Baumol, 1959; Marris, 1964) and recently Rhoades (1983) and Black (1989) have 
developed related merger explanations. 
An empire-building argument is not necessarily confined to the motive of growth 
maximisation. This is shown by Rhoades' (1983) analysis of the merger wave of the 
1960s. Another recent development in this field is Black's (1989) overpayment 
hypothesis. Black postulates that managers overpay for targets because they are overly 
optimistic and because their interests diverge from those of their stockholders. In sum, 
the empire-building theory has to be given the most credit of the theories, because is a 
common name for a variety of merger explanations and the evidence collected until today 
is relatively limited. 
Process theory 
A fifth developed theory of merger motives has its background on the strategic decision 
process. This research has produced a vast amount of models that describe strategic 
decision not as rational choices but as outcomes of processes governed by one ore more 
influences. 
Duhaime and Schwenk (1985) discuss the influence of individuals' limited information 
processing capabilities on acquisition and divestment decisions. Roll (1986) works out 
the implications of managerial over optimism. In his hubris hypothesis managers' 
expectations are systematically erroneous with an upward bias since a stock's market 
price serves as a downside cut off point. Rational bidders would not make overly good 
expectations lead to bids that. demison and Silkin (1986) take an explicit acquisition 
process perspective and present a framework of four organisational. process impediments 
to successful acquisition integration. 
Raider theory 
This label can be applied to a sixth possible merger motive. Its basic hypothesis is 
implied in the term 'raider'. Holderness and Sheehan (1985) interpret the term as 
meaning a person who causes wealth transfers from the stockholders of the companies he 
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bids for. The problem with the raider theory is that the wealth transfer hypothesis is 
illogic. In a successful bid the 'raider' pays other stockholders a premium to become the 
controlling stockholder of the company. Any extortion scheme would hurt him 
disproportionately, while partially bought-out stockholders might still enjoy a net gain 
from his activities. 
Merger motives can be defined in terms of the acquirer's corporate and business strategy 
objectives. Strategies are formulated and acquisitions decisions are made by the 
management of the firms. Empirical evidence showed that often mergers that are 
motivated by managerial self-interest are not yield positive results. The causes of this 
failure cannot be unambiguously attributed to each of the theories analysed. But the 
previous analysis could give a first picture of what shareholders and management could 
expect from this decision. For this reason these theories of merger motives can prove 
often dangerous guides for the assessment of the performance of a future merger but, on 
the other hand, they can provide an effective and efficient language for communicating 
between the merged firms. The empirical evidence provided below can give us also a 
picture of the research effort in this area. 
Empirical evidence on acquisition motives 
Whether managers act in shareholders' or in their own interest, as well as some of the 
merger motives has been tested in a few studies. Meeks and "ittington (1975) found 
that, for a U. K. sample, sales growth is positively related to directors pay increases 
although such pay increases are also due to higher profitability. 
Firth (1991) also tests whether executive reward increases with acquisition for a sample 
of 254 U. K. takeover offers during 1974-1980. He finds that the acquisition process 
leads to an increase in managerial remuneration, and that this is predicated on the 
increased size of the acquirer. He concludes that the evidence is consistent with 
takeovers being motivated by managers wanting to maximise their own welfare. 
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A more recent study by Conyon and Clegg (1994) finds, for a sample of 170 U. K. firms 
between 1985 and 1990, that directors' pay is positively related to sales growth. Further 
expansion through takeovers increases such pay and the relationship between frequency 
of takeovers and pay is positive. 
From the empirical evidence we can conclude that merger can be motivated by 
managerial self interest. This is known also as the "agency problem". This means that 
manager's interests and motives may be, in some circumstances, different from those of 
the shareholder's. A number of control mechanisms exist to minimise the incidence and 
cost of the agency conflict to shareholders. They include controls such as shareholder- 
manager alignment devices, policing of managerial conduct and managerial 
compensation contracts. 
2.3 Different types of mergers and acquisitions 
2.3.1 Corporate divestments 
Although the field of mergers and acquisitions tends to focus on corporate expansion, 
companies often have to contract and downsize their operations. The restructuring of 
business firms stems from a number of forces. One of the most basic is the need to meet 
global competition; another is the agency problem of conflict of interest between 
managers and shareholders or to move assets to owners who can utilise them more 
effectively. 
The most common methods of corporate restructuring include divestments, spin-offs and 
sell-off, equity carve-outs and management buyouts. This section describes the evolution 
of these new forms of corporate control transactions and is linked with the previous part 
of corporate diversification that is the opposite strategy for a company. It will describe 
the structure and characteristics of the different forms of corporate restructuring, discuss 
the rationale and motives and will provide evidence from the available literature on 
corporate restructuring and performance. 
Forms of corporate divestments 
Corporate divestments can be carried out in a variety of ways: 
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9 Sell-off. that is sale to another company. 
Spin-off or de-merger, where the divested part is floated on a stock exchange and the 
shares in that newly listed company is distributed to the shareholders of the parent. 
* Equity carve-out, in which a subsidiary is floated on a stock exchange, but the parent, 
retains the majority control. 
9 Management buyout (MBO), where the parent company sells a division or subsidiary 
to the incumbent management, or a private company, is bought by incumbent 
management. 
A major motivating factor for divestitures is the belief that reverse synergy may exist. 
Divestments, spin-offs, carve-outs and management buyouts are basically a downsizing 
of the parent firm. Several research studies have analysed the impact of divestments on 
the various aspects of a company. Empirical evidence on this impact for these different 
forms of corporate restructuring is as follows: 
Divestments 
Areas of research on the issue of corporate divestments can be mainly summarised in two. 
categories, impact on shareholder wealth as well as company performance and 
managerial motives behind the divestment. 
Afshar et aL (1992) examined the stock market reaction to corporate divestments by a 
large sample of UK companies and investigated some of the specific factors. They tested 
the hypothesis that divestment is means of avoiding bankruptcy. This paper summarises 
various theories of value creation through divestments and investigates the impact of the 
transactional details of divestment announcements on stock reaction. 
John and Ofek (Jan 1995) found that asset sales lead to an improvement in the operating 
performance of the seller's remaining assets in each of the three years following the asset 
sale and that the improvement in operating performance is positively related to the 
seller's stock return at divestiture announcement. 
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Kaiser and Stouraitis (June 1995) presents preliminary evidence on stock market reaction 
to divestiture announcements by European firms from Germany, Sweden, France and the 
UK. The main results indicated that stock price reaction is positive and continues for 60 
days, depends on whether domestic subsidiaries (positive effect) or foreign subsidiaries 
(neutral effect) are sold and relative size of the divested unit explains a considerable part 
of the variation in stock-price effects. 
Weisbach (1995) examined the relation between management turnover and divestitures of 
recently acquired divisions. Results indicated that at the time of a management change, 
there is an increased probability of divesting an acquisition at a loss or considered 
unprofitable by the press and suggested that management changes are important events 
that reverse poor prior investment decisions. 
Spin-offs and sell-offs 
Habib et al. (1997) offer an information based explanation for spin-offs. They provide a 
theoretical rationale for spin-off decisions in terms of information leading to higher 
valuation. They explain that when the various divisions of a firm are spun off into 
several firms that have separate stock market listings, the number of traded securities 
increases. 
Ravenscraft and Scherer (1991), for a sample of about 450 companies estimated a hazard 
function to determine the environmental and organisational. factors precipitating the sell- 
off of divisional units. The results indicated that sell-off is more probable under some 
circumstances like change of Chief Executive Officer; acquisition of the unit in a 
conglomerate acquisition previously or lower profitability. Also, the buyers of the sold- 
off units tended to improve their profit performance but not enough to realise a normal 
return on their investments. 
Daley et al. (Aug 1997), test a prediction from the corporate focus literature, mention that 
cross industry spin-offs create more value than own industry spin-offs. The results 
indicate significant value creation around announcements of cross industry spin-offs 
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only. Also, there is significant improvement in operating performance for cross industry 
spin-offs and none for own industry cases. 
Cusatis et al. (June 1993) investigated the value created through spin-offs over the period 
1965 
- 
1988 by measuring the stock returns of spin-offs, their parent firms and parent 
spin-off combinations for periods of up to three years following the event of spin-offs. 
Both the spin-offs and their parents experience unusually high incidence of takeovers and 
the abnormal performance are limited to firms involved in takeover activity. These 
findings suggest that spin-offs provide a low cost method of transferring control of 
corporate assets to bidders who will create greater value. 
Equity carve-outs 
Allen (1998) examined the innovative corporate structure of Thermo Electron 
Corporation that holds controlling interests in II units taken public in equity carve-outs. 
The results indicated that Thermo Electron, a rather poorly performing firm from its 
inception in the late 1950's to the first carve-out in 1983, has transformed into an 
organisation that is proficient in utilising capital markets and sustain growth over time. 
Also, provides interesting insights into the relation between equity carve-outs and value 
creation and into the organisational changes that establish or strengthen this link. 
Klein et al. (Dec 1991) provide also evidence that an equity carve-out is usually the first 
stage of a two-stage process either to dispose of parent interest in a subsidiary or 
eventually re-acquire the subsidiary's publicly traded shares. The results indicate that 
both the initial carve out announcement and subsequent sell-off announcement yield, on 
average, significantly positive abnormal returns to parent shareholders. 
Anslinger et aL (November 1997) examined, from a sample of 119 U. S. parents carrying 
out equity carve-outs, their performance as well as that of their subsidiaries and also four 
out of five sample firm executives were interviewed. Results suggested that equity carve- 
outs are an effective way for companies to exploit growth opportunities and increase 
shareholder value. This result appears to lie in the changed relationship between the 
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corporate centre and the business unit, and the effect this has in three important areas, 
corporate governance, human resources and finance. 
Management buyouts (MBO) 
Perforinance of MBO's may be assessed over the short and the long term. Wright and 
Coyne (1985) found from a study of III NIBO's up to 1983 that they showed 
improvement in profitability, trading relations, and cash and credit control systems. Also, 
Yhompson et aL (1989) studied 182 NIBO's over 1983-1986 period and found support for 
the above results. Over the long term, a study by Houlden (1990) found that, in terms of 
return on capital and return on sales over the first three years after the MBO, company 
performance improved but over the following three years it declined. 
Note that the first U. K. management buyout was a defensive measure. In 1985, Philip 
Ling led a L56m buyout of the engineering group Haden. The takeover code requires 
independent advisers to be appointed as soon as possible, independent directors and 
advisers be provided with all information available to the management's financial 
backers and also deems that a director with any envisaged post buyout role has a conflict 
of interest and should not express an opinion on the bid (Financial Times, 9 May 2003). 
This part has provided an analysis of corporate divestments and their different forms such 
as spin-offs, sell-offs, equity carve-outs etc. Divestments are an increasingly 
international phenomenon and are also a rebound to the poor performance of 
conglomeration which happened on a large scale on the 1960s and 1970s. As analysed in 
the literature review, in general, restructuring and divestment announcements have a 
positive effect on the stock market and overall performance of the divested parts often 
improves. 
The role of internal auditors can prove quite important in the different forms of 
divestment in evaluation and assessment of the business risk and the perspective of the 
divestiture decisions. Selim et aL (2002), in an international study, pointed out that 
divestitures present different and overlapping challenges. While divestments do not 
32 
provide solution to integration problem, they need to be evaluated from the firm's 
strategic perspective and valued carefully. In this research it was also indicated that 
internal audit has no role during strategic and specific divestiture planning and the nature 
of involvement is limited to the deal structuring and negotiation. 
Also, and because of the low level of divestiture activities and involvement during the 
stages of a divestment, we cannot have a 'rich' picture about the preferred role of internal 
auditors during divestment activity. Internal audit function can prove quite helpful in 
evaluating the merits of the divestiture alternatives such as equity carve-out; spin-off etc. 
and can also provide assurance the systems and procedures during the sale of a business 
unit and the conduction of deal negotiations. 
2.3.2 Cross-border acquisitions 
In recent years the number of acquisitions made by companies in foreign countries has 
increased substantially. Such trans-national or cross-border acquisitions have been 
motivated by a variety of strategic considerations. The approach to cross-border 
acquisitions is not a straightforward extension of the approach to domestic acquisitions. 
Cross-border acquisitions are much more complex due to differences in political and 
economic environment, corporate organisation, culture, tradition, regulatory framework 
and accounting rules between the countries of the acquirer and the target company. This 
part provides the motivation and barriers to cross-border acquisitions and also evidence 
on the success or failure of such transactions. 
There have been some cross-border mergers in the European Union on a regional basis. 
This has created groups such as Nordea in Scandinavia, Fortis in the Benelux countries 
and HVB in central Europe. Also, several large banks have snapped up much smaller 
ones in other European Union countries 
- 
as with Barclays / Zaragozano and HSBC's 
purchase of France's CCF. 
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Motivations behind cross-border acquisitions 
Companies undertake international acquisitions for a number of strategic or tactical 
reasons such as: 
" Growth orientation, to escape small home market. 
" Access to inputs or raw materials or access to cheap productive labour. 
" Diversify across products and markets and reduce earnings volatility. 
" Provide home country clients with service for their overseas subsidiaries. 
" Exploit temporary advantages like, for example, favourable exchange rate making 
foreign acquisition cheap. 
Barriers to cross-border acquisitions 
Cross-border acquisitions face a variety of obstacles in different countries (Sudarsanam, 
2003). Some of these barriers are: 
(a) Structural barriers 
Statutory: strong power for supervisory boards to block mergers, discriminatory tax 
laws against foreign acquirers. 
Regulatory: antitrust regulation, foreign investment review, and rules of professional 
bodies. 
Infrastructure: absence of acquisitions services, e. g. legal, accounting, investment 
banks, audit services. 
(b) Technical barriers 
Management: A two-tier board which cannot be removed or changed quickly, family- 
owned companies, powers to limit maximum voting rights and override shareholder's 
in company's interest. 
(c) Information barriers 
n Accounting: financial statements not available, poor quality of information, low 
compliance with international accounting rules. 
0 Shareholders: due to issue of bearer shares, shareholder structure not known. 
m Regulation: regulatory procedures not known or unpredictable. 
34 
(d) Culture and tradition 
m Attitude: possible dislike of hostile bids, xenophobia, unwillingness to disclose 
information, 'to sell is to admit failure' syndrome. 
m Value system: high premium on trust and confidence in negotiations rather than 
formal controls. 
Cross-border acquisitions face a variety of obstacles in different countries. For example, 
in Continental Europe, family control of companies can prove a quite difficult barrier for 
effective deals. Also, the importance of recognising issues such as the role of trade 
unions, different regulatory frameworks is great. These obstacles must be analyzed at the 
first stages of an M&A in order to avoid future problems during the integration process. 
Integrating a cross-border acquisition is generally more complex and often presents 
different forms of Problems. 
Kang (Dec 1993) examined a sample of 119 Japanese bidders and 102 targets during 
1975-1988 and a control sample of 119 U. S. bidders and 102 U. S. targets involved in 
domestic U. S. mergers during the same period. He also provided useful insights into the 
motivations for the wealth consequences of cross-border mergers. Results were 
consistent with the literature on foreign direct investment and the market for corporate 
control. Japanese mergers and acquisitions in the U. S. create statistically significant 
wealth gains for both Japanese bidders and U. S. targets. 
Datta and Pulia (1995) examined shareholder value creation in 112 large cross-border 
acquisitions undertaken by U. S. firms between 1978 and 1990. They empirically tested 
the impact of relatedness and cultural distance on such wealth effects. Findings suggest 
that cross-border acquisitions do not create value for acquiring firm shareholders and 
results also indicate that cultural fit has an important impact. 
Derwenter (March 1995) examined shareholder wealth gains from domestic and foreign 
takeover announcements in the U. S. chemical and retail industries. These data indicated 
that there is no significant difference in within industry mean takeover premia levels. 
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The results also indicated that the market's reaction to buyer nationality is closely tied to 
the transaction characteristics. 
Especially for European companies, KPMG Management Consulting (1999) conducted a 
survey about cross-border acquisitions and suggested that 'this decade has seen a rapid 
increase in mergers and acquisitions transactions and a view, gaining in strength, that 
they do not always deliver their promised deals' and 'the findings show that corporate 
and management cultures should he considered right at the outset'. 
Also Norburn and Scoenberg (1994), based on a sample of 70 U. K. companies acquiring 
in Continental Europe, discussed the types of cross-border acquisitions British companies 
make, the acquisition processes they adopt and the major areas of unforeseen difficulties. 
The key lessons are the need for specialised integration skills and the need to facilitate 
the transition from family to professional management. 
Finally McKinsey Consulting have examined the success of cross border acquisitions 
(Bleeke et aL 1993). They report from a sample of 28 foreign acquisition programmes by 
8 US, 9 Japanese and II European corporations that the overall success rate was 57 per 
cent which is much better than for purely domestic acquisitions. 
Cross-border mergers are subject to many of the same influences and motivations as 
domestic mergers. However, they also present unique threats and opportunities. When 
firms choose to merge internationally, it implies that they have concluded that this will 
result in lower costs or higher productivity than alternative contractual means of 
achieving international goals. Although the risks of operating in a foreign environment 
are greater, they can be reduced through carefully planning or by an incremental 
approach to entering the foreign market. Evidence provided above showed that cross- 
border mergers and acquisitions, unless they possess unique threats, have a positive effect 
on performance and on shareholder wealth. 
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This research is concentrated in the issue of cross-border acquisitions, limited its scope 
on the European Union area. Cross-border and international M&A projects possess 
further risks and set of difficulties. These are not only financial conventions and legal 
requirements but also differences on management style and corporate culture of the 
acquired firms. These risks and difficulties require a greater level of consideration and 
analysis. 
The researcher believes that cross-border M&A projects possess unique threats and thus 
need further consideration, although evidence proved that outcome and shareholder 
wealth is positive. 
2.4 Different stages in mergers and acquisitions 
2.4.1 Performance of mergers and acquisitions 
The rhetorical question 'Do mergers really work? ' and similar proclamations reflect the 
widespread perception that mergers are not successful and are often driven by irrational 
impulses. The outcome of acquisitions and mergers is of considerable interest to all the 
stakeholders in the merging firms. These include shareholders, managers, employees, the 
consumers and the wider community. 
Evidence assembled by several studies in the United States, United Kingdom and other 
countries points to a high rate of failure of mergers and acquisitions to create value for 
the shareholders of acquiring firms. Table 2.1 for the United States and Table 2.2 for the 
United Kingdom summarise the results of previous research and evidence, assessing the 
performance of acquirers in terms of shareholder value enhancement. 
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Table 2.1: Post-acquisition shareholder returns (%) in U. S. takeovers: Summary 
of empirical studies 
Returns to Returnsto Returns to 
target bidder acquirer 
Study (year) Type of offer shareholders shareholders shareholders during during in (years) after 
takeover bid takeover bid acquisition 
Jensen & Merger 20 0 
Ruback(1983) Tender 30 4 
Magenheim & Merger -OA -28 
Mueller (1988) Tender 1,4 9 
darell & Tender 29 1,0 
Poulsen (1989) 
Full sample 28 
-1,0 O'l Franks, Harris 
& Titman Contested 39 
-1,4 0,0 
(1991) Uncontested 25 
-0,9 0,3 
Loderer & Merger 0,0 
Martin (1992) Tender 0,0 
Agrawal, Jaffe 
& Mandelker Merger 
-103 
(1992) 
Loughran & Merger -16,0 
Vijh (1997) Tender 43,0 
Rao & Merger -4,0 
Vermaelen Tender 8,6 
Source: Selim et al, 2002 
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Table 2.2: Post-acquisition shareholder returns (%) in U. K. takeovers: 
Summary of empirical studies 
Returns to Returns to 
target bidder Returns to acquirer 
Study (year) shareholders shareholders shareholders in (years) 
during takeover during takeover after acquisition (%) 
bid (%) bid (%) 
Firth (1980) 28 
-63 0.0 
Franks & 22 0,0 
-12,6 Harris (1989) 
Limmack 31 
-0,2 -4,5 (1991) 
Sudarsanam et 29 
-4,0 
al. (1996) 
Gregory 
-0,5 -8,2 (1997) 
Higson & 38 0,4 
-1,1 Elliott (1998) 
Source: Selim et al, 2002 
We must note that wealth gains are measured by abnormal returns, i. e., returns in excess 
of an appropriate benchmark return. These tables provide clear evidence that 
shareholders of acquirers experience wealth losses on average, or at best, break even. On 
the other hand, shareholders of target companies are better off with abnormal returns in 
the order of 20% to over 43%. The poor wealth experience of acquirers is common to 
both the U. S. and the U. K. and is also fairly consistent across a range of models. Overall, 
mergers and acquisitions more often destroy, rather than enhance, value for the acquirer 
shareholders. 
However, one aspect of the post-acquisition performance is that there is some variation in 
acquirer and target shareholder wealth performance across merger types. Evidence 
presented above paints a rather unflattering picture of M&A's and raises important 
questions about the reasons for acquisition failure. This failure can arise at any stage of 
the acquisition process, which it will be divided for the purpose of this research in four 
stages 
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These stages are: 
" Corporate and acquisition strategy development 
" Deal structuring, due diligence and negotiation 
" Post-acquisition integration 
" Post-acquisition audit 
The following sections will cover these four stages and will summarize and present the 
empirical studies and the risks related to this process. 
2.4.2 Corporate and acquisition strategy development 
An acquisition is a means to an end, the end being the achievement of certain strategic 
objectives of the acquirer. These strategic objectives may be varied, including growth of 
the firm, gaining competitive advantage in existing product markets, market or product 
extension, or risk reduction. Like all other strategic decisions, acquisitions should satisfy 
the criterion of added value. 
Acquisitions need to be placed in the context of the firm's broader corporate and business 
strategy framework. Corporate strategy analysis has evolved in recent years through 
several paradigms-industries, structure driven strategy, and competition among strategic 
groups, competence or resource-based competition (7homas and Pollock, 1999). The 
evolution of business strategy has been driven more by the practical needs of business 
than by the development of theory. The emergence of corporate planning was associated 
with the problems faced by managers during the 1950's and 1960's in co-ordinating 
decisions and maintaining control in increasingly large and complex enterprises. 
Also, the primary emphasis of corporate planning during the 1960's and 1970's was on 
the diversification strategies through which large corporations pursued growth and 
security. Also, during the 1980's and 1990's, interest on the role of strategy in building 
competitive advantage resulted in a shift of interest toward the internal aspects of the 
firm. The main result of this evolution in business and corporate strategy is a bulk of 
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theories analysed. Under the industrial organisation model, companies choose cost 
leadership or product differentiation with narrow or broad segments (Porter, 1985). 
Under this model companies choose mergers and acquisitions strategy in order to gain 
market power, save cost, gain economies of scale and scope and finally gaining 
competitive advantage. 
On the other hand, in recent years, the resource-based view of competition has gained 
ground. During the 1990's, ideas concerning the role of a firm's resources and 
capabilities as the principal basis for its strategy and the primary source of profitability. 
Central to this resource-based view is the idea that the firm is essentially a pool of 
resources and capabilities, and that these resources and capabilities are the primary 
determinants of its strategy (Barney, 1991; Madhoney and Pandian, 1992; Peterlaf, 
1993; Collis and Montgomery, 1995). Using this view, mergers and acquisitions may be 
interpreted within the resource-based model as a search for partners with complementary 
resources and capabilities and also can explain different types of acquisitions such as 
related and unrelated. 
Evidence also showed that internal audit involvement in the strategy and strategic and 
acquisition planning is low. Selim et al (2002), in an international study, provide 
evidence that the actual participation of internal auditing during the strategic planning 
stage is quite low. Internal audit function appears to be quite uninvolved due to the fact 
that while internal auditors prefer to have a greater level of involvement during strategy 
development, management has the perception that it has the sole responsibility to develop 
and execute business strategic initiatives. 
But internal auditors can play a greater role in the strategic planning stage by making sure 
that there is a well defined and organised strategic planning process, advising on systems 
and processes that can mitigate acquisition risk and addressing the risk assessment 
process within the strategic planning process. One of the objectives of this research is to 
highlight the current and preferred level of involvement of the internal audit function in 
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the strategic planning stage in the European Union mergers and acquisitions and also 
provide useful evidence about the gaps between the current and the preferred situation. 
2.4.3 Valuation and due diligence process 
Valuation of the target and due diligence in an M&A project are an important part of the 
process of detennining the consideration to be offered to the target shareholders. The 
value that the bidder places on the target sets the maximum price that the bidder can 
afford to offer the target shareholders, as well as valuation of the totalitY of the 
incremental cash flows and earnings. 
Valuation of a target is based on expectations of both the magnitude and the timing of 
realization of the anticipated benefits. Where these benefits are difficult to forecast this 
process is not precise and exposes the bidder to valuation risk. The degree of this type of 
risk depends on the quality of information available to the bidder which also depends on 
the nature of the bid (friendly or hostile) and the time spent in preparing it. 
Companies, like people, are individuals. Each has a unique history, its own purpose and 
a place in the current economic picture. Companies and information differ and due 
diligence process can be one of the most useful stage of the merger process because the 
unique history of each company cannot establish a standard guideline. During due 
diligence stage, a general guideline can be comprised with the objective of compatibility 
with acquisition objectives, relevant facts and useful feedback about the company and the 
industry it represents can be summarized, financial data and a detailed review of the 
financial statements and human resource or cultural fit of the target company. 
Gates (1988) presents due diligence as one of the most important stages to get the most 
value from an acquisition and insists that due diligence can greatly reduce the risk of the 
deal and need to cover important aspects like marketing, financial information, business 
outlook etc. Also, Kaplan and Ruback (1995) compared different valuation models in a 
sample of 51 highly leveraged transactions completed between 1983 and 1989. This 
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study provides evidence that discounted cash flow methods gives reliable estimates of 
market value. 
Young and Sutcliffe (Aug 1990) suggest also that current high bid activity indicates that 
target companies may be undervalued. They examined the existence of value gaps by 
researching survey of stockbrokers' valuation and study of market values. They also 
found evidence that on average bidders overpay but many acquirers are expected by the 
stock market to create value. Also, negotiations and due diligence are conducted in an 
atmosphere where the bidder and the target may have private information that the other 
party does not have. Effective techniques developed for negotiations under such 
circumstances must be followed to avoid buying a "lemon" (Dierichx and Koza, 1991). 
It is also essential to suggest the role of advisers in the due diligence and deal structuring 
stage. A merger may involve the use of one or more advisers like merchant banks, 
lawyers, accountants, strategy consultants etc. The need for any of these advisers 
depends upon the extent of in-house expertise available to the company and the level of 
the complexity of the deal (Servaes et al, 1996). Also the large scope and complexity of 
current deals have made companies highly dependent on professional advice from 
investment banks further diminishing the clients' ability to judge or even question the 
investment banks Performance (Kosnik and Shapiro, 1997). 
A very important question for choosing an adviser to this stage would be what difference 
can make the choice of one adviser on the outcome or cost of a bid. Empirical evidence 
showed that bid period returns are highest when both bidder and target retain first tier 
banks and lowest when they both hire second tier banks (Sudarsanam and Salami, 1999). 
The internal auditor's role during mergers and acquisitions usually is associated with due 
diligence process (Trampe, 1998). Internal auditors can provide management with vital 
information about the value of the company being acquired, its financial condition, any 
weaknesses in its financing or internal controls as well as its history, customer base, 
property conditions and management practices. 
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An interesting case study of effective contribution of internal audit function during the 
due diligence stage is the case of Ameritech that was acquired by SBC Communications 
in October 1999 (Burke, 2000). The results of this involvement of internal auditing 
function during due diligence stage were as follows: 
" They got managements' attention in order to demonstrate that internal auditors had 
the necessary skills and competencies to add value to all M&A deals at Ameritech. 
" They identified several best practices and benchmarks used by world-class 
companies. 
" They performed due diligence internally and the result was to take advantage of the 
internal auditors' in depth knowledge of company operations and overall strategy. 
" Internal auditors' skill sets in areas such as interviewing, analysis and 
communications were also tapped. 
" Internal auditors' contributions resulted in reduced consulting fees, improved 
response time and knowledge retention throughout the company. 
Due diligence and internal auditing teams must therefore draw upon a wide range of 
competencies both from within the acquirer and from external sources. Internal audit 
function can contribute to the setting up of the due diligence team and to its functioning 
by identifying the areas that need focusing and by keeping the team to a more rounded 
and holistic, rather than a functional, view of the acquisition. 
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2.4.4 Post-acquisition integration 
Even though merger and acquisition activity is carefully designed to ensure a tight 
strategic fit between two companies, the task of integrating them remains difficult and 
may be getting even harder than in the past. A way of meeting the challenge is to treat 
the integration process as nothing less than a far-reaching change management initiative. 
The objectives of the merger integration process should be to uncover potential problems 
that could keep the combined organisation from running smoothly and to take actions that 
prevent these problems from even arising. An effective integration program requires the 
merging firms to identify the obvious trouble spots at the beginning and then surface and 
attack the 'hidden' problems that could touch off surprise disruptions after the deal is 
completed (Allier, 1997). Integration has the characteristics of a change management 
program and some concepts could prove useful and should be applied to merger 
integration (Galpin and Robinson, 1997). The ability of the organisation to change fast 
and adjust to the new situation, a clear and well defined leadership alongside with clear 
and excessive communication channels and focused initiatives can prove important for 
the success of a post-acquisition integration stage. 
One of the major problem areas during this stage is the integration of the merging firm's 
information systems and it has to be considered at the specific acquisition stage itself 
(Buck-Lew et al, 1992). Evidence has suggested that poor post acquisition performance 
was due to the failure of organisations to consider fully the implications of merging 
together the harder information systems and technologies (McKierman and Merali, 
1995). Organisational culture compatibility must also be considered alongside 
information systems synergies (Weber and Pliskin, 1996). Hoffman (1997) also discusses 
the turbulence faced by Boeing after its acquisition with McDonnell Douglas in carrying 
out information systems integration. 
The level and extent of involvement of the internal audit function during the post- 
acquisition integration stage according to an international study (Selim et al, 2002) is 
high. Internal audit function can serve the organisation by loaning out staff to assist with 
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the integration, provide consulting services to aid the business functions integrate 
smoothly, review and monitor high, medium and tactical integration plans. Also one of 
the most useful things that internal audit can do in an acquisition situation is to conduct a 
ccurrent-state assessment' of the business processes of both the acquired and the 
acquiring company (Davison, 2001). Finally, in addition to all of the financial and 
physical integration plans, a separate human resources and cultural plan should also be 
developed. 
The merger of Nations Bank and Boatmen in 1997 provides a good example of how 
internal auditors can help operations running smoothly during a merger and minimise the 
acquirer's financial loss due to customer defection or employee turnover (Trampe, 1998). 
Nations Bank's internal auditors' contribution had as a result: 
* Reduced consulting fees because Nations Bank's internal auditors had many of the 
same skills as consultants. 
9 Reduced external audit fees because with proper communication, coordination and 
planning internal auditors were able to do much of the external auditors work. 
Reduced internal and external fraud by monitor exceptions and trends to identify 
potential fraud. 
9 Enhanced customer retention as a result of their knowledge of the bank's transactions 
flow and their affection to the customers. 
* Assist transition teams and line of businesses managers in implementing internal 
controls and the internal control aspects of major changes resulting from the merger. 
From the above analysis and evidence it is obvious that internal auditors can play an 
important role and contribute effectively at the post-acquisition stage. This research will 
try to highlight internal audit's contribution to the European Union mergers and 
acquisitions and discover the gaps between current and preferred situation. Effective 
post-acquisition integration can help the company to overcome smoothly this stage and 
proceed to the final, post-acquisition audit, stage. 
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2.4.5 Post-acquisition audit 
Post-acquisition management has been called 'a most important, albeit, difficult task 
(Jones, 1982). The key to success is to implement effective control while at the same 
time motivating management to maximise performance. At the post-acquisition stages, 
the climate for achieving change can be difficult. It is vital that the new parent company 
moves quickly to control and monitor the activities of its subsidiary. 
An initial diagnosis of the subsidiary should address key areas of control and the internal 
audit team should be responsible and have the authority to require post acquisition audit 
on controls through systems (e. g. authorisation of payments, management information), 
controls through structures and controls through people (e. g. create loyalty to the parent 
company, motivate for maximum performance (Cook, 1993): 
But the stage of post-acquisition audit may often be neglected for several reasons (Selim 
et al, 2002), including: 
" Lack of organisational emphasis on learning. 
" Each deal considered so unique that past experience of mergers is deemed irrelevant. 
e Lack of a centralised and ongoing function that is responsible for achieving the past 
and diffusion of learning. 
4o Past learning not codified but resides in individuals' experience with those 
individuals being co-opted into deal making teams when necessary. 
Individuals' past experience is not systematically communicated but spread 
haphazardly through anecdotes and folklore within the organisation. 
* 'The trail gone cold' 
- 
difficult to trace the acquired or merged firm since it is now 
part of a larger strategic business unit or subsidiary so lessons cannot be learned. 
Post-merger audit by internal auditors can be acquisition specific as well as being part of 
an annual internal audit plan that has a major role in ensuring organisational learning and 
its dissemination. The need for post-acquisition audit is primarily bounded by its 
objectives. It is expected to provide evidence on the possible synergistic benefits that 
could be in the form of operating efficiencies and economies of scale. Possible problems 
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could be the assessment of different management styles, the over-reliance to investment 
bankers or inadequate planning. 
The role of post-merger audit is essential in order to follow-up, identify problems at the 
integration stage and suggest solutions for post merger integration. These solutions can 
include effective change management, learning of how organisations respond to change 
and adjust the program of post-integration, maximise the return on effort by changing the 
procedures and processes that will produce the greatest results and finally certify that the 
M&A process operates in a controlled environment. 
2.5 Regulatory framework of mergers and acquisitions 
The antitrust laws protect competition as a means to promote efficiency and thereby 
enhance consumer welfare. They condemn mergers that will enable the merged firm to 
restrict output and raise prices, because such mergers reduce efficiency, making life 
easier for the merged firm and its rivals. In this part, we will describe the institutional 
arrangements behind the regulatory frameworks in the United States, United Kingdom 
and the European Union, in order to present and compare regulations and laws in the 
countries that represent major M&A volume (in terms of deal value and size) and we will 
also provide the criteria and procedures for mergers and acquisitions in these areas. 
2.5.1 Antitrust regulation in the United States 
Among other countries, U. S. A. has the longest tradition of antitrust regulation, starting 
the Shen-nan Act of 1890. This Act declared contracts and combinations which restricted 
interstate trade or trade with other countries illegal, and any attempt at monopolizing this 
trade a criminal offence. The Sherman Act was not particularly suitable for the 
prevention of prospective mergers and acquisitions, especially in the form of acquisition 
of stock to gain control of companies. 
The Clayton Act 1914 was passed to overcome the shortcomings of the Sherman Act, and 
was subject to later amendments to make it a more effective mechanism for dealing with 
mergers. More specifically, Section 7 of the Clayton Act prohibits full or partial 
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acquisition by a commercial corporation of the stock or assets of another engaged in 
commerce in the country, if the effect of such an acquisition may be substantially to 
lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly. 
The Federal Department of Justice (DOJ) enforces the various statutory rules as well as 
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). Both agencies investigate and, if necessary, 
initiate proceedings in federal courts. The FTC also has various appeal procedures 
involving the administrative law courts and the independent FTC commissioners. 
We must also notice that, in addition to the above federal regulation, individual states 
have their own antitrust laws applying to mergers that would not affect interstate trade. 
Affected parties can bring or join proceedings under both federal and state laws. This 
contrasts with the European Union and the United Kingdom position, which we will 
analyse subsequently, where affected parties cannot bring a legal action to force the 
European Commission or the Office of Fair Trading (OFT) to investigate a merger. 
2.5.2 Merger control in the U. K. 
In the United Kingdom mergers have been the subject of antitrust regulation since 1965, 
during which period the U. K. government's policy has gone through distinct phases. 
While the main thrust of the antitrust regulation has been the maintenance of effective 
competition, many other issues of public interest have been from time to time considered 
relevant in determining whether a merger should be allowed. In this part, we describe the 
functioning and record of the U. K. antitrust regulatory framework. 
In the United Kingdom, there is no obligation to notify a proposed or completed merger 
to the authorities. The general law of the UK regulating mergers is contained in the Fair 
Trading Act 1973 (FTA). Also, the Office of Fair Trading (OFT) carries out a 
preliminary investigation and then recommends to the Secretary of State whether or not 
the transaction should be referred to the Competition Commission for in depth review 
and monitors merger activity in the United Kingdom. 
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The Fair Trading Act merger provisions were replaced when the relevant provisions of 
the Enterprise Act 2002 entered into force during 2003. The Act is designed to update 
the UK merger control regime and the two main changes had as a target to: 
9 Minimise political involvement in merger decisions by transferring decision making 
power from the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry to the independent 
competition authorities (the OFT and the Competition Commission). 
* Focus the criteria for decision making on competition, by assessing most mergers 
against a substantial lessening of competition test rather than a public interest test. 
There are three principal authorities involved with the enforcement of the UK merger 
control rules (Enterprise Act, 2002): the Office of Fair Trading (OFT) headed by the 
Director General of Fair Trading; the Competition Commission; and the Secretary of 
State for Trade and Industry. The main tasks of these authorities are as follows: 
The OFT 
-it is a first stage filter for mergers that meet the jurisdictional 'qualifies for 
investigation' thresholds. Acting on the Director General's advice, the Secretary of 
States, decides whether or not a transaction raises sufficient competition concerns as 
to merit fuller investigation by the Competition Commission. The OFT is under a 
duty to keep itself informed of actual or prospective mergers that qualify for 
investigation. It does this, by reviewing press reports and monitoring announcements 
made to the Stock Exchange. Also, the other major role of the OFT is to negotiate 
undertakings either to avoid a reference to the Competition Commission or following 
a Competition Commission investigation and adverse report, negotiating undertakings 
to remedy the adverse effects. 
Competition Commission 
- 
it is an independent body consisting of members drawn 
from industry, commerce and academic life. The Commission does not instigate the 
inquiries that it conducts. Cases are referred it for in depth review by the Secretary of 
State. These usually last 3-4 months following which a detailed report is presented to 
the Secretary of State. 
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e The Secretary of State 
- 
the Secretary of State plays the role of the decision. 
-maker 
deciding whether or not to refer a merger to the Competition Commission and 
following investigation on whether to block or clear the deal. However, decisions on 
merger cases will be taken by the independent authorities: i. e. the OFT at stage one 
and the Competition Commission following in depth review. 
Evidence attained from the stock market reaction to regulatory bodies' references, 
suggests that the average gain for target shareholders when the bids for their companies 
are cleared by the Monopolies and Mergers Commission is 38 per cent, over the period 
from twelve months before to one month after the report (Franks and Harris, 1993). 
Thus, most of the gains on bid announcements which are subsequently lost might have 
arisen from increased market Power of the merging firms. Forbes (1994) also found non- 
significant gains over the same periods for bidder shareholders, whose bids are stopped 
by the Monopolies and Merger Commission. Thus, Forbes' results are broadly in line 
with those of Franks and Harris (1993). 
2.5.3 European Union merger regulations 
Mergers of enterprises operating within the European Union are, since 1990, subject to 
European Union 
- 
level merger regulation. This regulation was promulgated with the aim 
of achieving the 'one-stop shop' clearance of mergers. This means that the merged 
companies deal with just one authority instead of review by various national authorities, 
which can lead to confusion and uncertainty. The result is that there is now a hierarchy 
of merger regulation in the European Union, with very large mergers having European 
Union-wide impact being examined within the European Commission (EC). Smaller 
mergers with their impact within a single member state are investigated by that state's 
own antitrust regulator. 
The Merger Regulation is the first Europe-wide merger control law and has been in force 
for more than 12 years and gave the European Commission the exclusive jurisdiction to 
examine large, cross-border mergers in Europe, within tight deadlines and to assess their 
impact on competition. The Merger Regulation plays an important role in guaranteeing 
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efficiency in production, in retaining the incentive for enterprises to innovate and in 
ensuring the optimal allocation of resources. 
The European Union competition rules are consisted from the Articles 81-88 at the new 
Treaty of the European Community. The basis for these anti-cartel rules is the Article 81 
and 82. According to Article 81, 'the following shall be prohibited as incompatible with 
the common market: all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of 
undertakings and concerted practices which may affect trade between Member States and 
which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition 
within the common market, and in particular those which (a) directly or indirectly fix 
purchase or selling prices or any other trading conditions, (b) limit or control Production, 
markets, technical development or investment, (c) share markets or sources of supply, (d) 
apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby 
placing them at a competitive advantage and (e) make the conclusion of contracts subject 
to acceptance by the other parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or 
according to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such contracts'. 
Article 82 concerns with anti-dominance rule. According to this article 'any abuse by 
one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the common market or in a 
substantial part of, it shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common market insofar 
as it may affect trade between Member States. Such abuse may consist in directly or 
indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices, limiting production or applying 
dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties and thereby 
placing them at a competitive advantage. 
On the other side there was much criticism summarized and presented thoroughly in the 
economic media (such as journals or magazines) about the regulatory framework from 
both European and U. S. companies (Financial Times, November 27h 2002). The 
opponents of the new rules insisted that though merger regulation would result in chaos 
for companies and headaches for their lawyers and some even wam that the new regime 
will make cartels harder to detect and punish. Critics also argued that this regime will 
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fragment antitrust enforcement, increasing costs and risks for companies. Also, as quoted 
by many American businessmen, Europe's commissioner for competition would provoke 
a trade war over merger policy and complained that the Commission sees markets in 
static and not dynamic terms (The Economist, Octoher 2e 2002). 
But on the other hand, after decades of failed attempts, the European Commission 
remains committed to the idea of a pan-European takeover directive. The Commission 
argues that more takeovers will lead to more restructuring and Europe will need more 
restructuring if it wants to catch up with, and overtake, the United States as set out in the 
Lisbon declaration (Berglof and Burkart, 2003). 
European merger control has played a key role in maintaining competitive structures in 
Europe and in fostering the creation of a single market. Despite the criticism, this is the 
long-term benefit of a vigorous competition policy, which is achieved not only through 
merger control, but also through the control of subsidies and the fight against cartels and 
monopolised sectors. 
2.5.4 Best practices on co-operation in merger investigations between European 
Union and United States 
in today's global economy, many sizeable transactions involving international businesses 
are subject to review by the European Union and United States. Where the United States 
and European Union are reviewing the same transaction, both jurisdictions have an 
interest in reaching, insofar as possible, consistent, or at least non-conflicting, outcomes. 
Possible divergent approaches to assessment of the likely impact on competition of the 
same transaction can undermine public confidence in the merger review process and may 
frustrate the agencies' objectives. This review can enhance the co-operation in merger 
review between the U. S. Department of Justice and the European Commission. 
Given legal constraints existing in both jurisdictions, effective inter-agency co-ordination 
between United States and the European Union depends to a considerable extent on the 
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co-operation and goodwill of the merging parties. In particular, co-operation is more 
complete and effective when (US- EUMerger Working Group, 2002): 
The merging parties allow the agencies to share information the disclosure of which 
is subject to confidentiality restrictions. 
The investigation timetables of the U. S. and E. U. run more or less in parallel so that 
the investigative staffs of each agency can engage with one another and with the 
parties on substantive issues at similar points in their investigations. 
9 At the start of any investigation, each agency should designate a contact person who 
will be responsible for setting up a schedule for conferences between the relevant 
investigative staff of each agency, discussing with the merging parties and co- 
ordinate information gathering or discovery efforts. 
Also, the U. S. competition authorities and the European Commission are in the process to 
introduce a series of co-operation procedures to smooth the process of merger 
investigations on both sides of the Atlantic. This cooperation will formalize several 
practices that already employed and will offer on merging companies the possibility of a 
meeting early on with both agencies to discuss timing and will allow the agencies to 
exchange information. 
Over the last several years, the European Commission have been making increasing use 
of the terms 'portfolio power', 'conglomerate effects' as theories of competitive harm in 
markets in which there is no direct overlap between the merging parties. These terms are 
used interchangeably to encompass a variety of different means by which a merger may 
allegedly create or strengthen a dominant position in non-overlap markets (United States 
Department of Justice, 2001). They used these theories to examine certain cases 
concerning American companies. These are: 
* Coca Cola / Carlsberg - the Commission argued that 'the inclusion of strong beer 
and packaged water brands, such as those of Carlsberg, in the beverage portfolio 
gives each of the brands in the portfolio grater market power than if they were sold on 
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a 'stand-alone' basis. The Commission also worried that economies of scale and 
scope were 'key competitive factors' in the carbonated soft drinks market and the 
newly merged firm would take advantage of these efficiencies. 
e General Electric / Honeywell- the case that has brought the most attention to 
portfolio effects is the Commission's recent decision blocking the merger of General 
Electric and Honeywell. In that decision the European Commission focused on the 
creation of opportunities for the merged firm to offer low Price bundles of aircraft 
engines and systems. Also, the leverage from General Electric of its existing 
dominance in aircraft engines into avionics and finally General Electric's aircraft 
leasing arm (GECAS) would buy only (or at least heavily favor) Honeywell products, 
which would help create a dominant position for the merged firm. The European 
Commission concluded that as a result of these actions, revenue streams for General 
electric and Honeywell competitors in engines and avionics / non-avionics systems 
markets would shrink in the event of a merger leading to a reduction in their future 
investment. 
However, on closer examination it is difficult to say so clearly that United States really 
has a significantly better regime. In the first place, despite rare cases such as General 
Electric / Honeywell analysed above, the European Union and United States have been 
converging on substantive merger issues over the last few years. Hence it is increasingly 
difficult to sustain the argument that the U. S. model on substance is better than the 
European Union model. On procedure, although the U. S. model formally gives greater 
protection to firms, it is far from clear that in reality it offers much more than the 
European Union system. Ideally, each system should learn off the other, so the European 
Union will strengthen judicial review, and United States speed up its administrative 
systems (Acquisitions Monthly, May 2003). 
2.5.5 Relationship of the U. K. and E. U. regulators 
In principle, mergers that fall within the scope of the European Commission Merger 
Regulation will not be subject to control under United Kingdom rules (or indeed, the 
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national rules of any other European Union Member State). Briefly, a merger will fall to 
be reviewed under the European Commission Merger regulation when it satisfies one of 
two alternative sets ofjurisdictional thresholds (OFT, Enterprise Act 2002): 
- 
Either the combined world-wide turnover of the merging parties exceeds 5 billion 
Euros and the combined European Union 
- 
wide turnover of each of at least two of the 
parties to the merger exceeds 250 million Euros unless each of the merging parties 
achieves more than two thirds of its aggregate Community-wide turnover within one and 
the same Member State 
- 
or the combined world-wide turnover of the merging parties exceeds 2,5 billion Euros 
and in each of at least three Member States the combined turnover of the merging 
parties is 100 million Euro and at least two parties to the merger each has a turnover of 
more than 25 million Euro and within the E. U. as a whole at least two parties to the 
merger each has a combined turnover of more than 100 million Euro. 
According to the latest Enterprise Act 2002 (Office of Fair Trade, Enterprise Act 2002), 
where a merger satisfies on of these two sets of jurisdictional thresholds, the merger 
must be notified to the European Commission. National merger control laws are 
expressly excluded from applying to mergers falling under the European Commission 
Merger Regulation. 
Finally, the Office of Fair Trading (OFT) is most likely to request that a case be referred 
back from the European Commission in when: (a) it concerns entirely or largely the 
United Kingdom or a market within the United Kingdom; (b) the OFT have the 
experience in reviewing the market or markets in question; and (c) where the assets 
concerned by the transaction are located in the United Kingdom so that if, ultimately, a 
remedy is required, it would be possible for the U. K. authorities to secure that remedy. 
Summary 
Regulatory framework plays a key role in maintaining competitive structures and in 
fostering the creation of consumers' welfare. This is the long-term benefit of a vigorous 
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competition policy and that is the objective of the regulatory and antitrust frameworks in 
United States, United Kingdom and the European Union. Apart from that, merging 
companies often cannot understand the legal risks and very often face regulatory 
obstacles to start the merger process. 
Internal audit role in this process could be useful and can help merged companies to 
manage better these legal risks. Research (McNamee and Selim, 1998) uncovered a 
significant and rapid change in internal auditing from a passive and reactive control- 
'based role to an active and anticipative risk-based role. This means that the role of 
internal auditors could be more active in this legal process. 
This brief description of the antitrust and merger control in United States and United 
Kingdom has been provided to illustrate the diversity of approaches to antitrust 
regulation. Table 2.3 provides a horizontal comparison of these three different regulatory 
frameworks. 
This part has provided an introduction to the rules and regulations governing mergers and 
acquisitions in United States, United Kingdom and the European Union, from the 
antitrust perspective. It has described the different regulatory frameworks in these three 
different areas and tries to provide evidence on the effect of these regulations to the 
merging companies. 
Many see merger activity as an expression of strong change forces. Through mergers and 
restructuring firms want to become more efficient and gain possible synergies and cost 
reductions. The role of antitrust regulation should not restrict these competitive forces. 
On the other hand a regulatory framework is essential in order to gain consumer welfare 
and control possible competition violation and cartel creation. 
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Table 2.3: Horizontal comparison of the regulatory frameworks on European 
Union, United States and United Kingdom 
ATES 
One 
- 
stop shop 
clearance of 
mergers: 
Very large mergers 
having E. U wide 
impact are examined 
by the European 
Commission and 
smaller mergers 
within a single 
member state are 
investigated by that 
state's antitrust 
regulator 
Formal guidelines for No formal guidelines 
the asses 
ý 
for the assessment of 
mergers 
Individual states have 
their own antitrust 
laws 
Dual regime 
- 
Federal and State 
laws 
4#ýcledparties 
cannot bring a legal 
action toforce the 
European 
Commission to 
cancel the decision 
made 
mergers 
4#ýcledparlies 
cannot bring a legal 
action to. force the 
. 
fice of Fair Q/ 
Trading to cancel 
the decision made 
There is no 
obligation to notify 
a proposed or 
completed merger 
to the authorities. 
The Qffice of Fair 
Trading carries out 
the preliminary 
investigation and 
then recommends to 
the Secretary of 
State whether or not 
the transaction 
should be referred 
to the Competition 
Commission 
Noformal 
guidelinesfor the 
assessment of 
Office of Fair 
Trading, 
Competition 
Commission and 
Secretary of State 
for Trade and 
Regulatory 
body 
Historical 
evolution 
Federal Deparlment 
oj'Juslice and 
Federal Trade 
Commission 
Sherman Act 
1890 
Clayton Act 
1914 
Dept of 
Justice 
rules 
European 
Commission 
- 
Merger 
control 
regulation 
(1990) 
- 
Fair Trading Act 
(1973) 
- 
Enterprise Act 
(2002) 
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2.6 The internal audit role during mergers and acquisitions 
2.6.1 The evolution of internal auditing profession 
Internal auditing profession has changed dramatically during the last six decades. During 
that period the profession's narrow scope of measuring and evaluating the effectiveness 
was expanded to a much broader spectrum of activities. Internal auditing has evolved 
from an essentially accounting oriented craft to a management oriented profession. At 
one time, internal auditing functioned as an assistant to the independent accounting 
profession and attesting to the accuracy of financial matters. Now, internal auditing has 
established itself as a distinctive discipline with a far broader focus. This can be obvious 
from the evolution of definitions of the internal auditing profession. 
According to the definition that was introduced in the Standards for the Professional 
Practice of Internal Auditing (1978) "Internal auditing is an independent appraisal 
function established within an organization to examine and evaluate its activities as a 
service to the organization". Thus, the main objective of internal auditing function was to 
assist members of the organization in the effective discharge of their responsibilities and 
provided useful feedback such as appraisals, recommendations, counsel, and information 
concerning the activities reviewed. 
In 1999, the Institute of Internal Auditors Board of Directors approved the new definition 
that determined "Internal auditing as an independent, objective assurance and consulting 
activity designed to add value and improve an organization's operations. It helps an 
organization accomplish its objectives by bringing a systematic, disciplined approach to 
evaluate and improve the effectiveness of risk management, control and governance 
processes (Institute ofInternal Auditors, 1999). 
Traditional internal auditing has focused on control and operations. However, integrated 
management control frameworks such as COSO and CoCo have more closely aligned an 
organization's control activities with broad organizational objectives and the risk of not 
achieving these objectives. More specifically, COSO framework was introduced by The 
Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission. Its focus was on 
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the achievement of certain objectives (effectiveness and efficiency of operations, 
reliability of financial reporting and compliance with applicable laws and regulations) 
and five inter-related components of control: control environment, risk assessment, 
control activities, information & communication and monitoring (Committee of 
Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission, 1994). 
On the other hand, the Canadian Criteria of Control Committee sponsored by the 
Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants include twenty criteria of control (in terms 
of purpose, commitment, capability, monitoring and leaming) and defines internal 
controls as the elements of an organization that support people in the achievement of the 
organization's objectives. These objectives can fall in one or more of the following 
categories: effectiveness and efficiency of operations, reliability of internal and external 
reporting and compliance with applicable laws, regulations and internal policies 
(Sawyer's, 2003). 
Accordingly, the new definition recognizes that controls exist to assist the organization in 
managing its risk and to promote effective governance processes. The risk framework 
drives the determination of assurance and consultative projects that should be performed 
to add value to the organization (Krogstad et al, 1999). Modem internal auditing 
provides services that include the examination and appraisal of controls, performance, 
risk and governance. Once perceived as the client's adversary, internal auditors now 
pursue cooperative, productive working relationships with clients through value-added 
activities. 
Internal auditing profession began to evolve in 1941 when the Institute of Internal 
Auditors was formed. It has passed through two dominant paradigms and is poised on 
the edge of a third. The first internal auditing paradigm focused on observing and 
counting. Then, Victor Brink introduced the concept of a system of internal controls and 
changed the paradigm from a focus on re-performance to a focus on controls. The third 
paradigm is based on viewing the business process through a focus on risk (McNamee 
and Selim, 1999). 
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Also, Page and Spira (2004) discuss that the perception of internal auditors as mindless 
box-tickers checking compliance with centrally imposed systems is long out of date but, 
on the other hand, they suggest that not all internal auditors become risk management 
professionals whose role is to identify, assess and mitigate the business risks faced by 
their organisations. The following table illustrates the differences between the two 
paradigms: 
Table 2.4: Comparison of old and new paradigms of internal auditing profession 
CLURACTERISTIC OLD PARADIGMS NEWPAIRADIGM 
Internal Audit Focus Internal Control Business Risk 
Internal Audit Response Reactive, after-the-fact 
Coactive. Continuous 
monitoring 
Internal Audit Tests Important Controls Important Risks 
Emphasis on the Emphasis on the significance Internal Audit Methods completeness of detailed of broad business risks 
control testing covered 
Internal Audit Role in the Independent Appraisal Integrated Risk Management 
Organization Function and Corporate Governance 
Two major regulatory frameworks had also "boost" the integrated role of internal audit 
function. Combined Code (Financial Services Authority, July 2003), introduced in the 
UK by Financial Services Authority and replaced the Combined Code issued by the 
Hampel Committee on Corporate Governance in June 1998. In 2006, Combined Code has 
been updated, applied for reporting years beginning on or after July 2006. The Code 
contains main and supporting principles and provisions concerning companies and 
institutional shareholders as well as guidance on internal controls (Turnbull Guidance) 
and on audit committees (Smith Guidance). 
61 
On the other hand, in the United States, Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
introduced Sarbanes-Oxley Act in July 2002 largely in response to major corporate and 
accounting scandals involving several prominent companies. Section 404 of the Act 
requires management assessment of internal controls requires most publicly registered 
companies and their external auditors to report on the effectiveness of the company's 
internal control over financial reporting. 
internal auditing is a dynamic profession that has evolved in response to changes 
occurring within it and in the organizations it serves. The new definition was one more 
important step in this process. However, as the pace of change accelerates, internal 
auditing must visualize and seize new opportunities to meet organizational needs. On the 
other hand, mergers and acquisitions are a very complex process that includes risks and 
opportunities and the new roles for internal auditors could broaden the profession's self 
image and encourage its full participation in the process. 
2.6.2 The business risk of M&A activity 
Evidence assembled by several studies in the United States, United Kingdom and other 
countries points to a high rate of failure of mergers and acquisitions to create value for 
the company and the shareholders. Briefly, the reasons for this trend can be summarized 
as follows (Jensen & Ruback, 1983; Aggrawal et al, 1992; Loughran & Vuh, 1997; Rao 
& Vermaelen, 1998): 
Cultural differences (Darnell D. C. 1999; Zaheer et al, 2003) 
A weak core business of the acquirer (Very, 1993) 
Overly optimistic appraisal of market potential (Diericx and Koza, Sept. 1991) 
Overestimation of synergies (Clarke and Breman, April 1990) 
Poor technology assessment (Singh, 1995; Johnson, June 1989) 
Inadequate due diligence (Gates, NovIDec 1988) 
Clashing management styles and egos (Datta, May 1991; Lane et al, June 1998; 
Weisbach, 1995) 
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9 Overbidding (Choi and Lee, 1996; Franks et al, 1988: Eccles et al, AIIA ug 1999) 
* Poor post-merger integration (Galpin, JanlFeb 1997: Allier, JanlFeb 1997) 
Risk is present in all companies and it can occur in most business processes, financial or 
non-financial. In the case of mergers and acquisitions some of the risks that can be 
associated are surnmarised in the following table (Davison, 2001): 
Table 2.5: Risks associated with M&A activity 
Poor sales Market share 
Loss of 
Market risks Projections shrinking market Interest rates go up 
share 
Incompatible 
Technology Software 
systems hard 
Data Data integrity 
risks licences and software security 
Human Culture Benefits1pay Trade 
. 
Job security 
resources risks differences scales uni ons 
Internal control No policiesl 
Inadequate Incompatibility of 
risks 
No controls procedures segregation 
internal control 
duties structure 
Financial risks Overbidding 
Accounting Unrecorded Overvalued assets irregularities liabilities 
Product Antitrust Environment Patentsl copyrightsl Legal risks liability concerns al concerns trademarks 
Corporate Brand image Hostile M&A Potential Unhealthy products 
image risks process layoffs 
Corporate Cultures not 
Perception Retention of key Culture risks culture compatible of quality personnel production 
Lack of 
History of Heavily 
Regulatory familiarity in regulatory regulated Acquiring a public 
risks industry non- target or company 
I I coTpliance acquirer 
Source: Davison, 2001 
The value of internal audit comes in the objective assurance and advice that it provides to 
boards, on the effectiveness of both the risk management processes and the ways in 
which risks are managed and controlled. Establishing and embedding effective risk 
management processes is of fundamental importance to all companies. Internal audit has 
a major role to play in an organisation's risk management control and governance 
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processes. The new Standards for the Professional Practice of Internal Auditing 
emphasises adopting a clearer risk based approach to internal auditing. This links also 
with the current definition of internal auditing (Institute of Internal Auditors, 1999) as an 
independent and objective assurance and consulting activity. 
According to the Institute of Internal Auditors 
- 
United Kingdom and Ireland (Position 
Statement on Risk Based Internal Auditing, M-UK), risk based internal auditing starts 
with the organisation's business objectives and then focuses on the risks that have been 
identified by management. The role of internal audit under this approach is to review the 
risk management processes (as opposed to purely internal controls) that are in place to 
reduce these risks to a level that is acceptable to the board (the risk appetite). 
The management of a company has operational responsibility for the management of risk, 
whilst the role of the Board is to ensure that risk management processes arc in place, as 
well as obtaining assurances from management, internal audit and others that the 
processes are adequate and effective. Risk management is about identifying and 
assessing key risks and also designing and implementing processes by which those risks 
can be managed to, and maintained at, a level acceptable to the board. 
Risk-based internal auditing refers to a means of assessing how well an organization 
identifies and manages the major threats to the achievement of its key objectives. Such 
an approach enables internal audit to provide assurance to the board and the audit 
committee of an organization, at least annually, that there is an effective overall process 
to identify and manage the key risks. We must note that careful consideration should be 
given as to how gain the necessary knowledge and skills in order to undertake this type 
of internal auditing and also requires a good understanding of risk management 
processes, tools and techniques at the same time as relying on the basic internal auditing 
skills of communication, interviewing and objective analysis. 
Another important issue of risk-based philosophy is the new Enterprise Risk 
Management Framework initiated by the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations 
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(COSQ) in order to develop a conceptually sound framework providing integrated 
principles and common terminology. The underlying premise of enterprise risk 
management is that every entity exists to provide value for its stakeholders and face 
uncertainties and risks in order to meet its objectives. On the other hand, management 
has to determine how much uncertainty the entity is prepared to accept as to strives to 
grow stakeholder value. 
Internal auditors play a key role in evaluating the effectiveness and recommending 
improvements to enterprise risk management process. The scope of internal auditing 
should encompass risk management and control systems and this includes evaluation of 
reporting reliability, review of the effectiveness and efficiency of operations and 
compliance with established laws and regulations. The internal audit function does not 
have primary responsibility for establishing or maintaining enterprise risk management, 
but internal auditors should assist both management and the audit committee by 
monitoring, examining, evaluating, reporting and recommending improvements to the 
adequacy and effectiveness of management's enterprise risk management process. 
Briefly, we can note that risk-based internal auditing provides independent assurance to 
the board that the risk management processes within the organization (covering all risk 
management processes at, for example, corporate, divisional, business unit, business 
process level) are operating as intended and also the responses which management has 
made to risks are both adequate and effective in reducing those risks to a level acceptable 
to the board. The scope of risk-based internal auditing covers business risks relating to 
all business activities and the key starting point are to determine that appropriate 
objectives have been set by the organization. This approach is presented in the following 
diagram: 
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Figure 2.1: Risk-based internal auditing 
Mergers and acquisitions encompass a number of risks causing the firm to miss its 
strategic, organisational and financial objectives. As a period of fundamental changes and 
destabilisation, these risks arise throughout all the stages of mergers and acquisitions. 
Figure 2.2 illustrate these sources of risks at the different stages of mergers and 
acquisitions projects. 
Figure 2.2: Sources of risks in mergers and acquisitions: General overview 
Corporate &Acquisition ', 
Strategy Development 
Table 2.6 
SOURCES OF RISKS 
IN M&A PROJECTS 
Table 2.5 
Post 
- 
Acquisition 
Integration 
Table 2.8 
Due Diligence 
Table 2.7 
Post 
-Acquisition 
Table 2.9 
67 
Table 2.6 Examples of possible risks in corporate and strategy planning 
Are the sources of the firm's current and future competitive strengths clearly 
identified? 
9 Can they be developed internally or do they need to be sourced externally? 
* 
What are the alternative ways of assessing the resources/capabilities? 
e What is the place of M&A in the firm's competitive strategy? 
e Has a balanced evaluation of alternative modes of market entry and growth been 
made? 
0 What are the relative costs and benefits of these alternatives? 
9 How are M&A ideas generated? 
* 
What growth opportunities will M&A bring? 
9 Does the firm have internal acquisition deal making, integration and post-audit 
capabilities? 
* 
Does it have models of acquisition value, risk appraisal and management? 
9 Has it devoted enough resources to strengthen this function? 
9 Is the acquisition function benchmarked against the best? 
Source : Selim et al, 2002 
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Table 2.7 Examples of possible risks in valuation and due diligence process 
9 Selection of inappropriate acquisition team and advisers 
e Inappropriate and costly bid strategies and tactics 
* Risk of conflicting interests with advisers 
9 Does due diligence cover commercial, HR and environmental risks? 
Availability of financing 
* Selection of the appropriate valuation technique 
s Selection of appropriate accounting method 
* Are antitrust rules and regulatory framework observed? 
e Setting unrealistic negotiation parameters and benchmarks 
Inadequate due diligence process 
Source : Selim et al, 2002 
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Table 2.8 Example of possible risks in post 
- 
acquisition integration 
Lack of integration strategy or plan to achieve the strategic and financial goals 
9 Lack of project management approach 
9 Absence of performance benchmarks and milestones for evaluating integration 
process 
* 
Does the integration experience contribute to organisational leaming and 
developing a core competence? 
* 
Does the integration plan cover all relevant aspects of the two firms? 
- 
Organisational restructuring 
Cultural integration 
IT systems 
- 
Human Resource issues 
- 
Processes 
. 
Operations and production 
* 
Does the integration process include effective communication strategies for 
internal and external shareholders? 
* 
Do project management teams include managers from both firms? 
Source : Selim et 
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Table 2.9 Example of possible risks in post-acquisition audit 
Absence of acquisition specific and thorough audit 
e Inadequate assessment of performance due to poor performance metrics or time 
scale for delivery of performance 
* Absence of clear identification of reasons for successor failure 
9 Lack of effective communication strategies to communicate the lessons from 
acquisitions 
9 Have the deals been audited for delivering their promises? 
e Do performance benchmarks represent a balanced scorecard covering? 
* Does the audit create a well-calibrated feedback mechanism for organisational 
leaming? 
9 Are both successes and failures in acquisitions communicated effectively so they 
become embedded in organisational procedures, systems, cultures and routines? 
9 Does post audit lead to more effective acquisition process and organisational 
capability that confers a competitive advantage? 
Source: Selim et al, 2002 
2.6.3 Empirical evidence on the internal audit role during mergers and 
acquisitions 
Although there is a great number of articles concerning the issue of mergers and 
acquisitions, little research has be done for the issue of internal auditing contribution to 
the various stages of a merger. According to Roger Cook (1993, pp. 28-32)), the internal 
audit function is potentially in a strong position to improve the quality of management 
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throughout the acquisition process, and provide a service, which can significantly affect 
the organisation's profitability. 
This potential depends on two major factors, organisational status and knowledge. For 
the first issue, internal audit's ability to contribute to the acquisition process will depend 
on the department's scope of review, the resources available and its authority to gain 
access to records and personnel. Internal audit should also be closely involved in 
reviewing systems with the acquired company and establishing control by the holding 
company over the activities of its subsidiaries. 
The second issue relates with the knowledge and understanding of the acquirer's 
advantages and disadvantages at the pre-acquisition stage. During this stage is where the 
scope for review is likely to be most limited but may be of real benefit to the 
organisation. The internal auditor's contribution at this stage is moderate although it can 
have a more expanded role (Selim et al, 2002). This happens because often companies 
focused on making the acquisition happen and then worried about integration and 
auditing. The role of internal audit varies at different times during the M&A stages. At 
the pre-acquisition stage is where the scope for review is likely to be most limited but it 
may be of real benefit to the organization. Also, at the post-acquisition stage there is a 
need to rapidly establish effective potential control of the new entity. 
According to Robert Cook (1993), at the pre-acquisition stage internal audit can review 
the candidate and start on preliminary review of its control environment. In this review 
internal auditors must have in mind the potential fit of this candidate. The likelihood of 
achieving a successful combination of the businesses can be assessed in three ways: 
business fit, financial fit and organizational fit. The purchase of an existing business 
provides opportunity but is also a high risk strategy. Despite the speed and uncertainty 
which can accompany acquisition decisions, internal audit should seek to become 
involved as early as possible. Once an acquisition strategy has been determined, the 
value of audit review is enhanced if findings are geared towards preparing the company 
for diversification. If appropriate systems, structures and a control environment are 
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already in place then the battle is half won before it begins. The following table lists a 
potential checklist during pre-acquisition stage: 
Table 2.10: Pre-acquisition stage 
- 
Checklist for review 
1. Screening of potential candidates 
11. Confirm readiness of acquiring 
company for diversification 
Market trends and Define distinctive 
market share competence 
Business A Political, economic. A. Business Source of 
. Position social and technical expertise competitive 
environment advantage 
Analysis of Ascertain how to 
competition add value 
Preparation and 
Profit measures presentation of 
management 
information 
B. Current and Asset values 
B. Financial Efficiency of 
forecast results discipline treasury function 
Liquidity Resource planning 
Business fit Organizational 
structure 
C Potentialfit C. Organisational Personnel 
between companies Financial fit effectiveness procedures 
Organisational fit Quality of planning function 
Source: Cook, 1993 
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Traditionally, internal auditor's contribution on a merger is greater at the stages of due 
diligence and post acquisition integr%ion. Selim et al (2002) observed that the actual 
participation of internal auditors at these stages is high. Also, Davison (2001) suggests 
that most of the auditors, who responded to a survey conducted by the Institute of Internal 
Auditors in 1998, stated that they performed only due diligence testing in regard to new 
mergers activity. 
It is critical that the internal auditors involved in the merger process provide due 
diligence. Due diligence can mean the difference between M&A success and failure 
(Aldhizer and Cashell, 2000). Unfortunately, the internal auditing literature on due 
diligence is fairly sparse and the literature that does exist concerns only with due 
diligence associated with joint ventures (Applegate, 1998; Aldhizer and Cashell, 1999). 
Given the short time period and lack of familiarity with the business, it is possible to 
overlook key business risks, significant control weaknesses and fraudulent financial 
reporting before signing an acquisition agreement. The comprehensive M&A integration 
strategy analysed below is currently under development by IBM and includes internal 
auditing as an important member of the integration team (Aldhizer and Cashell, 2000). It 
is made up of four phases: 
1. Forming a business resources team and generating cooperation among M&A 
stakeholders. 
2. Conducting pre-acquisition due diligence. 
3. Developing the post acquisition integration strategy. 
4. Conducting post acquisition due diligence. 
Post-acquisition management and integration has been called 'a most important, albeit 
difficult, task' (Jones, 1982). The key to success is to implement effective control while 
at the same time motivating management to maximise performance. There is an 
opportunity for internal auditing to make a significant contribution to the development of 
more effective post-acquisition management skills by promoting techniques of effective 
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control combined with measures that ensure people are highly motivated. Also, internal 
audit reports presented to both senior management and the board can alert company 
directors to the lurking dangers to which they may be exposed if the company is not 
diligent in its post-acquisition management (Cook 1993). 
One of the most useful things that audit can do in an acquisition situation is to conduct 
6current-state assessment' of the business processes of both the acquired and the 
acquiring company. Also, audits can assist in post-merger implementation by helping to 
plan the integration cfforts and, in addition to all the financial and physical integration 
plans, develop a separate human resources and cultural integration plan (Davison, 2001). 
At this important stage it is critical for bidder firm to put in place the merged organization 
that can deliver the strategic, synergy and value added results. But we must take into 
consideration that during post-acquisition stage, merged organization must have the 
capabilities to overcome all difficulties and obstacles with well defined goals, 
communication plans, benchmarks etc. This period is also a time of great uncertainty for 
all employees and thus a well planned integration plan must include strong 
communication channels in order to facilitate and smooth integration process. 
An initial diagnosis of the subsidiary should address three key areas of control and the 
internal audit team should have delegated authority to require the subsidiary to meet the 
parent's standards where necessary. This diagnosis can split in two phases. The first 
phase is concerned on the establishment of control over subsidiary through reporting 
systems, structures and people. The second phase analyzes the possibility to extract 
synergy through operational audits on the use of assets, economy and efficiency and 
finally the comparison of the outcomes with original strategy and review effects of 
integration on products and communication. This potential checklist for post-acquisition 
review is presented on the following table (Cook, 1993): 
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Table 2.11: 
PHASE I 
PHASE 11 
Source: Cook, 1993 
Post-acquisition stage 
- 
Checklist for review 
Cash and Bank 
Authorisation of paymen-I Reporting systems Management of 
information 
Remedial restructuring 
Shorter communication 
Structures lines 
Create separate 
mow accountable units 
Identifv talented middle 
People 
Use of assets 
Economy and efficiency 
Accomplishment of 
Create loyalty to parent 
Motivate through target 
and bonuses 
Safeguards against misuse 
Identify 'jewels in the 
crown' meriting 
investment 
Rationalize surplus 
Identify opportunities to 
integrate facilities, finance, 
data processing etc. 
Co 
- 
ordinate group 
arrangements for 
purchasing 
, 
pensions, 
insurance etc. 
Compare outcomes with 
original strategy and 
review effects on 
integration on products, 
Compare outcomes with 
I original strategy and 
review effects on 
integration on 
communication and 
distribution 
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A good example of practice on risk-based internal auditing and the transformation from 
traditional audit techniques during a merger is the case study of California Federal Bank 
(Lindow, 2002). According to this case study, California Federal Bank set as strategic 
objective to become a first-class West Coast financial institution. To make this happen it 
required numerous acquisitions and integration as well as the development of new 
business lines and products. How the company managed risk from all these changes was 
critical to success. 
In order to identify risk areas and continuously monitor the company's risk profile, they 
had to transform the internal audit department from its traditional role-performing 
checklist activities 
- 
to one that focused on corporate and business unit goals, strategies 
and risk management processes. To achieve this restructuring, the steps were as follows: 
* Define internal control 
Adopt best practices (monitor business activities and key performance indicators, co- 
ordinate with other risk management functions, develop the audit plan based on risk 
priorities, get involved in technology projects) 
Become part of the process (loss management, auto lending, wire transits etc. ) 
Develop a strategic plan (provide for a mix of skills sets within the audit group, 
ensure that auditors update risk assessments and monitor the risk indicators on an 
ongoing basis, establish the team's communication strategies and reporting formats) 
Create client service teams 
Deliver services and communicate findings 
Gain respect 
Internal auditors can be used as bridge builders between the merging parts. For example, 
in the case of California Federal Bank (Lindow, 2002), audit facilitated a meeting 
between the merging parts, which led to a redesigned loan-funding process using more 
automation and increased cost savings. The internal audit team also attended meetings 
between the subsidiary's underwriting and loan service groups, participated in 
discussions and reviewed reports. 
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On the other hand and as the role of internal auditor continues to evolve, the recent 
emphasis of the new definition of internal auditing to consulting activities has brought 
new questions and concerns regarding the ability of internal auditors to function in an 
independent and objective manner. Brody and Lowe (2000) examined whether the 
internal auditors' judgements are dependent on their company's role (buyer or seller) in 
an acquisition. Results revealed that the role of the company in the negotiation process 
did influence judgments. This suggests that internal auditors are likely to assume the 
position that is in the best interests of their company. 
Finally, we can note that when audit teams integrate into other functions throughout the 
business and go beyond traditional methods, they have the ability to add value by 
offering better, more proactive audit services and improving an organisation's risk 
management strategies. With investors, regulators and the media placing companies 
under greater scrutiny in today's climate, internal auditors can expect to have a more 
prominent role as part of the risk management processes. 
2.6.4 Internal auditing as a value added tool in the M&A process 
The definition of "value added" can vary considerably from one audit department to the 
next. For many practitioners, this phrase describes audit work that helps management to 
improve the business, rather than assignments that simply verify compliance with policies 
and procedures. The type of work or services that constitute value-added practice is 
situation specific. What adds the most value for one organization or even one area might 
be a waste of resources somewhere else (Roth, 2003). 
Value added auditing can be described as a systematic, disciplined approach to evaluate 
and improve the effectiveness of risk management, control and governance processes. 
Another similar term is value for money auditing. Value for money auditing takes into 
account the 3 E's (Economy, Efficiency, and Effectiveness). It frequently makes 
extensive use of performance indicators in the form of ratios and other statistics to give 
an indication of value for money (Chambers, 1997). 
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A survey conducted by the Institute of Internal Auditors Research Foundation in the 
study "Adding value: Seven Roads to Success" (2003), solicited information regarding 
best practices and value added auditing. Survey questionnaires were sent to 
approximately 4,500 North American audit directors and managers. Participants were 
asked to identify their current best practices in value added auditing, as well as practices 
they believe will become increasingly important to them. 
The ten most frequently named practices in each category are presented in the following 
table: 
Table 2.12: Current Vs Preferred Value Added Practices 
CURRENT BEST PRACTICES BECOMING MORE IMPORTANT 
Risk assessment to develop the annual 0 Control self-assessment 
audit plan 0 Consulting 
Control seýf-assessment (CSA) 0 Risk management 
Consulting 0 Computer assisted audit techniques 
Risk-based audit projects 0 Risk assessment to develop the annual 
Partnering with line management auditplan 
Participation of teams & Participation on teams 
Systems implementation reviews 0 Internal control training 
Computer assisted audit techniques * Continuous monitoring 
Internal control training 0 E-commerce / cyber security 
Automated work papers 0 Systems implementation reviews. 
Although what constitutes value-added activity will vary based on many factors. there are 
some general rules that apply across the board. Four factors that determine some 
prerequisites for internal auditors in order to add value to their organisation can be 
summarised as follows (Roth, 2003): 
A deep knowledge of the organisation, including its culture, key players, and 
competitive environment. 
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9 The courage to innovate in ways stakeholders don't expect and may not think they 
want. 
A broad knowledge of those practices the profession, in general, considers value 
added. 
e The creativity to adapt innovations to the organisation in ways that yield surprising 
results and exceed stakeholders' expectations. 
Three of these factors 
- 
organisational knowledge, courage, and creativity 
- 
represent 
competencies and personal qualities that, for the most part, are self-explanatory. 
"Practices the profession considers value added", however, leaves much room for 
interpretation, and thus merits further attention. 
Gary Stern (1994) also provides a "best practices" list for internal audit departments in 
order to possibly add value to their organization. Thus, internal auditors can help and 
become a catalyst for change and help business units to operate more effectively. 
Internal auditors can also use self-assessments in order to encourage auditees' 
involvement and participation for a problem solving approach. Also, bringing business 
staff into the philosophy of internal audit enables them to receive broader experience and 
perceive the scope and objective of internal audit department. Finally, other best 
practices in this article indicate to share technology with the business units, align with 
customers, conduct preventive auditing and place internal auditors in special assignments. 
Value added practices indicated in the literature were conrol self assessment, consulting 
skills and the use of computer assisted audit techniques. Control self assessment is a 
process which allows and encourages line management, staff, and internal auditors to 
participate in the review and evaluation of systems of internal control. It requires free and 
open discussion and can reduce the perception of audit as negative and bureaucratic 
procedure. On the other hand, the new definition (Institute of Internal Auditors, 1999) 
introduced consulting as another possible internal audit role based on the background and 
experience of internal auditors (Sawyer's, 2003). 
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Mergers and acquisitions tend to represent the ambition of adding value to the new 
company. Internal auditing can prove that is a value added activity during the process 
and the various stages of a merger. Value-added auditing is based on the premise that the 
results of all audits should be quantified in order to show the value added to the process. 
This process of quantifying the contribution of internal auditing recommendations is the 
difference between an audit department viewed traditionally as a cost center versus an 
audit department with the potential for being viewed as a profit center (Seaman, 1995). 
Motivated by the universal mandate to curtail expenses and boost profits internal auditing 
departments must seek ways to add value in the merger process. But very few internal 
audit functions are asked to measure or demonstrate the value they deliver. On the other 
hand, board directors and heads of internal audit agree that the most important ways in 
which internal audit adds value are providing assurance that the main business risks are 
being managed and providing assurance that the general internal control framework is 
operating effectively. 
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3. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
3.1 Introduction 
The extensive literature review in the previous chapter surrounded the whole merger and 
acquisition phenomena. It provided also empirical evidence assembled by several studies 
in the United States, United Kingdom and other countries that support the hypothesis of 
high rate of failure in the merger and acquisition process. As analyzed, this failure can 
occur at any of the stages mentioned: corporate and acquisition strategy, valuation and 
due diligence, post-acquisition integration, post-acquisition audit. 
Mergers and acquisitions are a very complex process that requires a deep understanding 
of the sources of value creation and the possible synergies. The risk of failure needs 
careful planning and evaluation. As mentioned, internal auditing has been involved in 
due diligence stage, with its role being limited to accounting issues. Also, in leading 
edge organizations, internal auditing has taken part in deal structuring, post-acquisition 
integration and post-acquisition audit (Selim et al, 2002; Davison, 2001). 
The increasing importance of merger and acquisition activity to corporate strategy and 
the record of failure of such strategies in creating value, both in the United States and the 
European Union adding also the great evolution of internal audit profession during the 
last years gave us the motivation to research the role internal audit function possibly can 
play in the process. This research will highlight especially the role of internal auditing in 
leading edge organizations in the European Union. By providing a proper and objective 
evaluation of business risk, internal auditing can contribute to the minimization of the 
various risks in the process. 
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3.2 Research questions 
The research questions will be as follows: 
QI: What is the role internal audit currently plays in leading edge 
organizations in the European Union thatpursue mergers and acquisitions? 
One of the objectives of this research is to identify and analyze the*role internal auditors 
currently plays during the stages of M&A projects. As evidenced in the previous parts 
internal auditors are not included in the M&A process and, in the cases that were 
involved, they performed due diligence and testing. Also, internal audit directors seemed 
to be involved in the preliminary discussions (Davison, 2001; Selim et al, 2002). 
Analysis of the curent role will form the first "pillae, of our research in order to decipher 
the present role of internal audit practioners and professionals. 
Q2: What is the contribution of internal auditing to the various stages of a 
merger and what role does it play in complementing and enhancing other 
functions involved? 
Internal auditing is not the only function taken part in the M&A process. It is obvious that 
various departments are taken part to the process. These are, for example, finance, 
Information Technology, marketing, human resource etc. It is obvious that some 
functions or processes can overlap rising the cost and the time horizon of the merger or 
acquisition. It will be useful to analyze the level of contribution of internal auditing to 
the different stages of the M&A process as well as the level of co-operation with other 
functions. 
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Q3: What are the preferred roles internal auditors would like to play in the 
merger and acquisition process? 
Internal auditing is now a mature profession whose practitioners are specialized in 
internal control, fraud detection and prevention and other areas of the corporate 
governance structure. The internal audit objective includes promoting effective control at 
a reasonable cost. We are moving from the traditional audit work such as planning, 
verification and compliance to a more risk based auditing that its scope of work is based 
on risk assessment, consultancy and a more proactive role. 
Thus it is not surprising that in recent surveys and research, internal auditors and audit 
directors wanted to contribute more effectively to the M&A process at all the stages. 
Many of them believe that more value could be added by the internal auditing department 
if their roles were allowed to expand. Also, internal auditors suggested that they needed 
more training in mergers and acquisitions in order to overcome the difficulties and the 
'mistrust' of the other member of the merger team. 
This research will try also to highlight and summarize the preferred roles that internal 
auditors would like to play at all stages of the European mergers and acquisitions. We 
must also notice that researcher's objective is to effectively contribute the deep 
knowledge of the audit directors and the internal auditors of these European organizations 
as a result of their knowledge and organizational experience. It will try also to highlight 
the interaction between internal auditing department and other functions involved in the 
merger process such as finance and IT. 
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Q4: What is the 'ideal' situation of internal auditing involvement in the 
mergers and acquisitions process according to empirical evidence and literature 
review (Normative model)? 
From the empirical evidence provided in chapter 2 we can develop and present the 'ideal' 
situation that various textbooks and articles present. This normative model would be 
very helpful in the analysis of the gaps between these three different models, the 
observed, preferred and the normative providing useful results in order to develop the 
best practices model. 
Q5: Is there a gap between the current, preferred and 'ideal' role internal 
auditors would like to play and, ifyes, what are the reasonsfor this gap 
When comparing the normative model, derived from the extensive literature review, to 
the observed current and ideal situation in the merger and acquisition process, a number 
of gaps will be identify. One of the objectives of this research is to highlight the reasons 
for the gaps in this process. These gaps could be management related; internal auditing 
related or related to some other general factors outside of the process and the companies. 
Q6. 
- 
What are the prerequisites that are essentialfor internal auditfUnction in 
order to play a more expanded role and how they will interact with the best 
practice model suggestedfor European companies? 
Selim et al (2002) suggests a list of prerequisites for a more effective internal audit role. 
This list includes actions such as: 
e Knowledge of the firm's corporate and business strategies 
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" 
Good understanding of the various sources of risks to which business units are 
exposed 
" Experience of operating businesses 
" 
Good interpersonal skills 
" Strong support from the board 
" Awareness of the resources and capabilities of internal auditing to act as an adviser 
and internal consultant 
In order to get the best possible results from the best practices model some prerequisites 
must be achieved. This research will try to identify and highlight these prerequisites in 
the European companies and could identify a large number of issues in order to provide 
useful recommendations to chief audit executives and internal auditing departments. The 
desired prerequisites could split in different sets such as those deals with internal audit 
strategy, knowledge, the level of proficiency, individual skills and capabilities etc. 
Q 7. 
- 
Can we develop a model(s) of best practices of the internal auditfunction 
which would enhance the effectiveness of the merger process of the European 
companies and helping thefirm achieve its strategic ohiectives? 
Using the findings in the previous research questions we can present a variety of 
opportunities and actions for the internal auditing function in order to respond more 
actively to its proactive role in the M&A process. Internal auditors can actively be 
involved and play a greater role in all the stages (pro-active and post-active) of the M&A 
process. 
Mergers and acquisitions are undertaken by companies to achieve certain strategic and 
financial objectives. Success of mergers depends on how well the organizations are 
integrated. The objective of a merger could be the value added by bringing together two 
companies. The issue of value added auditing is analyzed on the previous chapters. 
Empirical evidence (Stern, 1994; Roth, 2003; Seaman, 1995) and surveys (Value agenda, 
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Deloitte & Touche, 2003) analyzed this issue and tried to 'decipher' the ways an internal 
auditing department can add value to a company. 
3.3 Summary of research questions 
Based on the main points identified in the literature review, the above seven research 
questions have been formulated. By analyzing these questions, summarized also in the 
following table, in the forthcoming chapters the researcher hopes that he will decipher 
some useful findings which will make a significant contribution to the issue of internal 
auditing role during M&A projects in the European Union area and get some useful 
results and feedback in order to validate and update his best practice model. 
Table 3.1: Summary table of research questions 
Q1: What is the role internal audit currently plays in leading edge organizations in the 
European Union that pursue mergers and acquisitions? 
Q2: What is the contribution of internal auditing to the various stages of a merger and what 
role can play in complementing and enhancing with the other functions involved? 
Q3: What are the preferred roles internal auditors would like to play in the merger and 
acquisition process? 
Q4: What is the 'ideal' situation of internal auditing involvement in the mergers and 
acquisitions process according to empirical evidence and literature review (Normative 
model)? 
Q5: Is there a gap between the current, preferred and 'ideal' role internal auditors would 
like to play and, if yes, what are the reasons for this gap 
Q6: What are the prerequisites that are essential for internal audit function in order to play 
a more expanded role and how they will interact with the best practice model suggested for 
European companies? 
Q7: Can we develop a model(s) of best practices of the internal audit function which would 
enhance the effectiveness of the merger process of the European companies and helping the 
firm achieve its strategic objectives? 
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4. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
4.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to explain the research methodology used and also analyze 
important issues such as sampling, design of the questionnaires and specific methodology 
in order to find the most appropriate ways to have valid, reliable and generallsable 
results. 
Reliability refers to the consistency of a measure of a concept. It can be assessed by 
posing the following three questions (Easterby-Smith et al, 2002): 
1. Will the measures yield the same results on other occasions? 
2. Will similar observation be reached by other observers? 
3. Is there transparency in how sense was made from the raw data? 
Possible threats to the reliability of a research could be the participant error, participant 
bias, and observer error and bias. 
On the other hand, validity refers to the issue of whether an indicator (or set of indicators) 
that is devised to gauge a concept really measures that concept. Robson (2002) has 
charted the threats to validity, which provides a useful way of thinking about this 
important topic. These are: 
History 
Testing 
Instrumentation 
Mortality 
Maturation 
Ambiguity about causal direction 
Finally, in quantitative and qualitative research, the researcher is usually concerned to be 
able to assert that findings can be generalized beyond the confines of the particular 
context. Thus, if a study is carried out by a questionnaire with a number of people who 
answer the questions we can often say that the results can apply to individuals other than 
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those responded to the questionnaire. In order to overcome the issue of generalization the 
researcher has to choose a representative sample (Bryman, 2001; Saunders et al, 2003). 
Another useful point when analyzing a research methodology is the need for a clear 
research strategy. This strategy will be a general plan of how the research questions will 
be answered. It must contain clear objectives, derived from the research questions and 
also specify the sources from which the researcher intends to collect data. We must also 
notice that these strategies are not mutually exclusive and that we can use a multi-method 
strategy. The main research strategies are (Bryman, 2001; Saunders et al, 2003): 
Experiment 
Survey 
Case study 
Grounded theory 
Longitudinal studies 
Below we will provide a briefly analysis of these different strategies. 
Experiment 
Experiment is a classical form of research that owes much to the natural sciences, 
although it features strongly in much social science research. Typically, it involves 
different stages such as definition of a theoretical hypothesis, selection and allocation of 
samples, measurement of the variables and also control of other variables. Its strengths 
are that a small number of variables are subjected to testing and it can extend into real 
life, which creates a greater relationship to reality. On the other hand, its main 
weaknesses are that experiments can only examine a limited number of variables from 
the real world and also it is difficult to find willing organizations to participate in this 
type of research (Saunders et al, 2003). 
Surveys 
Surveys have become a very common method of research in our time and probably most, 
if all of us have had some experience with them either by playing the part of the 
researcher or as part of a sample requested to participate in a survey. Using a survey 
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strategy can give more control over the research process but much time will be spent in 
designing and piloting the questionnaire. Also, the data collected by the survey strategy 
may not be as wide ranging as those collected by other research strategies. But its main 
advantages are that they allow a greater number of variables to be studied than in other 
approaches and also they cover real situations and are more appropriate to making 
generalizations (De Vaus, 2002). 
Case study 
Robson (2002) defines case study as 'a strategy for doing research which involves an 
empirical investigation of a particular contemporary phenomenon within its real life 
context using multiple sources of evidence'. The data collection methods employed may 
be various such as questionnaires, interviews, observation and documentary. The design 
of a case study could include: conceptual framework, set of research questions, defining 
the case, sampling, data collection, pilot studies and finally data analysis. Case studies 
can be useful in developing and understanding reality in great detail but on the other hand 
there are restrictions to gain access to organizations, which in turn limits the 
general izabi I ity of results. 
Grounded theory 
Grounded theory is often thought of as the best example of the inductive approach, 
although this conclusion would be too simplistic. In grounded theory, data collection 
starts without the formation of an initial framework and theory is developed from data 
generated by a series of observations. These data lead to the predictions that are then 
tested in further observations which may confirm or not the predictions (Saunders et al, 
2003). 
Longitudinal studies 
The longitudinal study represents adistinct form of research design. Because on the time 
and cost involved, it is a relatively little-used design. With a longitudinal design a 
sample is surveyed and is surveyed again on at least one further occasion. It is more 
typically found in social sciences in fields such as sociology, social policy. However, a 
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longitudinal study can allow some insight into the time order of variables and therefore 
may be more able to allow causal inferences to be made. 
This research will be carried out using both quantitative and qualitative approach. At 
first, a survey using a standardized questionnaire will be carried out in order to collect a 
large amount of data rather than being based on data already available. The collected 
data will be standardized allowing easy comparison and descriptive data analysis. 
Although a questionnaire design, pilot test and analysis can be time consuming this 
approach can provide us the basis to further analyze data collected at this stage. 
In order to validate these preliminary results, semi-structured interviews will be carried 
out with a sample of population selected in order to gain understanding and have their 
opinion on the views and trends presented through the questionnaire analysis. This 
qualitative approach is more flexible and less structured than the standardized 
questionnaire; it will allow the validation and will increase the reliability of the 
preliminary quantitative results. A more thorough analysis of the different stages of this 
research is presented in the next parts of this chapter. 
4.2 Deciding on the Sample 
When a researcher embarks on his or her mission to carry out a survey, what he or she 
would like to accomplish most of the times is to establish the broadest possible 
generalization, applicable to infinitely large classes of events. If we could collect and 
analyze data from every possible case or group member this is termed census. For 
obvious reasons it is virtually impossible to observe all relevant events. Thus, sampling 
techniques provide a range of methods that enable to reduce the amount of data we need 
to collect by considering only data from a subgroup rather than all possible cases or 
elements. 
Jankowich (1991) defines sampling as the deliberate choice of a number of people, 
known as the sample. The main task in sampling is to select a representative sample of 
the population of interest, also known as the target population that is the population to 
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which the researcher would like to obtain a sample that will be representative of the 
target population. However, it is extremely unlikely that one will be able to draw a 
perfectly representative sample. Because the populations studied are not known in all 
respects, there is no way of knowing just how representative a given sample is. 
For the purpose of this research, a sample comprised of 120 bidder companies that 
pursued mergers and acquisitions and are based in the European Union was drawn. The 
list of participated companies is provided at the Appendix A: Table of sampling 
organizations. This list includes the mergers and acquisitions between European Union 
companies in the period 0 1/0 1/2000-31/12/2003 and was derived from Thomson 
Financial Database. The selection criterion was based on M&A projects held in the 
European Union this period, in order to collect data based on latest and updated trends 
and also allow sufficient time after the merger for a more valid and unbiased opinion of 
the participants. The other important selection criterion was based on the deal value of 
these transactions, in order to present results based on the analysis of the biggest deals in 
the European Union area during this period. 
Also, this survey included companies from all the countries of the European Union as 
well as different business sectors and industries such as telecommunications, media, oil & 
gas etc. We must note, as indicated on the limitations of this research, that we derived 
the sample companies from the 15 countries of the European Union and have not 
included the ten new countries entered at the enlargement of the Union in 2004. 
A postal questionnaire was sent in May 2004 accompanied with a letter explaining the 
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scope and objectives of the research and also a glossary of terms (pee Appendix B- 
Questionnaire). A follow up postal questionnaire was sent in July 2004, accompanied 
with a letter explaining the reasons for this follow up. From a total of 120 questionnaires, 
34 (28% response rate) was returned by October 2004. Next step was the analysis of the 
data provided on the returned questionnaires. In order to analyze the data, statistical 
package SPSS 11.0for Windows and Microsoft Excel spreadsheets were used. 
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This analysis leaded to a descriptive data analysis stage, presented in the next chapter, 
and was the basis in order to design the stage of the validation of the preliminary survey 
results. 
4.3 Questionnaire Design 
A questionnaire is an important instrument of research, a tool for data collection. The use 
of a questionnaire is a fully-structured technique. In this research we used postal self- 
completion questionnaires at the first stage in order to collect data, gain understanding on 
the research questions and form the basis for the validation of descriptive data through 
semi-structured interviews. The questionnaire was pilot tested during April 2004 and 
was sent to a number of practitioners and academics, in order to make comments and gain 
useful feedback on format, design and content issues. The results of the pilot test were 
quite satisfactory and minor changes were made to the format and the content of this 
questionnaire. 
In many ways, the self-completion questionnaire and the structured interview are very 
similar methods of research. However because there is no interviewer in the 
administration of the self-completion questionnaire, the research instrument has to be 
especially easy to follow and its questions have to be particularly easy to answer. As a 
result, self completion questionnaires as compared to structured interviews tend to have 
fewer open questions, since closed ones tend to be easier to answer, have easy-to-follow 
designs to minimize the risk that the respondent will fail to follow filter questions or omit 
a question, and also arc shorter in order to reduce the risk of 'respondent fatigue'. 
The following table provides a useful comparison between the advantages and 
disadvantages of self-completion questionnaire over the structured interview: 
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Table 4.1: Advantages Vs disadvantages between self-completion questionnaire 
and structured interview 
Advantages Disadvantages 
Cannot ask many qucstiolls that are not Cheaper to administer 
salient to respondents 
Difficulty of asking other kinds of Quicker to administer 
question 
Absence of interviewer effects Cannot collect additional data 
No interviewer variability Difficulty to ask a lot of questions 
Convenience for respondents Lower response rates 
Source: Bryman, 2001 
As mentioned earlier, the postal questionnaire was sent to a selection of 120 European 
Union organizations that pursued mergers and acquisitions during the period 01/01/2000- 
31/12/2003 and was based on the representativeness criterion in terms of country and 
industry, as well as the deal value of these M&A transactions. The set of questions was 
designed with primarily two aims, appearance and easiness to complete. It is true that no 
matter how good the covering letter is, the first impression the prospective respondent 
will get from the appearance of the questionnaire will determine to a large extend 
whether he or she will complete it. 
Because of the tendency for mail questionnaires and surveys to generate lower response 
rates than structured interviews, a great deal of research has gone into ways of improving 
response rate. The following steps and strategies are frequently suggested (Bryman, 
2001; Saunders et al, 2003): 
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m Write a good covering letter explaining the reasons for the research, why it is 
important, and why the recipient has been selected. 
Mail questionnaires can be accompanied by a stamped addressed envelope or return 
postage. 
Follow up individuals who do not reply at first, possibly with two or three further 
mailings. 
Shorter questionnaires tend to achieve better response rates than longer ones. 
Clear instructions and an attractive layout improve mail questionnaire response rates. 
0 It is useful to begin with questions which are more likely to be of interest to the 
respondent. 
There is also the view that in general mail questionnaires should comprise as few 
open questions as possible, since people are often deterred by the prospect of having 
to write a lot. 
Taking into consideration suggested strategies provided in the previous paragraph, our 
postal questionnaire was accompanied by a covering letter explaining the reasons and the 
main objectives of this research, the sampling criteria for the selection of their 
organizations in this survey, a stamped addressed envelope and a glossary of terms 
explaining some definitions in the questionnaire. The length of the questionnaire was as 
short as possible (8 pages) contained a balance of open and close-end questions and there 
was an effort to provide an attractive layout. This questionnaire was also followed up to 
individuals who didn't reply at first two months after the first mailing. 
The findings in this postal questionnaire and also the extensive literature review leaded to 
the selection of a sample of internal audit managers and practitioners that experienced 
M&A projects in their organizations and conduct semi-structured interviews. The ability 
to collect data at this stage of the research depends on gaining access. Saunders et al 
(2003) provide some useful strategies in order to gain access. These are: 
m Allow sufficient time 
m Using existing contacts and developing new ones 
97 
" Provide a clear account of purpose and type of access required 
" Overcome organizational concerns about the granting of access 
" Identify possible benefits to the organization in granting access to the researcher 
" Using suitable language 
" Facilitate ease of reply when requesting access 
" Establish the credibility with intended participants 
In this research, upon completion of data collection from the returned questionnaires and 
descriptive analysis, a number of preliminary results, conclusions and gaps had identified. 
Using this primary data we selected a number of internal audit managers and 
practitioners, different of those participated at the first stage, that their organizations 
experienced M&A projects. Details were derived from existing contacts on the local 
affiliates of the Institute of Internal Auditors in the countries included in this research and 
the development of new ones. A selection criterion was based on the participants' 
professional experience and their organization's involvement during M&A projects. An 
agenda contained main results and conclusions derived from descriptive data analysis, 
was sent through e-mail in order to prepare more effectively for the interview. In total 
ten internal audit practitioners and managers from four different countries (United 
Kingdom, Netherlands, Italy and Greece) and different sectors (such as banking, financial 
services, telecommunications, manufacturing) were participated at this stage. 
4.4 Research Methodology 
As analyzed above there are various methods and strategies in order to answer the 
research questions. The purpose of this part is to explain the methodology and specific 
methods used in this research. It will split in four stages (see Figure 3.1): 
Stage 1: Literature review, development of the postal questionnaires and 
preliminary data analysis 
The first stage comprises a comprehensive literature review of relevant published texts 
and papers in the various aspects and forms of mergers and acquisitions. This literature 
review forms the foundation on which this research and research questions are built. 
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Also, it has proved quite helpful to sample current opinions in newspapers, professional 
journals and thereby gain insight into the aspects of the research objectives. 
The extensive literature review and the research questions are analyzed thoroughly in 
Chapter 2. At the conclusion of this stage we had a 'rich' picture in order to develop the 
first postal questionnaire sent to 120 chief audit executives of organizations in the 
European Union that actively pursued mergers and acquisitions during the period 
0 1/0 1/2000-31/12/2003 and are representative in terms of deal value, size, country and 
sector. 
Stage 2: Development of the three different models, observed, preferred and 
normative 
Using the data provided from the analysis of the returned questionnaires and also from 
the literature review we will formulate the three different models. These are: 
w Observed model 
- 
this model will describe the role internal auditing currently plays 
during the M&A process at the European Union companies. 
Preferred model 
- 
this model describes the role internal auditors prefer to play during 
the M&A process. Given that many chief audit executives will probably have rich 
organizational experience and knowledge, the information of their preferred roles 
could be a very useful contribution to the research. 
0 Normative model 
- 
this model describes the 'ideal' situation according to the various 
textbooks and empirical evidence and its interface with functions such as corporate 
strategy, finance, human resources etc. 
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Figure 4.1 
- 
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Stage 3: Gap analysis and development of the suggested best practices model 
Data collected through returned questionnaires at Stage I was used at Stage 2 in order to 
develop the models that describe the role that internal auditors actually ("as is") are 
playing during the M&A process at the European Union companies, as well as the role 
they prefer to play ("as to be"). Also, literature review provided useful information 
which was used to build the normative model that will contain best practices experienced 
and presented at the various academic journals or reference texts. The comparison and 
analysis of these three different models leaded to the identification of gaps between the 
three models. 
Stage 4: Model validation and recommendations 
At this stage, we intended to validate primary data collected at the previous stages, 
identify possible reasons for the gaps identified, and collect information in order to 
present a validated best practices model and possible prerequisites for effective 
implementation and greater level of internal audit involvement during the various stages 
of M&A projects. As mentioned earlier, we conducted semi-structured interviews with a 
number of internal audit managers and practitioners, other than those participated at the 
first stage that their organizations experienced M&A projects. Their comments and 
feedback, in accordance with their rich organizational and internal audit experience 
contributed effectively to the validity and reliability of the primary data and also the 
development and summarization of the best practices model and prerequisites for a more 
effective and great contribution of internal audit function during M&A activity. 
4.5 Data recording and analysis 
Data recording and analysis phase is a typical procedure in any data analysis project and 
provides the researcher with the necessary means in order to present the collected data in 
a comprehensible manner. At this research, the returned postal questionnaires at Stage I 
will be collected, analyzed and filed properly in order to provide evidence on the 
accuracy of response rate. Primary data was analyzed in order to provide descriptive 
analysis presented in the next chapter. At the final stage semi-structured interviews 
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conducted with the use of an agenda sent to the interviewees and data collected stored in 
soft copy format with the use of Microsoft Word files. 
4.6 Summary 
This chapter described the research methodology as well as other important factors such 
as sampling, design of the questionnaires and data analysis. The primary aim of the 
researcher is to provide both quantitative and qualitative approach in order to answer 
research questions and give more reliability and validity to the results. Both quantitative 
and qualitative research can be viewed as exhibiting a set of distinctive but contrasting 
preoccupations of a researcher. Each one has its advantages and disadvantages. 
Quantitative data are based on meanings derived from numbers and usually they analyzed 
through the use of diagrams and tables. On the other hand, qualitative data are based on 
meanings expressed through words and observation and data analysis is conducted 
through the use of conceptualization. 
Thus, this research has quantitative approach at Stage I and 2 in order to design and 
analyze the postal questionnaire. At Stage 4, semi-structured interviews will have more 
qualitative approach because the researcher will collect and analyze the interviewees' 
views and experiences. However, we must say that multi-strategy research must be 
competently designed and conducted because a poorly conducted research will yield 
suspect findings no matter how many methods are employed. Finally, multi-strategy 
approach that combines quantitative and qualitative research should not be considered as 
a panacea because, while offering great potential in many instances is subject to similar 
constraints and considerations as research relying on a single method or research strategy. 
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5. DESCRIPTIVE DATA ANALYSIS 
5.1 Sample Size 
Data description phase provides the researcher with the necessary means in order to 
present the collected data in a comprehensive manner through the use of tables and 
figures. Data description analysis provides a very useful insight as to the nature of' 
responses obtained and shows in absolute or relative terms how often the different values 
of the variable are among the units of analysis. In this research the statistical package 
SPSS 11.0 for Windows was used in order to facilitate the actual statistical analysis. 
Also, and rather on relying solely on frequency tables to describe the data collected, we 
choose to use also pie charts and other forms of graphical representation. 
In total, 120 sampling organizations (see Appendix A-Table of sampling organizations) 
took part in this survey. Each chief audit executive received a questionnaire, an 
accompanying letter explaining the purpose and the objectives of the study and a 
44glossary of terms", which explained some key words on the questionnaire. Out of 120 
questionnaires that were mailed, 34 (28%) were eventually completed and returned by I" 
of September 2004. Data analysis revealed representativeness of industrial sectors 
included in the sample. Table 5.1 reveals the proportion of industries included in the 
sample in two general categories such as manufacturing and services and Diagram 5.1 
mentions the primary industry of the organizations that took part in this survey: 
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Figure 5.1: Specific Industry Classification 
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On the other hand, and because of the European's Union nature, we have included in the 
sample companies from all 15 countries of the Union. Figure 5.2 represents the 
distribution of returned questionnaires by country: 
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5.2 Existence of M&A department, use of external parties and establishment and 
size of an internal audit department in the organization 
Participants at this survey were asked if they had an M&A department in their 
organizations and also if they used external parties for the deal. If they did it so, we 
requested the type of the external party (e. g. investment bank, audit firm etc. ). Finally, 
and in order to have a picture of the size of their internal auditing departments, directors 
were asked to state how long they had an internal auditing department in their 
organizations and what is the size of each of their departments. The results are exhibited 
in Figure 5.3: 
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Figure 5.3: Existence of M&A Department 
No 
35,3% 
Yes 
64,7% 
It is clear from the responses that were given that a great percentage (64.7%) of 
respondents has an M&A department in their organizations. From the tables and figures 
below we can also state that almost all of the organizations have used an external party 
for the deal (91.2%). Also, a great percentage used investment banks and audit firms as 
external party (82.3%) for the deal. The results are exhibited in detail in Figures 5.4 & 
5.5: 
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Figure 5.5: Type of external party involvement 
lnv. Banks+Audft Firm 
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The results exhibited in the following Tables 5.1 and 5.2 states that a majority ofinternal 
audit departments have been established in the organizations for more than 20 years 
(67.6%). It is also evident that 19 out of 34 organizations (55.9%) emplov more than 20 
auditors and 6 out of 34 organizations (17.7%) employ more than 10 auditors indicating 
that the majority of the organizations employ more than 10 auditors in their 
organizations. 
Table 5.1: Establishment of internal audit departments 
Frequency Percent (%) Cumulative Percent 
Under 1 year 1 2.9 2.9 
1 up to 5 years 2 5.9 8.8 
5 up to 10 years 5 14.7 23.5 
10 up to 15 years 3 8.8 32.4 
More than 20 
years 
23 67.6 100.0 
Total 34 100.0 
Table 5.2: Size of internal audit departments 
Frequency Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
0-I Auditor 1 2.9 2.9 
2-5 Auditors 5 14.7 17.6 
6- 10 Auditors 3 8.8 26.5 
11 
- 
15 Auditors 4 11.8 38.2 
16 
- 
20 Auditors 2 5.9 44.1 
More than 20 
Auditors 
19 55.9 100.0 
Total 34 100.0 
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5.3 Internal audit role during mergers and acquisitions in the European Union 
companies 
One of the main objectives of this study is to analyze the role internal audit currently 
plays in recently merged companies in the European Union area. Thus, the postal 
questionnaire contained a number of questions concerning the roles internal auditors 
currently plays during the M&A process as well as the preferred roles believe that they 
can play. Previous research (Selim et al, 2002: Davison, 2001) has shown that even 
though internal audit has expanded its role in many business processes throughout 
organizations, M&A activity does not seem to be an area that internal audit has effective 
contribution, apart from due diligence stage and in some leading edge organizations in 
post acquisition audit stage. 
Also, many practitioners suggested that internal audit could add more value to the M&A 
process if its role was allowed to expand. In our study the majority of audit executives 
responded that internal audit has a role to play in the M&A process (Strongly agree, 20%; 
Agree, 50.6%) and a small percentage were either uncertain (11.8%) or disagreed 
(17.6%) answering this question. Table 5.3 and Figure 5.6 illustrate these results: 
Table 5.3: Internal audit has a role to play during M&A's 
Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
Strongly Agree 7 20.6 20.6 
Agree 17 50.0 70.6 
Uncertain 4 11.8 82.4 
Disagree 6 17.6 100.0 
Total 34 100.0 
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Figure 5.6: IA has a role to play in M&A 
Dsagree 
17,6% 
Table 5.4 and Figure 5.7 exhibits another interesting point that forms the basis in which 
we will analyze the current and preferred roles of internal auditing function during an 
M&A. Most respondents felt that the preferred role of internal audit in their organization 
should be more proactive than post-mortem. A total of 24 out of 34 directors (70.6%) 
agreed that they prefer their roles expanded at all the stages of the merger. 
Table 5.4: Possible positive outcomes if internal audit act more proactive than 
post-mortem 
Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
Strongly Agree 7 20.6 20.6 
Agree 17 50.0 70.6 
Uncertain 2 5.9 76.5 
Disagree 8 23.5 100.0 
Total 34 100.0 
Figure 5.7: A role proactive or postmortem 
Disagree Strongly Agree 
Uncertain 5,9% 
50,0% 
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5.3.1 Internal audit current role during mergers and acquisitions in the European 
Union companies 
As noted previously at the literature review stage, internal auditing profession has 
evolved during the years. At one time, internal auditing functioned as an assistant to the 
independent accounting profession and attesting to the accuracy of financial matters. 
Now, internal auditing has established itself as a distinctive discipline with a far broader 
focus. Traditional internal auditing has focused on control and operations. Modem 
internal auditing provides services that include the examination and appraisal of controls, 
performance, risk and governance. 
In our study we tried to get a picture of internal auditing current role during the M&A 
process. Thus, we split the possible roles into four different categories that represent also 
the evolution and the different stages and approaches of the internal auditing profession. 
From the responses we can conclude that only a small proportion of the respondents have 
the traditional 'box-checker' role (5.9%). It also stated from professionals that the 
traditional role of internal auditors as mindless box checkers checking compliance with 
centrally imposed systems is out of date (Page and Spira, November 2004). 
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On the other hand, we can state that almost one third of the respondents (29.4%) 
described their role as 'watchdog & internal control expert'. This means that the new 
COSO ERM framework and the new definition of the Institute of Internal Auditors are 
not fully embedded to many of the organizations. But we can also note that another third 
of the respondents (35.3%) has moved from the two previous traditional roles and act as 
risk based auditors, an evolution from a focus on internal controls and an independent 
appraisal function to a focus on business risk and integrated risk management and 
corporate governance. 
Finally, we can notice that only a small part of the respondents (8.8%) has tried to evolve 
and practice the 'internal consultant' role stated in the latest Standards published by the 
Institute of Internal Auditors. Figure 5.8 illustrates clearly the distribution of respondents 
on internal auditors' current role during M&A's: 
Figure 5.8: Internal audit current role 
Other 
5,9% Box Checker 
None 5,9% 
8,8% 
No opinion 
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M&A process consists of four main stages. These are M&A strategy development, due 
diligence, post-acquisition integration and post acquisition audit. At the literature stage 
on chapter two we made a thorough analysis of the various risks for the M&A process 
during these stages. Previous studies (Selim el al, 2002) showed that internal audit has 
been involved in the due diligence and post-acquisition integration stage with no or small 
contribution to the other stages. In our postal questionnaire we included a question about 
the present level of internal audit's involvement in these stages in the sampling 
organizations. 
First of all it is not surprising to state that internal audit function has not involved at all 
(67.6%) during the strategy development or it had a small involvement and contribution 
(20.6%). This can happen for various reasons such as that the organizations focus solely 
on making the M&A deal happen and then at a later stage worrying about integration and 
control issues. But this practice is contrary with the new 'risk-based' role internal 
auditors prefer to play during the M&A process. Figure 5.9 provides the reasoning of the 
above statements: 
Figure 5.9: Strategy development 
- 
Current role 
Moderate involvement 
None 
2,9% 
8,8% 
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Not involved 
67,6% 
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On the other hand and on contrary to previous research, respondents stated that internal 
audit function has not involved (41.2%) or has little involvement (32.4%) during the due 
diligence stage (Figure 5.10), which 'traditionally' internal auditors contributed. We can 
state also that in the European Union companies a great proportion of internal auditing 
departments has no or small contribution to 'proactive' stages of an M&A, although they 
stated that the preferred role of internal audit in the M&A process should be more 
proactive. 
This means that it can be the management's failure to recognize the importance of 
internal auditing during the first stages of an M&A. Although many directors responded 
that their current role in the organization was the 'risk-based' auditor or the 'internal 
consultant' we can state that this small contribution and involvement in the first stages 
weakens also their role as 'risk based' auditor. 
Figure 5.10: Due diligence 
- 
Current role 
None Major involvement 
5,9% 8,8% 
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32,4% 
The analysis of the questionnaires on the last two stages was not revealed surprisingly 
results. Internal auditing function had moderate (35.3%) or major (11.8%) involvement 
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at the post acquisition integration stage. Also 20.6% are not involved or have little 
involvement (26.5%). Finally a small percentage (5.9%) has no involvement during this 
stage. Figure 5.11 verify the above conclusions: 
Figure 5.11: Post acquisition integration 
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Figure 5.12 indicates that internal auditors also had major (52.9%) or moderate (26.5%) 
involvement during the post acquisition audit stage. Another 26.5% have moderate 
involvement and 8.8% little involvement. Finally, only 5.9% are not involved during this 
final stage. These results indicate that internal auditing is acting, in the European Union 
companies, in an 'after the fact' role on contrary to the international best practices that 
indicate the new 'coactive' and 'risk-based and consultancy' role. 
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Figure 5.12: Post acquisition audit 
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5.3.2 Internal audit preferred role during mergers and acquisitions in the 
European Union companies 
On the other hand, apart from the current role that internal audit departments and internal 
auditors pursue at the different stages of an M&A, we included in the questionnaire a part 
containing the same questions as those of current role but we added a separate column 
and giving the directors the possibility to express their opinions on their preferred roles, 
in order to analyze and state the possible differences and gaps between current and 
preferred situation. 
We can conclude from Figure 5.13 presented below that a great percentage of 
respondents prefer to act as 'risk-based' auditors (58.8%) as well as 'internal consultants' 
(23.5%). This means that a great portion of directors wants to move forward and prefer 
to provide risk based and consultancy services to the organization. But for many reasons, 
external or internal, this cannot be practiced among the organizations. 
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Figure 5.13: Internal auditor 
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Figure 5.14: Strategy development 
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But, on contrary to the previous results, in the question about their preferred roles during 
the M&A strategy development a great percentage responded that they do not want to be 
involved (32.4%) or want to have little (38.2%) or moderate involvement (11.8%). 
Figure 5.14 illustrates these results. 
Apart from strategy development stage that a great majority of internal audit departments 
prefer to have little or no involvement, the next set of responses about internal auditor's 
involvement in the next three stages reveals the preference of them to have a more 
coactive and collaborative role during the M&A process. Commencing from the due 
diligence stage we can state from Figure 5.15 that a great percentage prefer to have 
moderate (47.1 %) or major (17.6%) involvement. 
Figure 5.15: Due diligence 
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We can observe a similar trend to the responses given at the question about the preferred 
level of involvement during the post acquisition integration stage (Figure 5.16). 
Directors responded that they prefer to have moderate (41.2%) or major (23.5%) 
involvement at this stage. Last but not least we must also note that a great majority of 
internal audit directors prefer to have grater involvement in the post acquisition audit 
stage, which represents the 'traditional' and 'after the fact' audit role. Figure 5.17 shows 
that a great percentage of respondents have major (73.5%) or moderate (17.6%) 
involvement at this stage: 
Figure 5.16: Post acquisition integration 
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Figure 5.17: Post acquisition audit 
Preferred role 
None 
8,8% 
5.4 Internal audit's actual Vs preferred level of participation in the different 
stages of M&A's 
From the returned questionnaires we noted that the nature and extent of internal audit 
involvement activities differs across our sample organizations. Also, as analyzed in the 
previous parts, the actual role played by internal audit in the different stages of M&A also 
varies. The following tables summarize the responses given to the postal questionnaire 
regarding the actual role played by internal audit in the different stages of M&A 
activities: 
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Table 5.5: Internal audit's actual Vs preferred level of participation during 
M&A strategy development stage 
Nature/ extent of 
Number of companies 
Number of companies 
prefer to involve in this 
involvement involved in this stage stage (out of 34) (out of 34) 
Audit the process used in 12 14 
assessing & managing risk 
Receive communication 
about deals from 
Corporate Strategy 
department 
Investigate whether 
control issues were 10 16 
addressed in the planning 
process 
Advise on systems and 
processes that could 5 8 
reduce acquisition risk 
Develop a planning model 3 1 
Examine the business 2 
strategic plans 
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Table 5.6: Internal audit's actual Vs preferred level of participation during due 
diligence stage 
Number of companies Number of companies Nature/ extent of involved in this stage prefer to involve in this involvement (out of 34) stage (out of 34) 
Developing plans in order 
to integrate internal audit 12 14 
of merging firms 
Conducting due diligence 
alongside with other 
functions such as finance, 10 17 
accounting, human 
resources, law, etc. 
Ensuring due diligence 
covers financial, 9 14 
operational and 
compliance issues 
Working with external 
consultants carrying out 8 11 
due diligence 
Auditing financial 8 10 
reporting systems 
Auditing internal audit 
function in target 8 16 
company 
Ensuring weaknesses 
identified in due diligence 7 12 
are considered in 
finalizing the deal 
Conducting initial due 
diligence in assessing 7 14 
internal control 
Advising on risks and 
implementation to ensure 7 14 
risks are taken into 
account 
Ensuring awareness of 
regulatory and other 6 11 
compliance matters 
Auditing the business 
processes of the target 5 14 
company 
Reviewing integration 5 10 
plans for IT systems 
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Table 5.6 (continued) 
Number of companies 
Number of companies 
Nature/ extent of involved in this stage prefer to 
involve in this 
involvement (out of 34) stage (out of 34) 
Ensure the target is 
complying with to the 5 6 
acquirer's policies and 
procedures 
Providing advice on cross- 3 4 
border deals 
Providing advice on 
contracts and accounting 2 2 
matters 4 
- Examining deal 2 2 
structuring 
Table 5.7: Internal audit's actual Vs preferred level of participation during post 
acquisition integration stage 
Nature /extent of 
Number of companies Number of companies 
involvement involved in this stage prefer to involve in this (out of 34) stage (out of 34) 
Play an advisory role to 
functions carrying out 10 14 
integration 
Audit acquired company 
profit performance before 55 
final closing of the 
contract term 
Help with the 
development of a 
communication policy to 33 
inform acquired 
company's staff regarding 
systems, procedures, risk 
Prepare a checklist of 
activities necessary to 5 
actualize expected value 
from the acquisition 
Advise on the approaches 
to issues e. g human 2 
resources in planning the 
transition 
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Table 5.8: Internal audit's actual Vs preferred level of participation during post 
acquisition audit stage 
Number of companies 
Number of companies 
Nature/ extent of involved in this stage prefer to involve in this involvement (out of 34) stage (out of 34) 
Audit integration process 
to identify control 23 19 
weaknesses 
Report findings to 
business units 
, 
audit 23 19 
committee, board 
Risk based audit of 
policies, procedures and 22 21 
controls in merged 
acquir d company 
Investigate whether the 
specific goals of the 12 16 
acquisition have been 
achieved 
Prepare "Lessons 
Learned" document about 9 17 
integration process 
Assess performance 
against benchmarks, e. g. 7 8 balanced scorecard and 
action plans 
Audit the post-acquisition 7 9 
appraisal system 
Develop standards and 
checklists for the 7 9 
governance of stand-alone 
acquired subsidiaries 
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5.5 Internal audit as a "value-added" tool during the M&A process 
Internal audit provides an independent and objective assurance and advice service to the 
board and the audit committee, assisting them in their responsibilities to comply with the 
business objectives. On the other hand, the Institute of Internal Auditors has updated its 
definition about the role of internal auditing. In this context, the key words are 
independent, objective, and systematic and finally add value. Despite this often top 
management may not realize that these attributes can be applied by internal auditors in 
the wider area of business risk management. Some may perceive internal auditors to 
have only financial expertise. Thus, boards and audit committees may therefore 
overlooking an opportunity to obtain greater business benefit from his skilled resource. 
One of the objectives of this research is to analyze the perception of the audit executives 
about the possible value added role of internal auditing during the M&A process. Having 
in mind their rich organizational expertise we asked them at first if internal auditing, from 
their point of view, can add value to the M&A process. Chief audit executives replied to 
our questionnaire agreed (64.7%) and strongly agreed (17.6%) that internal auditing can 
add value to the M&A process with a small percentage to be uncertain about the "value 
added" role. Figure 5.18 exhibits these results: 
Figure 5.18: Possible A value added role 
in the M&A process 
Uncertain 
17,6% 
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On the next question we asked chief audit executives to scale their perception about the 
role of internal audit during the M&A process. In the previous parts. we noted that a 
number of audit executives agreed about the new and proactive role of modern internal 
auditing. So, in this part we asked them if internal audit function could add more value to 
the M&A process if allowed to expand and cover all the stages ofthe deal. Results are 
not surprising and show the trend of chief audit executives to perceive that a more 
proactive internal auditing contribution can possibly add more value to the process. More 
specifically half of the respondents agreed that a more expanded role could offer grater 
value for the deal. But, on the other hand, there is also a part of respondents (32.4%) that 
are uncertain about the contribution and the value of an expanded role. Figure 5.19 
represents this difference: 
Figure 5.19: Possible value added and 
expansion of A role 
127 
Disagree Strongly Agree 
8,8% 8.8% 
To help understand where internal audit adds value we gave chief audit executives a list, 
at the end of questionnaire, of the various ways and techniques derived from the literature 
that could possibly add value to the M&A process. These techniques and tools derived 
from best practices and from the thorough literature review provided at Chapter 2. 
Responses vary from type to type and are presented below. 
5.5.1 Control self assessment 
Control self assessment is a process whereby employee teams and management, at local 
and at executive levels, continuously maintain an awareness of all material factors 
affecting the likelihood of achieving the organization's objectives, thereby enabling, 
where needed, them to make appropriate adjustments. To promote independence, 
objectivity and quality within the process, as well as effective governance, it is described 
that internal auditors are involved in the process and that they independently report 
results to senior management and board committees. 
Control self assessment is a process which allows and encourages line management, staff 
and internal auditors to participate in the review and evaluation of systems of internal 
control. Control self-assessment reduce the perception of audit as a negative, 
bureaucratic procedure, addresses risk management and analysis, improve appraisal of 
the 'soft' controls (such as communication, management information, tone at the top) and 
there is a better implementation rate of recommendations. On the other hand, it can be 
very costly because of factors such as consultants, time, and opportunity costs of using 
senior audit staff in non core activities. 
In our research almost half of the respondents either agree (41.2%) or strongly agree 
(8.8%) that control self assessment can be a value added tool. On the other hand another 
part is uncertain (17.6%) or has no opinion (23.5%) on the value added by using this 
technique during the M&A process. These results are summarized in Figure 5.20 
provided below: 
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Figure 5.20: Control self assessment 
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5.5.2 Consulting 
In literature review section we have analyzed the evolution of internal audit profession 
during the decades. The latest trend introduces the concept of consulting to the internal 
audit profession. Table 5.9 represents the trend and analysis of the returned 
questionnaires to this new role of internal auditing, according also to the new definition 
of internal auditing, which is almost the same as the previous one. Almost half of the 
respondents agree (41.2%) or strongly agree (8.8%) that consulting role can proved as 
value added during the M&A process. But we can note there is also a strong opposition 
to this perception that is uncertain (17.6%), has no opinion (23.5%) or disagrees (8.8%) 
with this role. 
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Table 5.9: Possible value added outcomes of consulting role during M&A's 
Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
Strongly Agree 3 8.8 8.8 
Agree 14 41.2 50.0 
Uncertain 6 17.6 67.6 
Disagree 3 8.8 76.5 
0 opinion 
Pý 
8 23.5 100.0 
Total 34 100.0 
5.5.3 Computer assisted audit techniques 
The increasing use of computer has, to an extent, put an organization's data beyond the 
reach of the conventional auditor. As part of the audit program and audit planning, the 
auditor frequently uses some types of computer tools simple such as spreadsheets, word 
processing as well as more sophisticated such as interrogation package or integrated test 
facility. The results showed that many internal auditors are uncertain (38.2%) that 
computer assisted audit techniques can be value added to the M&A process. On the other 
hand, many of the respondents agree (38.2%) or strongly agree (5.9%) that the use of 
computers in auditing can be quite value added. 
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Figure 5.21: Computer assisted audit techniques 
5.5.4 Risk Management 
According to the new philosophy of internal auditing as an effective risk management 
tool, key concept in risk management is the acceptance of a certain amount of risk as the 
price for operations and the expectation of some rewards. Once risk assessed and 
identified, decisions can be made about how to treat the consequences of that risk. The 
concept of risk is critical to the new definition of internal auditing as well as to the new 
COSO ERM framework. On our returned questionnaires, a strong proportion of 
respondents either agree (55.9%) or strongly agree (32.4%) that risk management can 
possibly add value to the M&A process. 
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Figure 5.22: Risk management 
Strongty Agree 
5.5.5 Making auditing more collaborative and participation on teams 
M&A is a dynamic process that brings teams forms both companies together. In the case 
of a finalized deal these people will create a strong base for the new entity. Thus, a 
section on the questionnaire had questions about the participating tasks during a merger 
and the possible added value of an effective communication and sharing or transfer of 
ideas. On the question about the participation on teams (Figure 5.23) and the possible 
positive contribution to the future entity 47.1% of respondents agree and 14.7% strongly 
agreed on the value added effect of this participation. 
On the other hand, in the question about making auditing more collaborative (Figure 
5.24) 14.7% disagreed and 26.5% had no opinion and 14.7% were uncertain about the 
value added outcomes of this practice. But there was another 41.2% that agreed that 
while audit staff still performs risk assessment and analysis, this collaborative effort helps 
bring out into the open issues that auditors may not have previously detected. On a 
similar question about the sharing of technology with the business units (Figure 5.25) and 
the recruiting of staff from other functions (Figure 5.26) such as finance, accounting and 
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No opinion 5.9% 
information technology almost half of the respondents felt that this practice could be a 
value added practice through the M&A process. 
Figure 5.23: Participation on teams 
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Figure 5.24: Make auditing more collaborative 
Strongly Agree 
2,9% 
Figure 5.25: Share technology with business units 
Strongty Agree 
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Figure 5.26: Bring business staff into auditing 
5.5.6 Internal control training, continuous monitoring and systems 
implementation review 
Internal auditors are often treated as internal control experts. Internal control is process, 
affected by an entity's board of directors, management and other personnel designed to 
provide reasonable assurance regarding the achievement of objectives about the 
effectiveness and efficiency of operations, reliability of financial reporting and 
compliance with applicable laws and regulations (COSO definition). Thus, continuous 
internal control training could be more value added for both the auditors and the 
company. 
But on this question we have a well balanced set of answers (Table 5.10). Half of the 
respondents agree or strongly agree while another half is uncertain, had no opinion or 
disagrees. The same trend is represented also to the question about the systems 
implementation review. On the other hand, we have more than half of the respondents 
that disagree (20.6%), strongly disagree (2.9%) or had no opinion (29.4%) about the 
value added role of continuous monitoring of the M&A process during the various stages. 
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No opinion Strongly Agree 
Table 5.10: Internal control training 
Frequency Percent (%) Cumulative Percent 
Strongly Agree 3 8.8 8.8 
Agree 15 44.1 52.9 
Uncertain 9 26.5 79.4 
Disagree 1 2.9 82.4 
No opinion 6 17.6 100.0 
Total 34 100.0 
5.5.7 Become a catalyst for change, conduct preventive audit, align with customers 
and reduce external auditing costs 
Another possible value added practice during the M&A process for an internal audit 
department could be to become a catalyst for change. Auditors have shifted from an 
emphasis on what has gone wrong citing errors to thinking about what outcomes will help 
a business unit to operate more effectively. But, on our survey more than half of the 
respondents were uncertain (26.5%) or had no opinion (26.5%) while 14.7% were 
disagreed about the value added outcome of this practice. 
One of the main components of the new philosophy for internal auditors is to conduct 
preventive audits rather than have a detective role. This type of auditing includes 
systems development review, self assessment programs and consulting and internal 
control education. Also, internal auditors partners with auditees to identify the most 
likely opportunities for continuous improvement. Responses to this question were equal 
distributed. 44.1 % were either agreed or strongly agreed while 26.5% had no opinion and 
23.5% were uncertain. 
Another value added practice derived from the literature is to align with customers. This 
means that in the audit planning stages, the audit staff meets with key business managers 
to learn their views of problem areas and where they would like to see auditors focus 
their efforts. Whenever the auditing department develops a new audit procedure or 
monitoring tool, they consider how it can be transferred to management to be used by 
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them. But respondents were uncertain (41.2%) or had no opinion (29.4%) about the 
possible value added outcomes of this practice. 
Finally, anything that an internal audit department can do to reduce costs can add value to 
the company. Sometimes internal and external auditing can have overlapping procedures 
or audit areas. An effective internal auditing contribution to the various stages of an 
M&A could reduce external auditing costs and thus add value to the process. Almost half 
of the respondents (47%) agree or strongly agree while a third of them (29.4%) were 
uncertain about the possible value added effects of this practice. 
5.6 Summary 
- 
Preliminary conclusions 
This part will summarize the bulk of statistical tables and figures presented above. In 
general this research revealed representativeness of industrial sectors and countries 
included in the sample. Twenty main industry sectors as well as nine out of the fifteen 
countries of the European Union were represented in this study. A great percentage 
already has an M&A department in their organizations, used external parties for the deal. 
Also, the majority of internal audit departments has been established in these 
organizations for more than twenty years and employs more than ten auditors in their 
internal audit departments. 
A great percentage of respondents agreed that internal audit can add value to the M&A 
process. But if we summarize the actual against the preferred role of internal auditors 
(Table 5.11) we conclude that although a great percentage (82.3%) prefer to act "after the 
fact" and coactively as risk based auditors or internal consultants, 29.4% currently acts as 
watchdogs and internal control experts, 5.9% as box checkers and 8.8% has no role 
during the M&A process. 
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Table 5.11: Summary of actual Vs preferred role 
ROLES CURRENT ROLE PREFERRED ROLE 
Box Checker 5.9% 2.9% 
Watchdog & Internal 
Control Expert 
29.4% 8.8% 
Risk BasedAuditor 35.3% 58.8% 
Internal Consultant 8.8% 235% 
No opinion 5.9% 2.9% 
None 8.8% 
- 
Other 5.9% 2.9% 
Next step on this study was to analyze the contribution of internal auditing at the various 
M&A stages according to the current and preferred situation. Starting from current 
situation (Table 5.12) we note that the great majority of respondents are not involved or 
have no involvement during the strategy development stage. Surprisingly we can note 
the same trend for due diligence stage. Finally, at the post acquisition integration stage 
we note a balance between no or little involvement and moderate or major involvement 
and on post acquisition audit stage the majority of respondents had moderate or major 
involvement. 
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Table 5.12: Summary table of the contribution of internal auditing at the various 
M&A stages 
- 
Current Situation 
S tages t  
Post 
- 
Post 
- M&A Strategy 
\ 
Due Diligence Acquisition Acquisition 
Development 
Extent of Integration Audit 
e in I . volvem nt volve ent 
Major 
- 
8.8% 11.8% 52.9% 
Involvement 
Moderate 
2.9% 11.8% 35.3% 26.5% 
Involvement 
Little 
20.6% 32.4% 26.5% 8.8% 
Involvement 
Not Involved 67.6% 41.2% 20.6% 5.9% 
None 8.8% 5.9% 5.9% 5.9% 
If we want to summarize also the results for the preferred situation of the contribution of 
internal auditing to the M&A stages (Table 5.13) we can note that apart from strategy 
development stage that a great majority of respondents do not prefer to involve or prefer 
to have little involvement, at the other three stages (due diligence, post acquisition audit 
and post acquisition integration) the majority of respondents prefer to have a greater level 
of involvement. 
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Table 5.13: Summary table of the contribution of internal auditing at the various 
M&A stages 
- 
Preferred Situation 
Stages t   
M&A Strate gy Post - Post - 
\ 
Development Due Diligence Acquisition Acquisition Integration Audit 
ýxtento f 
nivol t Ivement in ve ent 
Major 
Involvement - 17.6% 23.5% 73.5% 
Moderate 
Involvement 11.8% 47.1% 41.2% 17.6% 
Little 38.2% 14.7% 14.7% 
- Involvement 
Not Involved 32.4% 14.7% 11.8% 
- 
None 17.6% 5.9% 8.8% 8.8% 
In summary, the stages, in the descending order of the degree of internal audit's 
involvement in the M&A stages are as follows: 
0 Post acquisition audit 
0 Post acquisition integration 
9 Due diligence 
e M&A strategy development 
We must note that Table 4.1 and Figures 4.1 and 4.2 illustrated country and industry 
classification in the sample. We have tried to analyze if there are major differences in 
current and preferred practices in relation with some variables such as country of origin, 
industry and size of the internal audit department. We found that eventual differencies in 
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frequencies and means are not statistically significant and this is probably due to the 
response rate and the distribution of the replies. 
When comparing the normative model to the observed and preferred practitioner models 
for M&A activities, a number of gaps have been identified. Although a great majority of 
chief audit executives prefer to expand their roles during the M&A process, data analysis 
revealed that almost a third of respondents continue to act "after the fact" and not 
proactively. Also, their contribution to pre-acquisition stages (such as strategy 
development and due diligence) is low to moderate. 
A great number of respondents believe that internal audit can add value to the M&A 
process. On the other hand, there is also an important part of respondents that are 
uncertain or disagree about the contribution and the value added of a possible expansion 
of internal auditing into a proactive process. We can also summarize from the current 
and preferred practices that most of the chief audit executives do not have some preferred 
practices in mind in order to expand their roles in the early stages of strategy 
development and due diligence. Although there was a part on the questionnaire in order 
to mention other current or preferred practice, different of those presented in the 
literature, none of the respondents contributed any innovative or different practice. 
At the third stage of this research, semi-structured interviews will be conducted with 
practitioners on the internal auditing area in order to identify and present the reasons for 
the gaps previous analyzed. These gaps can be categorized as general, management 
related and internal audit related. Also, useful recommendations for an effective internal 
audit involvement in M&A activities could be used in order to present a variety of 
opportunities for internal audit to actively participate and respond to the needs of their 
organization in a more proactive and consultancy role. 
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6 EMPIRICAL DATA ANALYSIS 
6.1 Introduction 
Previous chapters presented and analyzed mergers and acquisitions phenomenon in 
relation to the internal auditing contribution to the various stages of an M&A. This 
chapter will try to summarize, analyze and validate the three different models derived 
from the literature review, the postal questionnaire (sent to 120 organizations in the 
European Union area that pursued mergers and acquisitions between 01/01/2000 
- 
31/12/2003) and also the use of data derived from semi 
- 
structured interviews conducted 
at this stage. 
In order to validate preliminary and descriptive data we decided to follow a qualitative 
approach through semi-structured interviews. This methodology increases reliability and 
generalisability of "raw" quantitative data, supporting accordingly research hypotheses 
and questions. The main problems of a qualitative approach focus on the difficulties to 
replicate it, as well as, possible bias and subjective view of the participant's. On the other 
hand, in this research qualitative semi-structured interviews were used as a method in 
order to support primary data, leading to more unbiased opinions. In order to overcome 
participant's bias we selected our sample from different countries and industries and 
supported interviews with the use of an "aide-memoire" (see Appendix C- Aide 
Memoire) summarizing the main objectives of this research. 
As mentioned at the research methodology, it was decided to conduct semi 
- 
structured 
interviews with a selection of internal audit managers and practitioners, different of those 
participated at the postal survey, that their organizations participated in M&A projects. It 
was also considered that if these opinions supported the primary analysis, the results 
could therefore consider as evidenced. The sample was taken from organizations that 
experienced mergers and acquisitions in the European Union area and were not the same 
as those selected in the previous sample. Communication details for the head of internal 
audit departments were found from existing contacts and the contribution of local 
Institute of Internal Auditors affiliates. The primary aim was to select a representative 
sample (in terms of country and industry classification). 
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An e- mail was sent, containing all the necessary feedback and objectives of this research 
in order to inform them more effectively about the aim of the interviews. Because of the 
low level of response rate we re-sent the e- mail to the sampling organizations. Finally, 
and after the follow up e- mail, ten internal audit managers and practitioners were agreed 
to participate and interviewed. Figure 6.1 illustrates country classification of the 
interviewees participated. 
Figure 6.1: Interviewees (Sort by 
Country) 
Netherlands 
20% 
Greece 
Italy 50% 
20% 
UK 
10% 
m Greece 
ýmUK 
o Italy 
c: i Netherlands 
Participating interviewees and their organizations were drawn from a variety of industries 
(three from telecommunications, three from banking and financial services, two from 
food and beverages and two from manufacturing). As mentioned, these interviews had as 
a primary objective to validate the preliminary results derived from the descriptive data 
analysis (such as current, preferred and ideal situation) and also provide useful feedback 
about the reasons for the gaps identified at the analysis and comparison of these three 
different models("as is", "as to be" and "best practice"). Based also on their strong 
organizational and audit experience we tried to formulate, having also as a basis the 
postal survey results, a best practices model applicable to the environment of the 
European Union organizations and summarize their recommendations for a possible 
active internal audit involvement during M&A process. 
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6.2 Actual participation of internal audit function in the different stages of 
mergers and acquisitions 
- 
Observed Model 
Analysis of postal questionnaires revealed interesting points about the role internal 
auditors currently play during the various stages of M&A projects in the European Union 
organizations. The trend derived from the analysis of postal questionnaires is that, 
although internal audit profession has evolved during the years to a more pro 
- 
active and 
consulting activity, almost half of the respondents indicated that they have only post 
- 
active or no role during the M&A process. On the other hand a great majority agreed (70, 
6%) that internal audit has a role to play during the M&A process and this role should be 
more proactive than post-mortem. 
It was also evidenced at the conclusion of the previous chapter that internal auditors has 
no or little involvement at pre 
- 
acquisition stages (97% during strategy development and 
20% during due diligence stage) and their major involvement is limited at the post 
- 
acquisition audit stages (47% during integration and 80% during post 
- 
acquisition audit 
stage). In summary, according to the previous analysis, the stages in the descending order 
of the degree of internal auditors' involvement, is as follows: post 
- 
acquisition audit, 
post 
- 
acquisition integration, due diligence, strategy development. 
During my interviews with internal audit practitioners the researcher set this preliminary 
data in order to collect their opinion and also validate our descriptive analysis. The 
directors were asked about the nature and extent of involvement in their organizations 
during M&A projects and also comment on the results of the postal survey concerning 
current situation. 
Question: Do you believe that internal audit has a role during the M&A process? 
At first, in this general and introductory question, all the participants agreed on the 
general assumption that internal audit has a role to play during the M&A process and this 
role should be more proactive than post-mortem. 
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Question: nat is the level of internal audit involvement at the various stages of an M&A 
proiects in your organizations? 
But in more specific questions, concerning the level of involvement in their 
organizations, responses were contradictory. It was interesting to notice that participants 
from mature business and internal audit environment, such as United Kingdom and 
Netherlands, indicated that they had a more active role and participation at the early 
stages of M&A projects. On the other hand, participants from countries with less mature 
internal audit departments (such as Greece) indicated that their role was limited only at 
the post 
- 
acquisition stages. 
In the cases of active internal audit involvement, it was indicated that 
"Top management believed that internal audit function contributed very 
effectively to the whole M&A process", (LI Manager, Netherlands). 
Internal auditors contributed at the early stages of the M&A process, visited acquired 
companies approximately four months before the acquisition in order to perform generic 
risk analysis and their role was 
"To prevent the company to score their own goal ", (L4 Manager, UK). 
This quote forms the basis of the value added role of internal audit function 
"Not quantifiable but based on the opportunity cost", (L4 Manager, UK). 
These cases of effective internal audit contribution were taken into consideration by top 
management, which then wanted a more closely supervision and participation by internal 
audit department in the cases of M&A projects. 
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Also, the main task of internal auditors in the pre-acquisition stage was 
"To visit acquired company and perform generic risk analysis and focus 
primarily on processes and procedures and not in financial matters", (L4 
Manager, Netherlands). 
Apart from these cases, general view derived from the interviews supports primary data 
collected through descriptive data analysis and demonstrates that internal audit function 
has low to moderate level of involvement during the pro 
- 
active M&A stages. All the 
participants indicated and recognised during the interviews this general trend and their 
views were based on their rich organisational and practical experience in the area of 
internal auditing. 
Question: What is the reason of low to moderate level of internal audit participation on 
pre-acauisition stajzes Las evidenced also from quantitative data analysis of postal 
guestionnaires)? 
Directors were also asked to comment on the reasons for this low to moderate level of 
internal audit participation on pre 
- 
acquisition stages. It was interesting to notice that in 
the cases of organizations with low or no involvement at earlier stage, internal audit 
directors were reluctant to participate quoted that 
"Strategy and audit are opposite because strategic decisions are taken by 
management", (LI Manager, Italy) 
And although they perceive that their departments possess the necessary skills in order to 
contribute to M&A process it was quoted that 
"Internal audit involvement can prove time consuming", (L4 Manager, Italy) 
and is also ambiguity about the final result of the deal. 
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It was also stated that 
"The use of internal auditors during pre-acquisition phase is often prevented by 
the owners of the target company and although internal audit can add value to 
this process practically its role is limited by the fact that confidentiality prevails 
at this stage ". (L4 Manager, Netherlands). 
Another important factor indicated, supported also by the high level of third part 
involvement (such as investment banks or audit firms) evidenced at the descriptive data 
analysis is 
"That target companies are very reluctant to disclose confidential information to 
the possible buyer and prefer outside companies / consultants, who will sign a 
confidentiality agreement and report to the buyer in a controlled manner". (L4 
Manager, Netherlands). 
An important issue, derived from the interviews and linked with the previous paragraph, 
relates the level of objectivity and independence of an internal audit function participated 
at the early stages of an M&A process. Directors supported the view, presented earlier at 
the literature review, of possible impaired objectivity quoting that 
"Buyers' shareholders and management wants to have a completely independent 
view / check of the target company, whereas an internal auditor working as an 
employee for the h uyer may he considered to be less independent, also depending 
on hislher reporting line ". (L4 Manager, Netherlands) 
and 
"Possible participation of internal audit function in the assessment of strategic 
decisions can increase the danger of impaired objectivity and independence ", (IA 
Manager, Greece). 
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Directors were also stated, in order to support the reasoning for management reluctance 
on possible internal audit participation, that: 
"If management wants to sell or acquire another company, doesn't want to show 
or reportproblems in operations or control weaknesses that couldprobably delay 
orpostpone the deal", (IA Manager, Greece). 
Fast process of preliminary communication and deal structuring often prevents the 
participation of internal audit function at the early stages of M&A process. Additionally, 
top management wants the deal done before the competitors have the time to make 
necessary strategic moves and create conflicts or increase the value of the deal. Also, 
management doesn't want to present control weaknesses or related problems to possible 
target companies and this perception is embedded because of possible negative reaction 
of the shareholders of the acquirer. 
Another important issue indicated from practitioners is the perception, embedded on the 
different and multiple functions participated at the different stages of the M&A process 
(such as finance, IT, accounting, legal), of overlapping responsibilities and tasks 
performed by internal audit function indicating that 
"Management often perceives that possible internal audit involvement at the early 
stages could be time consuming for the finalization of the deal", (LI Manager, 
Greece). 
Apart from these general views about the possible reasons of this low and partial level of 
involvement during the pre 
- 
acquisition stages, interviewees provided also very useful 
feedback and illustrated the picture of their internal audit departments, as well as their 
views about the reasons related to internal audit function from their rich experience and 
background. 
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One main aspect illustrated (especially from the interviews in Italy and Greece) is the 
possible weaknesses at the entity level, control environment and corporate governance 
practices at their organizations. It was also pointed out that internal audit function is not 
yet quite mature at these organizations in order to participate effectively in specialised 
projects such as M&A. Also, and as a result of these weaknesses at the control 
environment, audit committees do not effectively contribute to the M&A process and 
thus cannot assign necessary resources for a more active participation. 
It was also quoted that 
"Resources of the internal audit department are too limited at the present 
situation in order to accept any role right now in a possible M&A project", (IA 
Manager, Greece). 
This view correlates with the issue of poor corporate governance and audit committee 
contribution to the M&A process. On the other hand there are often practical aspects of 
this low level of involvement at pre-acquisition stages because 
"due diligence in some cases has to be executed by local auditorsfor language 
and regulatoryframeworks reason ". (L4 Manager, Greece) 
and also 
" there is no flexibility, especially in small audit shops, to the annual audit plan 
and scarcity of resources in the staff (such as experience and expertise in such 
areas)", (L4 Manager, Greece). 
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Ouestion: Can vou indicate important steps or best practices gMerienced from your 
professional and organisational gMerience? 
One very important aspect of this research is to decipher current situation in terms of 
current best practices during an M&A project. Participating interviewees were asked to 
propose some of their current best practices exercised in their organisations during the 
stages of M&A project. A more detailed and summarised (in terms of M&A stage) 
analysis is provided in the final part of this chapter. On the other hand, as quoted, during 
strategy development stage interviewees on those organizations that had some level of 
involvement indicated that they 
"Audit the process of risk assessment and management". (IA Manager, 
Netherlands), 
"Investigated whether control issues were addressed in the planning process", 
(LI Manager, UK) 
and finally 
"Listed possible acquisition risks in the future control environment of the new 
company". (LI Manager, UK). 
During due diligence stage, internal audit practitioners stated that they developed plans in 
order to integrate internal audit of merging firms, conducted due diligence alongside with 
other functions such as accounting, finance and law and worked with external 
consultants. In addition, internal auditors were used in order to map and assess possible 
risk areas and inspect, based in their knowledge and expertise, the target's company 
control environment. 
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During the post 
- 
acquisition integration stage, interviewees noted that they had an 
advisory role to functions carrying out integration and 
"Determine additional synergy (such as cost savings, group purchase power), if 
allowedfidl access to the target's information ", (IA Manager, UK). 
Finally, during the final stage of post 
- 
acquisition audit, internal auditors audited 
integration process to identify control weaknesses, reported findings to business units, 
audit committee and Board, investigated whether the specific goals of the acquisition 
have been achieved and prepared "Lessons Learned" document about integration process. 
In summary, feedback and knowledge gained during semi 
- 
structured interviews with 
internal audit practitioners helped the researcher to confirm and support our preliminary 
results derived from the returned postal questionnaires. As indicated, the general trend 
evidenced is that current situation seems contradictory. The researcher believes that in 
mature internal audit departments (in countries like Netherlands or United Kingdom) 
current situation does not seem so negative concerning the issue of pre 
- 
acquisition level 
of internal audit involvement. In these cases internal audit department had an active role 
and helped their organizations on the buyer's procedures, reporting systems and control 
environment. 
On contrary in other cases, in less developed and less matured internal audit departments, 
the pre 
- 
acquisition role was very limited and often internal audit managers were 
reluctant about a possible more active involvement is stages such as strategy development 
or due diligence. This reluctance was partly due to the management decision to not 
include internal audit department in pro 
- 
active stages. In general, the semi 
- 
structured 
interviews carried out by the researcher confirmed our preliminary results and gave as a 
"rich" picture of internal audit departments in leading edge organizations that pursued 
M&A projects in the European Union area. 
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The main point at this stage is the "confusion" of some internal audit practitioners about 
their different roles in an organisation. It is evidenced from this research that internal 
audit departments are not yet and often are reluctant to participate in pro-active stages of 
M&A, encounter also the reluctance of top management to accept their new consulting 
and advisory roles. The researcher believes that internal auditors are not quite confident 
about the possible positive contribution during the stages of M&A and also tend to act as 
assurance activity and after the event, in order to discharge any responsibilities in the 
case of negative results. 
6.3 Internal auditor's preferred roles during the different stages of M&A 
- 
Preferred Model 
Another important objective of this research was to identify the views of respondents in 
the internal audit area about their preferred role during the stages of an M&A project. 
Descriptive data analysis revealed that the majority (almost 80%) of the respondents 
prefer to act as risk-based auditors or internal consultants and prefer also to have little or 
moderate involvement at pre-acquisition stages (such as strategy development, deal 
structure and due diligence). 
Having also in mind this preliminary data analysis the researcher set as aim of the semi 
- 
structured interviews conducted, the participants' (internal audit managers and 
practitioners) views and opinions about their preferred role during M&A projects in their 
organizations. Their views took also into consideration these preliminary results obtained 
from the returned postal questionnaires setting also the base for the formulation of the 
preferred model. This model represents a crucial part of this research because it sets the 
objectives and the direction of internal audit departments for a possible more active 
involvement in the various stages of M&A projects. 
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Question: Apart from your current level of involvement, can vou su-ajzest a preferre 
role(s) for your internal audit department during the stages (eMeciall(y pro-actives) of an 
M&A pLoject? 
Concerning the issue of their preferred role, participants were asked about their potential 
roles in a case of a future M&A project, taken also into consideration results derived from 
the preliminary survey. All the participants during the interviews indicated that internal 
audit role during M&A projects can be more proactive but, on the other hand, some 
interviewees were reluctant about a possible participation of their internal audit 
departments in M&A projects during pre 
- 
acquisition stages. They quoted that this view 
is due partly on the perception that 
"Strategy and internal audit are opposite and that major strategic moves (such as 
M&A) are setting by management whereas internal audit involvement could be 
time consuming and out of the audit scope ", (IA Manager, Greece) 
and also 
"Internal audit departments are risk aversefor possible responsibility in the case 
of afailure " (LI Manager, Greece). 
It is interesting to note that interviewees that do not prefer and are reluctant on the issue 
of a possible greater level of involvement during pre-acquisition stages in their 
organisations, tend also to act after-the-event and participated only in post-acquisition 
stages in past M&A projects. Although all the interviewees preferred to act as 'risk based 
auditors' or 'internal consultants' apart from their traditional role of internal control 
expert and 'after the fact' investigators, it was also quoted that 
"Internal auditors are often confused about management's expectations on M&A 
projects". (IA Manager, Italy), 
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and also 
"A possible consulting role could jeopardize their traditional role thus not 
contribute effectively to the audit objectives and audit plan ", (L4 Manager, 
Greece). 
On the other hand, and in the cases of interviewees willing and prefer to have greater 
involvement (in United Kingdom and Netherlands) at pre-acquisition stages in their 
organisations, it was indicated that 
"Internal auditors can possibly add value to the M&A process because of their 
wide knowledge and understanding of the potential buyer's organization, 
procedures, reporting systems and internal controls ". (L4 Manager, Netherlands). 
The main areas where internal auditors ascertained their level of expertise and prefer to 
focus are due diligence, risk assessment and control environment assessments. They 
prefer also 
"To determine additional synergy (e. g. cost savings, group purchase power), if 
allowedfull access to the target information ". (LI Manager, UK). 
Question: Do you believe that internal audit departments and practitioners possess the 
necessarE skills in order to participate effectively during M&A proiects? 
Another important aspect of the interviews was practitioner's views about their internal 
audit departments and the ability of their staff in a possible future active involvement in 
M&A projects. It was not surprising that all the interviewees were quite confident that 
their internal audit departments are in position and also their internal auditors has the 
necessary skills and level of professionalism in order to participate actively and 
effectively on pre 
- 
active roles. On the other hand, some practitioners pointed out some 
concerns on the issue of 
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"Possible difficulties in order to gain access and useful information from the 
target companies", (L4 Manager, Greece) 
and also 
"Staff availability and resources needed in order to raise the level of expertise 
needed in order to effectively contribute to the M&A process", (L4 Manager, 
Greece). 
Question: In the case of a future active particfpation of your department in an M&A 
, 
proiect: can vou indicate also your preferred best practices or actions followed? 
Interviewees were also asked about their preferred actions in the case of a future 
participation of their internal audit departments in M&A projects. As indicated they 
"Prefer to assess and report on the control environment and the entity 
- 
level 
controls of the target company in order to gain understanding and have the full 
picture'of the possible acquired company ", (LI Manager, Greece), 
and also 
"raise and elevate the risks in the potential acquired company". (L4 Manager, 
Greece). 
On the other hand, despite their willingness to participate in M&A projects, they have to 
overcome budget and resources problems and negative perception from management of 
the target company. 
Despite the fact that a number of interviewees noted that they prefer to have a low level 
of involvement during strategy development stage, on the other hand and in the case of a 
possible decision by top management for a more active participation, 
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"They prefer to concentrate in the areas of risk assessment of the potential 
acquired company", (L4 Manager, Greece) 
and also 
"Raise the level offamiliarity of the target company and have the full picture 
when the deal will hefinalized", (L4 Manager, Greece). 
This increased level of familiarity will also 
"Facilitate post-acquisition audit and planning because of the preliminary 
information gathered hefore the deal" (L4 Manager, Italy). 
Also, and during due diligence stage, it was quoted that a main objective can be 
"An understanding of the risk areas of the future company and thus concentrate 
on high risk cycles and gain uniformity on the procedures, processes and 
information systems integration ofthe new company", (L4 Manager, Greece). 
This level of involvement can proved cost effective for the bidder company at the 
integration stage of the deal. 
In summary we can conclude that a general census about the role of the modem internal 
auditors (supported by practitioners and academics) indicates the emphasis of internal 
audit departments in consulting and advisory activities apart from their traditional role. 
This has brought concerns about the ability of internal auditors to function in an 
independent and objective manner and also participate in specialized projects such as 
mergers, acquisitions and strategic alliances. 
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Internal audit practitioners participated in this research (at the postal survey and the 
interviews) quoted that they possess the necessary skills in order to effectively participate 
in M&A projects. Their responses illustrated also that they prefer to have a level (low or 
moderate) of involvement in pro 
- 
active stages and thus perform activities such as 
advising and consult on systems and processes, assess risk areas, gain useful information 
on the target's control environment or conduct initial due diligence. 
The researcher believes, based also on the descriptive and empirical data analysis, that 
internal auditors have the motivation to participate on M&A projects and upgrade their 
role in the organisation. On the other hand, they have to overcome various and very 
important problems such as limited budget and resources, negative perception from 
management about their new role and limited allocation of audit resources from audit 
committee. 
Also, and apart from their indicated preferred roles, the majority of interviewees pointed 
out that management often perceive internal auditors just as fact checkers and not as a 
source of important new information whereas prefer that their departments can 
effectively contribute and have a full picture during an M&A project, because of their 
deep knowledge and experience on processes and thus support senior management as key 
advisers through the whole process. 
On the modem unstable and risky business environment of an M&A process and also the 
great number of failures on the achievement of predefined objectives, the implementation 
of a comprehensive proactive and integration process could be valuable for the bidder 
company. Thus, internal audit function can upgrade its role and has the potential to 
participate to the various stages of an M&A project and thus contribute on the 
achievement of predefined objectives and possibly add value to the deal. 
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6.4 Gap identification and analysis 
Descriptive data analysis and further exploration on specific parts of the postal 
questionnaire revealed interesting points for the current and preferred situation, 
concerning the issue of internal audit involvement during M&A projects in the sampling 
organisations. On the other hand, extensive literature review revealed interesting issues 
on mergers and acquisitions in general and, more specific, on the state of the internal 
audit maturity across countries and the level of involvement in M&A projects. 
According to the normative model (derived from the extensive literature review), internal 
audit profession has evolved from its focus on detail testing of internal controls and 
checking boxes on internal control questionnaires, to a more proactive and consultancy 
role. Over the last few years, the importance to strong corporate governance of managing 
risk has been increasingly acknowledged. Organisations are under pressure to identify all 
the business risks they face; social, ethical and environmental as well as financial and 
operational, and to explain how they manage them to an acceptable level. Meanwhile, the 
use of enterprise-wide risk management frameworks has expanded as organisations 
rccognise their advantages over less coordinated approaches to risk management. Internal 
audit, in both its assurance and its consulting roles, is in position to contribute in the risk 
management process. 
The trend, derived also from the literature, is that internal audit function can work 
effectively at the pre-acquisition stages analyzing and auditing target company's 
operations and processes (in order to assess the level of adequacy of internal control 
systems), map key risks and controls and prepare a remediation plan in order to consult 
and help target company comply with the overall environment of potential parent 
company. According to this new role presented in the literature, management has the 
primary rcsponsibility to assess risk and design, implement and maintain, on an ongoing 
basis, important control points within an organization and provide assurance to the audit 
committee and senior management as to the state of risk and the system of internal 
controls. 
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Finally, according to the general overview of the published best practices and directions, 
we can indicate a trend for internal audit departments to proceed to a more active role and 
participation to the M&A process and to evolve from a traditional approach and 
methodology to a more detailed and 'before the fact' approach. We can also note the need 
for a more effective internal audit contribution to post 
- 
acquisition stages and active 
participation to the integration stage. 
When comparing the three different models (normative, observed and preferred), the 
researcher identified a number of possible gaps in terms of level of involvement, focus, 
scope or methodology (see Figure 6.2). 
Figure 6.2 Gap identification and analysis 
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MODEL GAPS 
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As evidenced from descriptive data analysis, a great number of respondents (70,6%) 
believe that internal audit has a role to play during the M&A process and also that their 
preferred role should be more proactive than post 
- 
mortem. On the other hand, although 
respondents prefer to expand their roles during the M&A process, data analysis revealed 
that almost a third of respondents continue to act "after the fact" and not proactively 
160 
(35% act as 'box checkers' and 'internal control experts') although almost all (90%) 
prefer to act as internal consultants and risk based auditors. 
Data analysis revealed also a low level of internal audit contribution and involvement in 
these organizations during pre-acquisition stages (such as strategy development and due 
diligence). On the other hand, their responses revealed that they prefer to participate 
earlier and during pre 
- 
acquisition stages rather than just act as fact checkers and 
conduct post 
- 
acquisition audits after the M&A process. Also, a great number of 
respondents perceive that a possible internal audit contribution can add value to the M&A 
process but on the other hand an important number are uncertain or disagree about the 
positive contribution and the value added to the organization in the case of a possible 
future expansion of internal audit function into a proactive process. 
The researcher summarized these different gaps identified in terms of audit scope, focus, 
level of involvement and methodology. The following table exhibits this categorisation. 
Table 6.1: Gaps identified 
Models 
OBSERVED PREFERRED NORMATIVE 
MODEL MODEL MODEL 
InternalAudit 
Post acquisition Due diligence 
FOCUS M&A Process 
audit Integration 
SCOPE Limited Expanded Full 
LEVEL OF 
Low Moderate Moderate 
INVOLVEMENT 
Limited audit of 
METHODOLOGY Risk management Risk Management 
target processes 
ROLE Post-mortem Proactive Proactive 
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An important objective of this research is, apart from the gap identification, the reasoning 
behind these differences. These gaps were surnmarised and sent to the interviewees prior 
to the conduction of the semi-structured interviews in order to provide us with a great 
level of feedback and support these reasons. In order also to group and address these gaps 
more effectively, we divided them into two main categories such as management related 
and internal audit related. 
6.4.1 Management related reasons for the identified gaps 
The first issue set at the discussion with the interviewees was the responsibility of 
management as a reason for these gaps. It was indicated that the use of internal auditors 
during a pre 
- 
acquisition stage is often prevented by the owners of the target company 
"Because they don't want to present control weaknesses and thus reduce the price 
of the deal". (L4 Manager, Netherlands). 
Another important aspect illustrated at the interviews is that management often prefer 
outside consultants rather than in house internal audit function. The reason lies on 
managements' perception that outsourcing can contribute a greater level of necessary 
skills and needed expertise in order to successfully overcome internal audit issues and as 
quoted 
"Outsourcing means shifted responsibilities ", (LI Manager, Netherlands). 
This was also clear from the descriptive data analysis illustrating that a great number of 
deals were processed with the direct involvement of third parties such as investment 
banks, audit finns or both. This synergy can lead also to a full package of financial and 
audit services and thus decline the overall cost of the deal. 
It was also indicated that a possible internal audit involvement, especially at the pre - 
acquisition stages, could be 'lime consuming". This means that often management wants 
to close and finalise the deal as early as possible in order to prevent possible takeover 
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defence measures from competitors. Also, the decision behind a possible merger deal is 
based on the strategic needs of the company and takes into consideration possible 
positive synergies for the bidder company. Thus, top management perceives that a 
possible internal audit involvement can delay M&A process. 
Another related issue was the tight time framework of the deals. As quoted 
"Because of the nature of M&A process there is always, especially at the early 
stages, the possibility of a failure and negative outcome of preliminary 
discussions. Tight timeframes prevent management to include internal auditors in 
the process andpostpone their participation after the deal is done ", (L4 Manager, 
Greece). 
Also, management of the target company prevents the likelihood of internal audit access 
because 
"Target companies prevent to disclose confidential information to the possible 
buyer", (L4 Manager, Italy). 
This means that management of the potential target company prevent the disclosure of 
potential control weaknesses identified during the pre 
- 
acquisition contacts and thus 
deduct the overall deal value. 
The researcher believes (based also on the descriptive and empirical data analysis) that 
management is one pole of explanation of this low level of involvement during pre- 
acquisition stages. This perception is due partly to the image of traditional internal 
auditor used only to assure internal controls in an organisation. Although internal audit 
activity has as a primary objective this level of assurance, management is not yet 
convinced about the possible value added outcomes of an integrated internal audit 
approach during the whole M&A process. 
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As evidenced also from the interviews, top management (especially in organizations with 
poor control environment) seem to be reluctant and prefer to outsource necessary skills 
(such as due diligence). A few exceptions cannot change overall perception and it is 
internal audit function that needs to convince top management that possesses necessary 
skill and knowledge in order to participate effectively in M&A projects. 
6.4.2 Internal audit related reasons for the identified gaps 
Apart from management related reasons for the gaps identified, interviewees provided us 
with great level of feedback for reasons based solely on internal audit function. 
Interviewees were asked to comment on the responsibility of internal auditors for this low 
level of involvement as well as for not integrating to consulting activities. One important 
reason indicated from the interviewed practitioners is that 
"Specific tools (such as control self assessment, risk identification and 
assessment, specialised audit software) are recently introduced in the internal 
audit profession and are not yet used and contrihute during specialized projects 
such as M&A "0 (L4 Manager, Italy). 
This means that existing internal auditor's toolkit cannot yet effectively contribute and 
support internal audit effort during M&A projects 
Also, management of internal audit departments often doesn't take the initiative to 
change management's perception about the role of internal auditors and the possible 
positive contribution in M&A projects. It was indicated that this reluctance is due on the 
"Attitude of internal auditors to not have any responsibilityfor a possiblefailure 
or delay during the deal", (LI Manager, Greece). 
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In addition, 
"Internal audit departments don't have, especially in the case of cross border 
acquisitions, the necessary knowledge of local regulatory frameworks, 
economical and political environment o the target company", (L4 Manager, )f 
Greece). 
This situation deteriorates also current situation of limited budget and resources 
(especially in small audit shops), thus 
"It is very expensive to develop the skills needed in order to overcome effectively 
and efficiently in an M&A project and maintain a stable and experienced M&A in 
order to participate in this type ofspecialisedprojects ", (L4 Manager, Greece). 
In combination with previous analysis, it was indicated that in order to participate and 
contribute effectively to M&A projects 
"Internal audit departments need to deviate from the yearly audit plan", (M 
Manager, Greece). 
This type of decision needs the total support of audit committee and supposes careful 
planning but often 
"Management and audit committees perceives that there is no need of internal 
audit participation during the early stages of M&A, thus there are reluctant to 
verify a deviation or a modification of the annual audit plan". (L4 Manager, 
Greece) 
Apart also from these two categories of reasons, interviewees provided some general 
points in order to evidence the gaps identified in the previous analysis. First of all, it was 
indicated that 
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"Target companies are very reluctant to disclose confidential information to the 
possible buyer, often being a competitor and prefer outsourcing to audit 
consultants, which they sign confidentiality agreement", (L4 Manager, 
Netherlands), 
and thus 
"Report to the buyer in a controlled and confidential manner", (IA Manager, 
Netherlands). 
Also, in the cases of failure of a deal, target company doesn't want to disclose 
confidential and sensitive information to the buyer 
The issue of independence and objectivity is also very important and this is due to the 
"buyer's shareholders and management needfor an independent view and audit 
of the target company, whereas an internal auditor working as an employee for 
the buyer, may be considered to be less independent and biased, depending also 
on his reporting line ". (IA Manager, UK). 
Specialised knowledge was quoted also as very important reason because I 
"Some tasks, especially in cross 
- 
border acquisitions, have to be executedfrom 
local internal auditors (often outsourced) for cultural and effective 
communication reasons". (L4 Manager, Greece) 
and 
"Administrative functions and legal departments are usually involved instead of 
internal audit". (L4 Manager, Italy) 
often perceived as overlapping activity. 
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In general, and during the interviews, internal audit practitioners agreed that the image of 
internal auditors as mindless box 
- 
tickers checking compliance with centrally imposed 
procedures, processes and systems is out of date. On the other hand they indicated, from 
their perception and professional experience, that internal auditors have not all become 
risk management professionals whose role is to identify, assesses and mitigate business 
risks. 
They had also noticed that in some organizations, internal audit departments were more 
willing to proceed and organize workshops or seminars in which risks were idcntif"led and 
assessed and also used specialized audit software in order to prioritize risks. On the other 
hand, other internal audit departments prefer to act with more 'traditional' roles such as 
post and after 
- 
the 
- 
fact activities such as full scope audits. 
A general view derived from the interviews is that most of the responses and attitude of 
the practitioners were not surprising and indicated the confusion that internal auditors 
often perceive about their current role in the organisation, indicated also at the 
preliminary results derived from the returned postal questionnaire at the previous stage of 
this research. 
It was also revealed that the great majority of internal auditors prefer to move forward 
and participate to proactive activities in the case of M&A projects but they are often 
reluctant because of the embedded perception of the management in their organizations. 
This explains also the current low level of internal audit involvement in pro-active 
activities, such as strategy development and due diligence stage, and is based on the 
management's perception of a possible internal audit involvement during pre-acquisition 
stages. 
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6.5 Suggested list of possible prerequisites 
Apart from the gap identification and analysis, the researcher set as primary objective the 
identification and analysis of possible prerequisites that can bridge effectively the gaps 
between the three different models (see Figure 6.3). During the interviews, the researcher 
tried to explore further and set a number of questions concerning the future of internal 
audit profession, as well as the possible prerequisites that can help bridge the gaps and 
used as pillars for a possible expansion of internal audit function into consulting or pro- 
active stages. Their views were based on their personal perception and experience in the 
internal audit area as well as a deep knowledge of the economic environment in their 
organisations. 
Figure 6.3 Possible prerequisites 
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Question: From you professional gMerience can vou provide us vourview on possible 
y the ggRs prerequisites in order to bridge effectivel identified through descrintive data 
analysis? 
Their responses and views were categorized in order to present more effectively the areas 
that possibly need further improvement in order to bridge the gaps identified. 
W Intention from management of the internal audit department to participate in AMA 
projects and organizational culture 
One of the major prerequisites indicated during the interviews is the intention of the hcad 
of internal audit department to participate and contribute effectively in specialized audit 
projects such as mergers and acquisitions or strategic alliances. As quoted: 
"it is the responsibility of the chief audit executive to recommend at regular 
meetings the intention to participate in current or future M&A projects", (L4 
Manager, UK) 
It was also evidenced from the interviews that often management of the internal audit 
department had not the intention to participate during the pre-acquisition stages, leaving 
the responsibility solely to top management to decide. Although it is management's 
responsibility to recommend and approve internal audit involvement, head of internal 
audit department can set some basic thoughts to top management and motivate a future 
more active participation. 
Also, and as part of the control environment, 
(d an organizational culture that perceives internal audit function as a value added 
activity and encourages and motivates internal audit input as monitor, adviser and 
consultant", (L4 Manager, UK) 
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can support a possible expansion of internal audit engagement in earlier stages during an 
M&A project. 
K, Active participation of chief audit executive or manager of the internal audit 
department in the Audit Committee 
Another important factor indicated during the interviews is the possible activc 
participation of chief audit executive or the head of the internal audit department in the 
Audit Committee. This participation can prove quite helpful and constitutive 
"in order to convince top management for the possible value added from the 
participation of the internal audit departments in M&A projects ", (LI Manager, 
UK). 
An effective Audit Committee 
"is the cornerstone of good corporate governance " and also "has the responsibility and 
credibility to convince top management for the possible participation of internal audit 
team in the M&A process". (L4 Manager, UK). 
Head of internal audit department can "motivate" members of the Audit Committee to 
concentrate in areas of focus such as scope of audit work, risk management, control 
issues and non-recurring transactions such as M&A and also 
"Can work closely with the chairman of the Audit Committee in order to identify 
potential risks of the parent company ", (L4 Manager, UK). 
Also, the chairman of the Audit Committee 
"Must have a high level of credibility in the organization in order to convince top 
managementfor a possiblefuture active involvement", (LI Manager, UK). 
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W Increased level of independence, objectivity andprofessionalproficiency 
In order to overcome possible issues of impaired independence and objectivity (sct also 
as a reason for the reluctance of management to assign pro-active activities during M&A 
projects) and for the reinforcement of independence of internal audit department internal 
auditors and chief audit executives must report directly to the Board and the Audit 
Committee. Concerning the issue of objectivity, interviewees indicated that 
"Internal auditors must remain objective in their performance of consulting 
activities and must make a balanced assessment of all the relevant 
circumstances", (LI Manager, Italy). 
They must also not be influenced by their own interests or by others in forming their 
judgments and thus reflect an unbiased assessment of the situation. This desired level of 
independence and professionalism will not result in a perceived or actual loss of 
objectivity and thus internal auditors can assist in order to effectively play the role of 
both monitor and advisor and remain objective. 
An important prerequisite, linked also with the issues of objectivity and independence is 
the level of internal audit professionalism. Practitioners indicated that 
"internal auditors must possess the necessary knowledge and skills in order to 
monitor, audit and consult on the target company's systems, processes and 
procedures", (L4 Manager, UK). 
Top management must also be convinced that the internal audit department has the 
necessary expertise, in order to effectively assess control environment and activities of 
the target company and thus facilitate opinion at the pre - acquisition stage and have a 
general overview if the deal is done. 
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R. Evidence and cases of effective contribution of internal audit function it: AMA 
projects 
A good level of documentation of positive outcomes in cases of active intcmal audit 
involvement during pre-acquisition stages can be used as competent evidence. As quoted 
ft presentation of case studies or evidence of mistakes andfailures in AMA projects 
due to the low level of involvement of internal audit departments, with parallel 
underlining of possible value added in cases of a more expanded role, can prove 
quite helpfulfor the reversal of top management perception about the possible future 
role and contribution of internal audit department in the AMA process "0 (LI 
Manager, Netherlands). 
F Rotation of internal audit staff 
An important factor, indicated also earlier from the interviewees, is the quality of human 
resources in the internal audit department in order to overcome effectively a possible 
involvement during the M&A stages. As indicated 
"A good selection of human resources for the staffing of an experienced audit 
team can help to participate more effectively to the M&A process as well as a 
stable audit team with specialized knowledge and background (e. g. finance, 
accounting, local and international regulatoryframeworks) canform the basisfOr 
an effective participation and contribution to M&A projects ", (LI Manager, 
Greece). 
Rotation of staff between internal audit and administrative functions can prove also very 
helpful and constructive in order to gain experience of the various processes and 
procedures in the company. 
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K, Use of specialized audit toolkits 
- 
Some interviewees indicated also the use of 
specialized audit toolkits or the update of existing ones in order to support effectively 
and efficiently internal audit work. 
As mentioned 
"The introduction of specific audit toolkits and softivare, properly parameterized 
for M&A projects could be very helpful for the support of internal audit leant 
assigned with specialized M&A projects " (LI Manager, Italy). 
This toolkit can comprise, for example, risk assessment software, specific audit programs 
suitable for the various stages of M&A and electronic working papers. This bulk of audit 
work could be saved in a repository database in the internal audit department. 
W Level of responsibility of internal audit opinion in M&A projects 
Responsibility of internal audit opinion remains a key issue because, as indicated 
"Outsourcing due diligence means also shifted responsibilities", (LI Manager, 
Netherlands). 
Head of internal audit function can have the opportunity to expand internal audit 
involvement in M&A projects 
"If it can underline the level of responsibility of internal audit opinion in the case of 
negative orpositive outcome in M&A projects ", (L4 Manager, Netherlands). 
This means that internal audit function can be perceived and used as an advisor during 
M&A projects if the head of internal audit accepts a level of responsibility on the opinion 
or suggestions of internal audit function to top management. In this case, management 
would prefer to use internal auditors' opinion rather than outsource during the stages of 
an M&A project. 
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R Annual audit coverage plan 
A possible adjustment in the annual audit plan was mentioned as an important success 
factor in the case of internal audit contribution. Because of the nature of internal audit 
function 
"There is always a bulk of audit projects, assignments and needs, thus chairman of 
the Audit Committee alongside with the head of internal audit function need to 
establish priorities and obtain the audit committee's formal approval of the adjusted 
audit plan", (L4 Manager, Greece). 
This adjustment can be part of the risk assessment stage and would help to establish an 
internal audit team and assign responsibilities and tasks without interrupting normal audit 
activities approved in the audit plan. 
W. Risk assessment 
As indicated, internal auditors together with the top management of the bidder and target 
company need to identify functional and risk areas, prioritize risks and create the risk 
profile of the target company. In order to effectively participate in this assessment, head 
of internal audit need to review preliminary information and data from the target 
company. Also 
"An experienced head of internal audit function has the needed expertise to 
understand business environment as well as consult on the risk assessment 
stage", (L4 Manager, Italy) 
resulting in pro-active participation and integration of internal audit function to more pro- 
actively tasks, apart from the traditional role to assure the system of internal controls. 
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IF, Reportingfindings on key risks and recommendations against the risk profile 
Last but not least, an identification of the key controls and findings of the preliminary 
audit as well as subsequent recommendations and list of the potential acquisition risks 
can form the basis for the post-acquisition audit of the new formed business, helping also 
expand the level of internal audit participation in future M&A projects. 
6.6 Best Practices Model for effective internal audit involvement during the 
various stages of M&A activities 
The last objective of this research is to formulate a best practices model in order to 
effectively support a possibly internal audit involvement during the stages of an M&A 
project. At first, the researcher included a section in the postal questionnaire, contained 
best practices derived from the literature review. Participants were asked to choose if they 
had applied or prefer to apply these practices. Data analysis (provided in more detail at 
the previous chapter) revealed their preferences. The researcher used these findings 
during the semi-structured interviews in order to support and validate these data, and also 
gain feedback in more detail for the possible actions undertaken in these steps. 
Question: Can you indicate, from your gMerience in your organizations, actions or best 
practices g&verienced (orprefer to fMerience in the fiiture) from your company during 
the stages of an M&A projects (e. gg. stratM development, due diligence, post-acquisition 
integ-ration, post-acquisition audit)? 
Best practices model (as shown at Figure 64) constitutes the final outcome of the 
previous analysis, concerning the identification of the three models as well as gap 
analysis and potential prerequisites in order to bridge them effectively. 
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Figure 6.4 Best Practices Model 
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6.6.1 M&A strategy development stage 
The first stage of every M&A activity is the strategy development stage. Corporatc and 
business strategy has evolved in recent years and M&A can be looked as major stratcgic 
move in order to gain competitive advantage. Strategy can be effective if goals arc simplc 
and long term, through profound understanding of the competitive environment and 
objective appraisal of resources. 
As noted previously, a great majority of internal audit departments have no or very low 
level of involvement at this stage. The majorities of respondents are reluctant to 
participate at this stage and suggested that often top management does not inform them 
about possible non-recurring events. Also, interviewees quoted their views on the issue of 
this low level of involvement. On the other hand the researcher summarized best 
practices indicated at the postal questionnaire and presented to the interviewees, in order 
to validate them and gain feedback on possible best practices at this stage. Interviewees 
recommended that during strategy development stage internal auditors can: 
Audit the process used in assessing and managing risk 
-A risk based approach focuses 
on the identification of risks and can help the companies to determine what events or 
circumstances could cause an obstacle in order to meet corporate objectives. Interviewees 
indicated also the new approach 
"that the organization identifies risks before the impact of control measures and 
also measures and considers controls only after risk identification is complete ", 
(TA Manager, UK). ": L 
As also indicated, internal audit can play a geater role as a 
'facilitator in the event identification and as a consultant in the risk assessment 
stage during an M&A project", (IA Manager, Greece). 
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Receive communication about deals and non-recurring events 
- 
It was indicatcd as of 
great importance the communication to the internal audit dcpartmcnt from top 
management and with all necessary information about non-recurring events such as 
possible mergers and acquisitions. 
As indicated 
"internal audit department must be the recipient of all necessary information and 
feedback about current or future events and also about changes in corporate 
objectives or strategy ", (L4 Manager, Greece). 
This type of communication can help internal auditors to determine possible future risks 
and plan more effectively audit plan and control issues. 
Investigate whether control issues were addressed in the planning process - Because of 
the nature of business environment, often M&A deals are accomplished in a limited time 
framework and top management doesn't take into consideration major control issues or 
deficiencies of the target company. 
As quoted 
"Internal auditors possess necessary skills in order to assess and indicate if 
control issues addressed during M&A strategy development stage were taken into 
consideration after the deal". (LI Manager, UK). 
This practice can help also at the post-acquisition integration stage in order to encounter 
future control issues. 
Advise on systems andprocesses that could reduce acquisition risk -A possible merger 
or acquisition of a target company encounters significant changes on systems and 
process. It was indicated that 
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"Internal auditors can participate at the pre-acquisition stages in order to map 
systems and processes of the target company and thus can help the company to 
reduce or mitigate possible post-acquisition risks", (LI Manager, UK). 
An effective documentation and assessment of the possible risk and control issues at a 
pre-acquisition stage can also reduce the cost of integration of these systems and 
processes at the newly formed company. 
6.6.2 Due diligence stage 
Due diligence is the process of identifying and confirming or not confirming the business 
reasons for the proposed capital transaction in an M&A. As evidenced from the I itcrature 
and the returned questionnaires, internal auditors are not participated in the due diligence 
process and if participated their involvement began later in the process. On the other 
hand, internal auditors can provide senior management with vital information about the 
value of the company being acquired, its financial condition and any weaknesses in its 
financing or internal controls strengths and weaknesses. Because senior management 
already has partly decided the planned M&A, often due diligence is more of a fact 
finding mission than a critical step on the decision process. 
Very often management perceives internal auditors as fact checkers and not as a source of 
important new information. This trend was also indicated in our research at the 
descriptive data analysis of the returned postal questionnaire illustrating that the majority 
of internal auditors have little or moderate involvement. On the other hand, most of the 
respondents wanted a greater level of involvement during this stage because they already 
have knowledge of the operations and employees in every important area in the acquiring 
company and thus can be extremely valuable as key advisers to senior management 
throughout the M&A process. 
The researcher set all this preliminary analysis to the interviewees in order to validate and 
gain suggested best practices during the due diligence stage. Participated internal audit 
managers and practitioners asserted that internal auditors can: 
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Conduct due diligence alongside with other functions such as finance, accounting, 
human resources, law 
- 
During an M&A project several functions are involved in the 
process. 
"A good communication level between several functions of bidder company can 
help to avoid unnecessary duplicates or additional efforts and inefficiencies ", (IA 
Manager, Netherlands). 
Also the direction of the bidder company's due diligence efforts 
"Depends heavily on what the company expected to gainfrom the transaction in 
terms of employees, processes, products or customers ", (M Manager, Italy). 
Develop plans in order to integrate internal audit of merging firms and review the 
internal audit function in Target Company 
-a major problem often noted during an 
M&A project is the duplication of functions and departments after the event occurs. 
Practitioners agreed also that it can be useful and time effective to develop preliminary 
planning for the audit of the new merged firm. 
This practice can be effective if 
"There is a high level of integration of the internal auditfunction after the event ", 
(L4 Manager, Greece). 
This high level of integration can be reality 
"Through preliminary review of the target's company processes, organizational 
status and entity level controls as well as a good level of communication between 
the internal auditors of the target and hidder company", (MAlanager, UK). 
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Also another major issue after the merger process is the integration between the new 
departments of the merged firm. This issue can prove time consuming and can lead to 
corporate failure because of the low level of integration between the various departments 
of the new firm. Internal audit function of the bidder company can communicate 
benchmark and assess internal audit department of the target company, leading to a gap 
analysis between the two functions and careful plan the new function in order to 
effectively integrate and function after the event. 
Ensure due diligence covers financial, operational and compliance issues 
- 
Internal 
audit function can be used as "reviewer" in order to ensure that due diligence has covered 
all the key and major issues concerning financial, operational and compliance areas. 
This objective can be achieved more effectively 
"Through detailed review and assessment of the documentation carried out by 
otherfunctions of thefirm "P (L4 Manager, Greece), 
"Communication between participatingfunctions ", (LI Manager, UK) 
and 
"Effective level of communication between various functions and top 
management", (L4 Manager, Greece). 
Ensure that weaknesses identified in due diligence are considered in finalizing the 
deal 
- 
Internal auditors can assess and follow - up on the major issues identified during 
the due diligence stage. At this point it was indicated that 
"Internal auditors can assess the level of compliance with the deficiencies 
identified and report on the issues that were not considered and can be proved 
riskyfor the success of the M&A project ", (LI Manager, Greece). 
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Work with external consultants carrying out due diligence 
- 
It is a very common 
practice, and also evidenced from the literature review and postal survey at the previous 
chapter, to use a third party (such as audit and law firms) and outsource the majority of 
actions during due diligence stage. As quoted, internal audit function 
"Has the necessary knowledge and expertise to cooperate andfacilitate the work 
of external consultants leading to cost and time savings for the company " (M 
Manager, Greece). 
Ensure awareness of regulatory and other compliance matters 
- 
As indicated earlier 
at this research, mergers and acquisitions are bounded with tough regulatory frameworks 
concerning the issue of competitive advantage and avoidance of monopolies or 
oligopolies. These frameworks (especially in the European Union area) had been the 
reason for large M&A failures and cost heavily in order to comply with these regulations. 
As illustrated 
"Internal auditors can help during the M&A process based on their expertise and 
documentation of different regulatory issues", (L4 Manager, UK). 
This level of expertise derives also from the main responsibility of internal audit function 
compliance with laws and regulations and the responsibility of the internal audit function 
for the level of compliance maintenance. 
Document business processes and control points of the target company 
- 
It was 
indicated that another important success factor during an M&A process be the audit of 
the business processes of the target company. Practitioners revealed the importance of 
this action quoted that 
"A diagnostic review of the main processes and mapping of the main risk areas 
and control activities in place can be quite useful for future audits. This review 
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can save time during post acquisition audit stage and internal audit function can 
rely on previous documentation andfocus on testing ofdocumented controls ", (IA 
Manager, UK). 
6.6.3 Post- acquisition integration stage 
The term post 
- 
acquisition integration refers primarily to the combination of two or more 
companies. It is the first post - acquisition stage and a well planned and integrated M&A 
project can be a very positive force for the successful completion of the deal. At this very 
important stage the main objective is to integrate smoothly to "one firm" and accomplish 
the planned level of synergy. Integration stage can be very risky because it is a time of 
great uncertainty for human resource, especially in the target firm. 
As evidenced from the descriptive data analysis, internal auditors have greater level of 
involvement during this stage and thus can help company to generate cost savings and 
possibly minimize acquirer's risk and possibility of failure. Using also data derived from 
semi-structured interviews we can conclude that internal auditors during this stage can: 
Play advisory roles to functions carrying out integration 
- 
As quoted, 
"Internal auditors can play an advisory role and work as bridge builders and 
coordinators between the various functions of the bidder and target firm", (M 
Manager, UK). 
During this stage there are various changes in the internal environment of the new firm 
and management or employees may often be distracted. Internal auditors can case their 
fears and communicate effectively the objectives of the new firm and because of their 
level expertise and knowledge of the control environment can assist other functions such 
as finance, information systems or human resource to overcome possible obstacles during 
integration stage. 
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Prepare a checklist in order to map activities and issues determined at pre- 
acquisition stage - In order to review effectively post-acquisition progress during 
integration stage 
"Internal auditfunction canformulate andprepare of a checklist of activities and 
issues determined at previous stages, in order to ensure that predetermined steps 
have beenfollowed"Y (L4 Manager, Greece). 
Development of such list requires a mapping and setting up of core processes and 
systems that needs to integrate, in order to gain synergy and lead to value added from the 
deal, and are determined at the due diligence and strategy development stages. 
Help with the development and implementation of a communication policy to 
inform acquired company's staff regarding systems, procedures, risk - One of the 
main objectives of the internal audit function is the review and assurance of effective 
communication channels in the company. Internal auditors can work as 
"Facilitators and implement a communication policy in order to inform 
effectively personnel about the new environment", (L4 Manager, Italy). 
All personnel need to receive clear messages during this turbulent period in order to 
smoothly integrate on the new systems and processes and internal audit function can 
consult and advise on the formulation of a communication policy. 
Also, and for the effective flow of information in a large and newly created organization, 
"Communication difficulties can he reported timely and supported by open 
channels of communication and a willingness to listen ", (LI Manager, UK). 
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6.6.4 Post-acquisition audit stage 
The final stage of an M&A project is the post-acquisition audit. At this stage, and as 
evidenced from the literature review and descriptive data analysis, internal auditors have 
the greater level of involvement comparing to the other stages. An important and crucial 
part at this stage is the level of involvement of internal audit function during the previous 
stages. As indicated from the interviewees, a low level of involvement of intcmal audit 
function can lead to difficulties and time consuming activities in order to gain 
understanding of the key risks and processes of the new built organization with 
implication in the documentation of key controls and the development of the audit plan. 
On the other hand, practitioners noted that a greater level of involvement of internal audit 
function can lead to "a deeper knowledge of the newly acquired company and the 
difficulties faced at the previous stages". This means that audit planning can be designed 
in detail and focus in the key areas. This pre-active involvement could be also cost and 
time effective. As a result of greater experience at this stage, practitioners provided a 
great number of practices, based also at the analysis of the postal questionnaire. Internal 
auditors at this stage can: 
Audit integration process to identify control weaknesses 
- 
One of the main tasks of 
the internal audit function can be the audit of the integration process. In the case of active 
internal audit involvement at the integration stage, internal auditors can effectively 
document and identify potential control weaknesses. The main areas of focus, as quoted, 
can be 
"The assessment of the entity's level control environment ", (LI Manager, 
Greece), 
"Review existing policies and procedures of the target firm", (M Manager, 
Greece) 
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and also 
"Review the flow of information, vertically and horizontally, as well as the 
effectiveness of the existing reporting and communication channels ", (M 
Manager, UK). 
Report findings to business units, Audit Committee, Board of Directors 
- 
It was 
indicated as essential and important task of the internal audit function to report findings 
after the finalization of the deal to business units, the Audit Committee and the Board of 
Directors. 
As illustrated by the interviewees, the internal audit report will contain the audit scope 
and objectives, documentation of internal control system in the target company, main 
control weaknesses identified and a possible remediation plan for the compliance with the 
control environment of the bidder company. 
it was also quoted as essential 
"the effective communication of the report to the Audit Committee and Board of 
Directors in order to have a first picture of the acquired company and take all 
necessary measures in order to integrate and operate as "one" company", (LI 
Manager, UK). 
Audit and review policies, procedures and controls in merged / acquired company 
- 
In order to review various policies, procedures and controls of the target company 
internal audit function can use the risk based approach. This means that the audit plan 
will be based on a risk assessment and on corporate objectives set by the new 
management. Internal auditors can then define the scope and objectives of the audit and 
proceed to the documentation and assessment of the various risks and the controls in 
place in order to mitigate these risks. This approach can identify the gaps in the control 
procedures and prepare a remediation or compliance plan in order to proceed to an 
integration of policies, procedures and controls. 
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Investigate whether specific goals of the M&A project have been achieved 
- 
Anothcr 
important practice indicated during the interviews is 
"The investigation and the level of compliance with the specific goals and 
objectives set at the beginning of the M&A project". This task can be exercised 
more effectively and efficiently if internal audit function participates actively to 
the pre-acquisition stages and had a "clear picture of the preliminary goals and 
objectives of the deal ", (IA Manager, Greece). 
Prepare "Lessons Learned" document about M&A process 
- 
Practitioners also notcd 
that 
"Many companies significantly underestimate the amount of time and resources 
needed resulting in constraints toward the end of the AMA project", (IA 
Manager, UK). 
Thus, and towards the end of the project, there is a big opportunity to reflect back and 
document significant "Lessons Learned" implications from the M&A project. Major or 
minor issues arose can be summarized and used to address obstacles during the M&A 
project and set a smoother course for a future M&A event. 
This document can also include the most significant observations and comments from the 
participation of the various stages of an M&A and also recommendations relating to 
project management, scoping, risk assessment, documentation of internal controls and 
deficiencies evaluations. 
Good understanding of the target company - The last, but not least, action noted by 
practitioners is the need for internal audit department to function effectively as a 
"member of the new shaped company". This means that internal auditors can evaluate 
and review control environment, reporting lines, information systems and the structure of 
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the target company in order to smoothly integrate to post 
- 
acquisition audit and crcatc an 
effective audit plan. 
6.7 Summary and conclusion 
This chapter had as a primary objective to validate preliminary data analyzed through the 
descriptive analysis, gain understanding of the gaps identified through the comparison of 
the present, preferred and normative situation and finally provide some prerequisites in 
order to bridge effectively these gaps, as well as, a best practices model for an effective 
internal audit contribution during the various stages of an M&A project. This empirical 
analysis was based on semi-structured interviews conducted with internal audit managers 
and practitioners in the European Union area. 
One of the main objectives of the research was to analyze the current role of internal 
auditors in M&A projects in the European Union. Previous research (Selim eval, 2002) 
has shown that even though internal auditing has expanded its role in many business 
processes, M&A activity does not seem to be an area where it has effective contribution 
apart, in some cases, from during the due diligence or post-acquisition audit stage. In this 
study, 70 percent of respondents stated that internal auditing has a role to play in the 
M&A process, adding that their role should be more proactive than post mortem. One- 
third of the respondents described their current role in the M&A process as "watchdog" 
and "internal control expert, " and a small percentage viewed their role as "box checkers. " 
The general trend derived from the interviews is that the low level of involvement in the 
proactive stages of M&As seems to indicate that management just wants the deal done 
and believes either that internal auditing cannot contribute or it will add too much time to 
the pre-acquisition stages. On the other hand, this survey also included questions about 
the preferred role of internal auditing in M&As. Fifty-nine percent of respondents say 
they prefer to act as "risk-based" auditors, with 24 percent saying they would like the role 
of "internal consultant, " indicating that many practitioners want to move forward and 
provide a more proactive role. This trend also is represented in their responses about their 
Iss 
level of involvement in pre-acquisition stages, such as strategy developmcnt or due 
diligence. 
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7. SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
7.1 Executive summary 
Previous chapters analyzed the M&A of companies and the role of internal audit function 
through the various stages of an M&A project. Literature review of various journals and 
textbooks as well as information gleaned and presented in chapter two were used to 
construct the objectives of this research. Next step comprised the analysis of the research 
methodology used, in order to effectively analyze and satisfy the research objectives. The 
methodology was based on a survey through the use of a postal questionnaire, sent to 
chief audit executives of 120 bidder organizations that pursue mergers and acquisitions in 
the European Union area during the period 01/01/2000 
- 
31/12/2003. Returned 
questionnaires formed the basis of the descriptive data analysis, comprised by current and 
preferred situation, actions and best practices. 
Descriptive data analysis revealed important issues when comparing the "as is" to "as to 
be" situation and a number of gaps were identified. This analysis formed the basis for the 
empirical data analysis. This stage comprised the validation of the descriptive data and 
the issues identified through semi 
- 
structured interviews with internal audit managers 
and practitioners, in organizations that participated in M&A projects in the European 
Union area. Their expertise and wide knowledge supported our preliminary results and 
gave us strong feedback and comfort in order to validate the reasons for low to moderate 
involvement in M&A projects and the gaps when comparing the three different models. 
We identified and collected also a number of potential prerequisites in order to increase 
the level of internal audit involvement in M&A projects. 
Final step of this research was to validate best practices and actions indicated through the 
returned postal questionnaires. The contribution of interviewees during the semi- 
structured interviews was of great importance, and their suggestions & recommendations 
supported and enriched our preliminary best practices model. As indicated earlier at this 
research, this model is not intended to limit internal auditors but it can be used as a useful 
tool and benchmark in order to direct internal audit function, especially in the case of 
active participation in each stage of an M&A project. 
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7.2 Conclusion 
This research tried to explore the internal audit role during the various stages of M&A 
projects in the European Union area. As indicated in the literature review, M&A projects 
encounter a great number of risks and, in the majority of studies, end up in failures and 
loss of shareholder wealth. These exposures are often the reasons that lead to major 
failures in the financial or operational area for the recently constructed entity. On the 
other hand the role of internal audit function has changed during the last two decades. 
Internal auditors have evolved from their traditional role of internal control experts to a 
more pro-active and risk-based approach. This means that they moved forward from the 
assessment of internal controls to a more advisory and consulting role and from a 
primarily control-based approach to a predominantly risk-based approach. 
Descriptive and empirical data analysis pointed out and indicated very clearly that 
internal audit function, in the majority of organizations taking part in this research, has 
little involvement during the pro-active stages of M&A projects. On the other hand, it is 
interesting to notice and explore that internal auditors prefer to participate more actively 
in specialized projects such as M&A and also highlighted a desire to become more 
associated and involved at the earlier stages in the process. 
Another interesting point derived is that the majority of internal auditors took part in this 
research perceive that internal audit participation can add value to the M&A process, and 
also this value can be enhanced if their role is allowed to expand. Overall, participants 
agreed that it is management's overall responsibility and decision for the participation of 
internal audit function at the various stages of M&A projects. It was interesting to notice 
that a key prerequisite indicated is the change of management's perception about the 
role of internal auditors during M&A projects. On the other hand, interviewees agreed 
also that internal audit function must possess the necessary skills and knowledge in order 
to provide quality and value added output. 
The results of this research had indicated also a number of gaps when comparing current 
and best practices (normative) model with the preferred roles internal auditors indicated 
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through the postal survey and the semi-structured interviews. This means that although 
articles and case studies in the literature indicate a number of best practices and positive 
contribution to all the stages of M&A projects, descriptive and empirical analysis in this 
research pointed out the reluctance and confusion internal auditors often perceive in their 
organizations during M&A projects. This gap analysis leaded also to the identification of 
a number of prerequisites in order to bridge the differences in the management and 
internal auditors' perception, as well as, a number of best practices and actions in a 
possible future internal audit engagement is this type of projects. 
This research has supported also the perception that although internal audit profession has 
evolved from a "box-ticking" perception to a more risk-based and consultancy function in 
the organizations, internal audit practitioners often are reluctant to change embedded 
management view about the roles and responsibilities of internal audit function during an 
M&A project. The main responsibility for a future greater level of internal audit 
participation in M&A projects remains to top management but, on the other hand, 
management of the internal audit department has to give the direction and convince audit 
committee for the quality of its opinion. 
A possible opportunity for a possible future expansion of internal audit's role in M&A 
project is the introduction of Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002). The Act does not explicitly 
mention mergers and acquisitions; however acquisition minded companies that fail to 
consider the Act's implications may be in unpleasant surprises. Since the certification and 
attestation requirements of Sections 302 and 404 apply to internal controls over the 
company's entire financial statements - including acquisitions completed before the 
reporting date - the Act may have an impact on certain merger and acquisition processes. 
The practical impact for companies is that Section 302 assessments will have to include 
acquired entities, beginning with the first quarter - end after the acquisition. Management 
must also consider the impact of acquisition on its 404 assessment. 
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Knowing that management's certifications under Sections 302 and 404 of the Act will 
ultimately apply to acquisitions, internal audit team can consider the materiality of a 
target relative to the business and also the quantitative and qualitative elements of 
materiality. Internal audit teams can be involved at the pre-acquisition stages in order to 
assess the materiality (alongside with top management of the target company) and also 
assess the ways management will accomplish compliance. After the acquisition, internal 
auditors can participate on the documentation of internal controls; assess their design and 
operating effectiveness as well as the level of compliance with those of the bidder firm. 
Management could fail also to identify and anticipate non-recurring transactions such as 
mergers and acquisitions or also fail to establish appropriate policies and procedures. 
Internal auditors can ensure the existence of non-routine written policies and procedures 
and consult, for example, on the completeness of specific responsibilities or the 
procedures for the flow of communication of working group with senior management, the 
audit committee. 
The role of internal auditor continues to evolve and the recent emphasis on consulting 
activities has brought concerns regarding the ability of internal auditors to function in an 
independent and objective manner. Internal auditors need to explore their consulting role 
as one in which they provide objective feedback to management. Internal auditors must 
continue to demonstrate that they add value to their organization but they need also to 
perform their consulting role very carefully in order to maintain their unique aspect of 
independent and objective assurance in the organization. 
This new role and task should not jeopardise their "traditional" role as internal control 
experts and overcome major operational or compliance risks and controls in the 
organization. Management of the internal audit department, audit committee and the 
Board of Directors are in position to define and use internal audit function as important 
tool for the attainment of corporate objectives and their participation in specialized 
projects such as M&A. This research highlighted the intention of internal auditors to have 
a greater level of involvement in this type of projects, defining also the need for expertise 
audit teams especially in large audit shops. 
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As a defined objective of this research a best practices model was also developed, in 
order to provide a basis and a benchmark to future participation of internal audit teams in 
M&A projects. This model was derived from the formulation and covering of three 
different models the normative (formulated using the extensive literature review); the 
observed and the preferred (based on the postal questionnaire), their comparison and the 
validation (through the interviews with internal audit managers and practitioners) of the 
practices mentioned in the descriptive data analysis. 
On the other hand, we must note that there is no evidence in this research that mentions a 
surely positive outcome for the bidder company if these best practices were followed. 
This means that the use of these best practices must not be seen as a panacea but only a 
useful guide derived from the organizational and internal audit experience of the 
participants and the interviewees. 
By providing an objective and proper assessment and evaluation of business risks 
attached during an M&A project, internal audit function can challenge and find new 
opportunities for the expansion of their role to a more pro-active and consulting role 
apart from its "internal control" based role. In order to effectively meet predefined 
objectives, it is essential that internal audit function and internal auditors have access to 
all appropriate information, sites, systems, processes and people. 
In addition, management of the internal audit department must ensure that the remit of 
internal audit function is understood and respected at all levels within the organization 
communication with internal audit is on an honest and open basis and also internal 
auditors are not excluded but seen as valuable function within a new environment. 
Also, significant emphasis on verbal and flexible communication with management at the 
planning and pro - active stages is essential, because on going communication with 
management during the assignment execution ensures that factual matters are confirmed 
and verified. This communication can be facilitated, if internal audit function has 
sufficient status within the organization, in order to perform its work free from 
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interference. It can be enhanced by having direct access and periodic meetings with the 
audit committee and also open communication lines with senior management to ensure 
critical issues are addressed on a timely basis. 
Finally, management of the internal audit department must also ensure that internal audit 
function is adequately resourced in terms of budget and staff and sufficient level of 
knowledge and experience of the business processes, business risks, best practice 
controls, regulatory requirements and audit tools and methodologies. This level of 
expertise can be supported with the implementation of an effective training process that 
will provide the internal audit department with a range of skills in order to falfil its 
mission effectively. A well designed training program enable internal audit's ability to 
provide and demonstrate its value service and facilitates the transfer of accumulated skills 
and experience into the business. 
The people who are responsible for the expansion of internal audit role during the stages 
of M&A projects are primarily internal auditors (and more specifically management of 
the internal audit department) and top management. On the other hand, audit committee 
and Board of Directors can set a disciplined framework and the appropriate "tone at the 
top" in order to guide internal audit function to a consulting role in the organization. 
7.3 Opportunities and areas for future research 
Mergers and acquisitions are an area with enormous research potential and opportunities. 
M&A projects involve complex interrelated mechanisms for the bidder and the target 
company. Literature review has shown that there is an enormous number of articles and 
research conducted on the issue of M&A activity, from financial and managerial 
pcrspcctive. 
On the other hand, the role of internal auditors during the stages of an M&A project as 
well as in different types of projects has not yet been researched in a satisfactory level. In 
addition to some of the issues raised above, the researcher believes that there are 
opportunities for future research in internal auditing and M&A activities and these studies 
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can help to shed more light to the possible internal audit role in a complex activity such 
as M&A's. 
i. Extent research questions and sampling population in order to include the 
enlarged European Union area (adding ten new countries recently joined) 
As indicated in the research methodology, this study has limited its sampling population 
in the European Union area before the joining of ten new countries in 2004. Sampling 
period was set between 0 1/0 1/2006-31/12/2003, and organizations selected were picked 
from the 15 existing countries in the European Union area. Further research may include 
all 25 countries and extent also the sampling period after 2004 in order to decipher the 
role of internal audit function during M&A projects in the enlarged European Union area. 
In addition, this enlarged sampling population can lead to a greater response rate and 
therefore can lead to a comparison and a statistical analysis between countries, industries, 
size of internal audit department and the differences between current and preferred 
practices as well as internal audit department profile. An analysis of eventual differences 
in frequencies and means can lead to statistical testing and the extraction of interesting 
points. 
ii. Carry out a longitudinal study and replace postal questionnaires with case 
studies 
In this research, a number of organizations could be selected and the researchers can 
observe, evaluate and assess the roles played by internal auditors in the sampling 
organization. The researcher can collect a large number of data during the M&A project 
and provide a rich and "on the job" basis, in order to effectively analyze the role of 
internal audit function and thus propose necessary changes in the future role. On the other 
hand, in this type of study, the researcher must overcome a number of risks such as 
restricted access to the selected organizations and possible bias. 
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In addition, a research including top and senior management expcctation's from intcmal 
audit function, alongside with their opinion for current and prefcrrcd rolc during M&A 
projects can extract very useful points and decipher management view for the dircction 
and scope of internal audit department. 
iii. Carry out a study for the internal audit role in other forms of AMAs, such 
as corporate divestments, joint ventures 
A further limitation of this study, set at the research methodology stage, was that this 
research was based only in mergers and acquisitions and did not include othcr forms of 
corporate restructuring such as divestments, joint ventures, and spin-off. Further rcscarch 
can include the internal audit role in this type of projects and define sampling population 
(European Union, Asia etc. ) as well as sampling period. The possible rcscarch 
methodology can include both quantitative (through the use of postal questionnaires) and 
qualitative methods (interviews, case studies). 
In addition there are also a number of key research questions which a future study could 
usefully investigate: 
v" The relationship between active internal audit involvement during NI&A 
projects and firm performance 
Further research may include an investigation as to whether an active internal audit 
involvement during the various stages of an M&A project can add value to the business 
and contribute to the success of the project. 
V The relationship between active internal audit involvement at pre-acquisition 
stages and country of origin 
Further research may include an analysis of the correlation between country of origin and 
active internal audit involvement during the pro-active stages of an M&A project such as 
strategy development and due diligence. 
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List of sampling organizations in the European Union 
(0 /01/2000 
- 
31/12/2003) 
No Target Bidder Effective Value date (U. S. $ M. ) 
I Mannesman (GM) Vodafone AirTouch 19/06/00 202,785.13 (UK) 
2 SmithKline Beecham (UK) Glaxo Wellcome (UK) 17/01/00 77,255.21 
3 Elf Aquitaine (FR) Total Fina (FR) 27/03/00 55,339.80 
4 National Westminster Royal Bank of Scotland 13/03/00 38,524.65 Bank (UK) (UK) 
5 Seat Pagine Gialle (IT) Tin. it (IT) 16/11/00 18,694.27 
6 Norwich Union (UK) CGU (UK) 30/05/00 11,858.33 
Scottish Widows Fund & Lloyds TSB Group 7 Life Assurance Society (UK) 03/03/00 11,119.50 (UK) 
8 Credit Commercial de HSBC Holdings (UK) 01/04/00 11,100 France (FR) 
9 Istituto Nazionale 
delle Assicurazioni Generali 13/01/00 179.62 10 Assicurazioni (IT) (IT) , 
10 Woolwich (UK) Barclays (UK) 25/10/00 7,962.51 
11 Aerospatiale Matra (FR) DaimlerChrysler Aerospace (GM) 10/07/00 6,748.03 
12 CWC DataCo (UK) Cable & Wireless (UK) 30/05/00 5,897.63 
13 Burmah Castrol (UK) BP Amoco (UK) 06/09/00 5,578.75 
14 Debis Systernhaus (GM) Deutche Telecom 21/09/00 5,372.95 (GM) 
15 World Online International Tiscali (IT) 07/09/00 4,913.36 (NT)_ 
16 AGA (SW) Linde (GM) N/A 4,680.06 
17 VEW (GM) RWE (GM) N/A 4,545.69 
18 TI Group (UK) Smiths Industries (UK) 04/12/00 4,337.48 
19 Flextech (UK) Telewest Communications (UK) 27/01/00 3,750.5 
20 MobilCom (GM) France Telecom (FR) 23/03/00 3,636.77 
21 Seat Pagine Gialle (IT) Telecom Italia (IT) 26/05/00 3,599.75 
22 Sun Life and Provincial AXA (FR) 10/07/00 3,535.15 Holdings (UK) 
23 Bass (UK) Interbrew (BL) 22/08/00 3.469.09 
24 Coca Cola Beverages (UK) Hellenic Bottling (GR) 09/08/00 3,459.86 
25 Hyder (UK) WPD Holdings (UK) 26/10/00 3,402.85 
26 Ratin (DN) Rentokil Initial (UK) 01/03/00 2,971.9 
27 Thomson Travel Group Preussag (GM) 17/08/00 2,730.60 (UK) 
28 Racal Electronics (UK) Thomson-CSF (FR) 11/07/00 2,685.77 
29 United News (UK) Granada Media (UK) 28/07/00 2,648.8 
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No Target Bidder Effective Value date (U. S. $ m. ) 
30 Tarmac (UK) AngloAmerican (UK) 04/05/00 ___ 2,52333 
31 United Assurance Group Royal London Mutual 05/05/00 2 462.57 (U K) Insurance Society (UK) , 
32 United Biscuits (UK) Finalrealm (FR) 18/05/00 2,355.90 
33 Origin (NT) Atos (FR) 31/10/00 2,344.67 
34 Scania (SW) Volvo (SW) 18/01/00 2,335.36 
35 Club Internet (FR) T-Online International 16/02/00 2,334.16 (G M) 
36 Esat Telecom Group (I R) BT Hawthorn (UK) 10/06/00 2,268.76 
37 Banco Pinto & Sotto Banco Commercial 19/06/00 2,175.54 Mayor (PO) Portugues (PO) 
38 Arjo Wiggins Appleton Worms et Cie (FR) 24/07/00 1,960.80 (U K) 
39 Saatchi & Saatchi (UK) Publicis (FR) 07/09/00 1,767.81 
40 Tomkins (UK) Doughty Hanson (UK) 01/09/00 1,722.62 
41 Groupe GTM (FR) Vinci (FR) 13/07/00 1,694.70 
42 Scania (SW) VolksWagen (GM) 27/03/00 1.620.66 
43 Aegon (NT) Vereniging Aegon 22/06/00 1,592.11 (NT) 
44 Cia de Seguros Mundial Banco Santander 01/06/00 1 555 57 Confianca (PO) Central Hispano (SP) , . 
British Sky 
45 KirchPayTV (GM) Broadcasting Group 04/05/00 1,520.29 
(U K) 
46 Perpetual (UK) Amvescap (UK) 19/10/00 1.513 
47 Rugby Group (UK) RMC Group (UK) 04/02/00 1,468.18 
48 SAT-I (GM) ProSieben Media (GM)- 
--22/08/00 
1.415.92 
49 
___- 
Diligentia (SW) Skandia Life Insurance 20/03/00 1.412.89 (U K) 
50 Banca Regionale Europea Banca Lombarda (IT) 25/05/00 1,410 (IT) 
51 Cie Benelux Paribas (BL) BNP Paribas (FR) 06/10/00 1397.50 
52 Williams (UK) Assa Abloý (SW) 30/08/00 1,333.29 
53 British Borneo Oil & Gas Eni (IT) 29/03/00 1.256.92 (U K) 
54 
- Stagecoach Porlerbrook Abbey National (UK) 20/04/00 1,231.23 (UK) 
55 
_ Cimenteries CBR Heidelberger Zement 01/04/00 1,221.69 Cementbedrijven (13L) (GM) 
56 Swallow Group (UK) Whitbread (UK) 04/02/00 1,212.20 
57 Banco di Napoli (IT) San Paolo-IMI (IT) 07/06/00 1,207.8 
58 Amvest (NT) Rodamco Continental 31/07/00 1.204.55 Europe (NT) 
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59 A13B Alstom Power (FR) Alstom - - 11105100 -- 1,20 1.333 (FR) 
60 St James Place Capital Halifax Group (UK) 22/03/00 1,199.25 (U K) 
61 Druid Group (UK) FI Group (UK) 17/03/00 1.080.74 
62 Medeva (UK) Celltech Chiroscience 24/01/00 1.055.29 (U K) 
63 Dresdner Bank (GM) Allianz (GM) 20/07/01 19,655.94 
64 Granada-Compass Shareholders (UK) 02/02/01 17,914.68 Hospitality (UK) 
65 Ing C Olivetti (IT) Olimpia (IT) 05110101 6,124.62 
66 Legrand (FR) Schneider Electric (FR) 30/07/01 5,501.56 
67 Blue Circle Industries Laffirge (FR) 11/07/01 3,737.54 (U K) 
68 Banca 
Commerciale Banca Intesa (IT) 01105101 3,144.31 Italiana (IT) 
69 RealDanmark (DN) Danske Bank (DN) 28/03/01 3.079.53 
70 Artesia Banking (BL) Dexia Belgium (BL) 03/07/01 3,040.42 
71 Yorkshire 
Power Group Innogy Holdings (UK) 02/04/01 2,707.35 - (U K) 
72 AMS-Missiles 
Systems Matra BAe Dynamics 18/12/01 2 694 84 Div (UK) (FR) . . 
73 Le Meridien Hotels (UK) Grand Hotels (M) Acquisition (UK) 11/07/01 2.675.96 
74 Scottish Provident Abbey National (UK) 01/08/01 2,589.12 Institution (UK) 
75 Montedisson (IT) Italenergia (IT) 07/01/01 2,499.94 
76 Energie Baden FDF (FR) 07/02/01 2,480.40 Wuerttemberg (GM) 
___ 77 _ Freeserve (UK) Wanadoo (FR) 20/02/01 2,306.47 
78 Laporte (UK) Degussa SKW (GM) 13/03/01 2.004.66 
79 Caisses Regionales (FR) Credit Agricole (FR) 14/12/01 1.790 
80 Scottish Life Assurance Royal London 
Mutual 01/07/01 1,614.03 (U K) Insurance (UK) 
81 Media Ways (GM) Telefonica (SP) 01/02/01 
82 Innogy-Yorkshire Electric Northern Electric (UK) 21/09/01 1,425.38 Dist (UK) 
83 Avesta Sheffield (SW) Outokumpu Steel (FN) 23/02/01 1,360.24 
84 France Telecom Cable Suez Lyonnaise Eaux 18/05/01 N/A Networks (FR) Cable (FR) 
85 Sidel (FR) Tetra Laval (FR) 25/05/01 N/A 
86 Marconi Medical Koninklijke Philips 19/10/01 N/A Operations (UK) Electronic (NT) 
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87 Euralux (LX) Mediobanca (IT) 13/04/01 N/A 
88 CIC (FR) Credit Mutuel (FR) 01/11/01 N/A 
89 Gucci Group (NT) Credit Lyonnais (FR) 18/12/01 N/A 
90 Hepworth (UK) Vaillant (GM) 13/03/01 N/A 
91 Banca Carime (IT) Banca Popolare 29/06/01 N/A Commercio e (IT) 
92 Reemtsma Cigarettenfabrik Imperial Tobacco 07/03/02 4 577.25 (GM) Group (GM) , 
93 Enterprise Oil (UK) Shell Resources (UK) 02/04/02 6,231.75 
94 Lattice Group (UK) National Grid Group 22/04/02 18,439.95 (U K) 
95 Castorama Dubois (FR) Kingfisher (UK) 15/05/02 4,361.67 
96 Jefferson Smurfit Group MDP Acquisitions (IR) 17/06/02 4.389.51 (I R) 
- 97 Railtrack (UK) Network Rail (UK) 27/06/02 11,462.32 
98 Autostrade (IT) Schernaventotto (IT) 02/11/02 8,930.92 
99 Infraco SSL (UK) Metronet (UK) 05/12/02 4,710.30 
100 Credit Lyonnais (FR) Credit Agricole (FR) 16/12/02 16,760.57 
101 Intercontinental 
Hotels Shareholders (UK) 14/04/03 5.438.55 Group (UK) 
102 Cegetel (FR) Vivendi Universal SA 22/01/03 3.986 (FR) 
103 Ruhrgas AG (GM) E ON AG (GM) 07/03/03 3,824.07 
104 lberdrola SA (SP) Gas Natural SDG SA 10/03/03 29 736.45 (S P) , 
105 Telecom Italia SpA (IT) Ing C Olivetti & Co 12/03/03 28,591.86 (IT) 
106 Six Continents PLC (UK) Cap Management & 03/03/03 10,664.06 Investment (UK) 
107 D/S 1912 (DN) D/S Svendborg 06/05/03 9,814.59 
108 Safeway PLC (UK) William Morrison 09/01/03 6.509.33 
1 Supermarkets (UK) 
109 Banco Atlantico (SP) Banco Sabadell (SP) 22/12/0-33 1,859.08 
110 Banca Popolare di Banca Popolare 
di Lodi 17/04/03 730.63 Cremona (IT) Scarl (IT) 
III Interbanka Spa (IT) Banca Antonveneta 14/03/03 384.54 SpA (IT) 
112 Hellenic Industrial Bank of Pireaus SA 28/11/03 237.80 Development Bank (GR) (GR) 
113 Caisses d' Espagne (SP) CNCE (FR) 04/07/03 3,939.92 
114 
Gjensidige NOR ASA Den Norske Bank 04/12/03 725.05 2 (NO) Holding ASA (NO) , 
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A! j. S. $ m. ) 
115 Refresco Holding (NE) 3i Group (UK) ___ 30/09/0') 279.9 
Barclays Bank Pic 116 Banco Saragozano (SP) Madrid (SP) 16/07/03 1,298.45 
117 FGH Bank NV (NE) Rabobank (NE) 24/10/03 470.23 
Banca Primavera 
- 
PFS Banca Generali SpA 118 Business (IT) (IT) 30/09/03 293.90 
119 T&S stores (UK) Tesco (UK) 07/01/03 766.9 
Scottish & Newcastle 
120 HP Bulmer Holdings (UK) 28/07/03 529.8 (U K) 
Source: Thomson Financial 
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GENERA L INFORMA 17ON 
What is the primary industry of your organization (Please circle)? 
Aerospace & Defense Electricitv licalth Mining, 
Electronic & Oil & Cas 
Automobiles & Parts Electrical Household Goods & Textiles 
Equipment 
Banks 
Engineering & Insurance Pharmaceuticals & 
Machincrý Biotechnolog 
Food & Drug In-, estment Companies Real Estate Beverages 
Retailers 
Forestry & Paper Leisure Entertainment & Soft%ý are & Chemicals Hotels Computer Scr, 
* 
ices 
Construction & Building Cencral retailers Media & Photography Specialty & Other 
Materials Finance 
Steel & Other Metals 
Support Services Telecommunications Tobacco 
Sen ices 
Other Utilities Food Producers & Life Assurance 
Transport Processors 
Other (Please specify) 
............................................................................................. 
2. A Number of emploývees 
..................... 
2. B Turnover 
........................................... 
2. C Counhýy where corporate headquarter iv located 
...................................................... 
Do you have an M&A department in your company? (Please tick) 
F Yes F No 
If yes, please specify how many people currently employ 
.......................................... 
Did you use external parties for the deal? (Please tick) 
F- Yes F No 
If yes please specify the type (e. g. investment bank, audit firm etc. ) 
............................. 
7. How long have you had an internal audit department in your organization? (Please tick) 
F Under I year F5 up to 10 ý cars F 15 up to 20 ý cars 
I up to 5 years F 10 up to 15years F More than 20 ý ears- 
How many internal auditors does your organization currently employ? (Please tick) 
F 0-1 auditor F 6-10 auditors F 16-20 auditors 
F 2-5 auditors F 11-15 auditors F More than 20 auditors 
F Outsourced function 
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11. CURRENT AND PREFERRED PRACTICES 
9. Internal audit has a role to play in the M&A process (Please circle). 
Strongly Agree Agree Uncertain Disagree Strongly Disagree 
12345 
10. The preferred role of internal audit in the M&A process in your organisation should be 
more proactive than post-mortem (Please circle). 
Strongly Agree Agree Uncertain Disagree Strongly Disagree 
12345 
What are the current and preferred roles that internal audit is or should play (luring the M&A in 
your organization? (Please tick one of the following) 
ROLES Current role Preferred role 
Box checker 
Watchdog and 
Internal Control Expert 
Risk 
- 
Based Auditor 
Internal Consultant 
Other (Please specify) 
................................. 
................................. 
................................. 
................................. 
................................. 
................................. 
12. What is the present level of internal audit's involvement in M&A in your organization? 
(Please tick) 
M&A Stages Major 
involvement 
Moderate 
involvement 
Little 
involvement 
Not involved 
M&A strategy development 
Due diligence 
Post acquisition integration 
Post acquisition audit 
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13. From your point of view, what is the preferred level of internal audit's involvement in 
M&A? (Please tick) 
M& A Stages Major involvement 
Moderate 
involvement 
Little 
involvement 
Not 
involved 
M&A strategy development 
Due diligence 
Post acquisition integration 
Post acquisition audit 
14. The following table lists the type of involvement of various internal audit departments 
during M&A. Please tick one or more of the following, which best fit with both the current 
and preferred role of internal audit with M&A 
14.1 W&A STRA TEG YDE VEL OPMENT 
Nature / Extent of Current Preferred 
Involvement Situation Situation 
Auditing the process used in 
assessing & managing risk 
Investigating whether control 
issues were addressed in the 
planning process 
Developing a planning model 
Advising on systems and 
processes that could reduce 
acquisition risk 
Examining the business 
strategic plans 
Receiving communication 
about deals from Corporate 
Strategy department 
Other (Please specify) 
....................................... 
....................................... 
....................................... 
....................................... 
....................................... 
....................................... 
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14.. 2 DUE DILIGENCE 
Nature / Extent of Current Preferred 
Involvement Situation 
--------- - 
Situation 
Conducting due diligence 
alongside with other functions 
such as finance, accounting, 
human resources, law, etc. 
Working with external 
consultants carrying out due 
diligence 
Ensuring due diligence covers 
financial, operational and 
compliance issues 
Providing advice on contracts 
and accounting matters 
Auditing internal audit 
function in target company 
Providing independent 
validation of the assumptions 
used in pricing target 
Ensuring people doing the 
valuation have the right 
qualifications 
Ensuring weaknesses 
identified in due diligence are 
considered in finalizing the 
deal 
Auditing the business 
processes of the target 
company 
Reviewing composition of 
acquisition team 
Investigating whether there is 
too much pressure on the 
team to do deals 
Providing advice on cross- 
border deals 
Conducting initial due 
diligence in assessing internal 
control 
Ensuring awareness of 
regulatory and other 
compliance matters 
Developing plans in order to 
integrate internal audit of 
merging firms 
Reviewing integration plans 
for IT systems 
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Ensure the target is complying 
with to the acquirer's policies 
and procedures 
Advising on risks and 
implementation to ensure 
risks are taken into account 
Examining deal structuring 
Alerting the human resource 
department to key personnel 
retention problems 
Auditing financial reporting 
systems 
Other (Please specify) 
................................ 
................................ 
............................... 
............................... 
14.3 POST A('Qtll, ý1770A'IN7'1-, GP-47'10AI 
Nature/ Extent of Involvement 
Current Preferred 
Situation Situation 
Auditing acquired company 
profit performance before final 
closing of the contract term 
Helping with the development 
and implementation of a 
communication policy to 
inform acquired company's 
staff regarding systems, 
procedures, risk etc. 
Preparing a checklist of 
activities necessary to actualize 
expected value from the 
acquisition 
Playing an advisory role to 
functions carrying out 
integration 
Advising on the approaches to 1 
issues such as human resources 
in planning the transition 
Other (Please specify) 
................................. 
................................. 
................................. 
............................ 
............................. 
............................. 
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14ý 4 POVl'- ACQUISMONAUDIT 
Nature / Extent of Current Preferred 
Involvement Situation Situation 
Auditing integration process 
to identify control weaknesses 
Reporting findings to business 
units 
, 
audit committee, board 
Risk based audit of policies, 
procedures and controls in 
merged / acquired company 
Assessing performance against 
benchmarks, e. g. balanced 
scorecard and action plans 
Auditing the post-acquisition 
appraisal system 
Investigating whether the 
specific goals of the acquisition 
have been achieved 
Developing standards and 
checklists for the governance 
of stand-alone acquired 
subsidiaries 
Preparing 11, essons Learned" 
document about integration 
process 
Other (Please specify) 
....................................... 
....................................... 
....................................... 
......................................... 
......................................... 
......................................... 
Ill. VALUE ADDED ROLE 
15. Based on your professional experience, do you believe that: 
15.1 Internal audit can add value in the M&A process (Please circle) 
Strongly Agree Agree Uncertain Disagree Strongly Disagree 
12345 
15.2 Internal audit can possibly add more value in the M&A process if its role is allowed to 
expand (Please circle) 
Strongly Agree Agree Uncertain Disagree Strongly Disagree 
12345 
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15.3 Evidence derived from literature review as well as discussions with practitioners suggest 
that, the best practices described at the following table can "ad(] value" to the organization 
during the M&A process. Please circle one or more of the following practices that you 
perceive could add value to the M&A process. 
CURRENT BEST 
PRACTICES Strongly Agree Agree Uncertain Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Control self-assessment 
2 34 5 
Consulting 1 2 3 4 5 
Risk management 1 2 3 4 5 
Computer assisted audit 
techniques 
1 2 3 4 5 
Participation on teams 1 2 3 4 5 
Internal control training 1 2 3 4 5 
Continuous monitoring 1 2 3 4 5 
Systems implementation 
review 
1 2 3 4 5 
Automated workpapers 2 34 5 
Risk based audit projects 2 314 5 
Become a catalyst for change 1 2 34 5 
Mak, 
- auditing more 
collaborative 
1 2 34 5 
Bring business staff into 
auditing 
1 2 3 4 5 
Share technology with the 
business units 
1 2 3 4 5 
Align with customers 1 2 3 4 5 
Conduct preventive auditing 1 2 3 4 5 
Reduce external auditors costs 1 2 3 4 15 
Other (Please specify) 
................................................................................. 
................................................................................. 
................................................................................. 
................................................................................. 
Thank youfor completing this questionnaire. Please return this 
questionnaire using the enclosed envelope. Ifyou would like or be 
willing to be interviewed, as part of the validation of this research, or 
just receive summary results please complete thefollowingforms or 
alternatively attach your business card. 
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REQUEST FOR INTLRVIEW 
All responses will be kept strictly confidential. In order to validate our results. we wIII 
conduct semi-structured interviews within a selected sample of organizations. IfYOU are 
able to spare no more than one hour for all Intcrvie\ý please complete the t, ()Ilo\k 1110: Zý 
Name of the person completing the qUestionnaire 
................................................................. 
Position of the person completing the questionnaire 
............................................. 
Company name 
...................................................................................................................... 
Company address 
......................................................................................................... 
Telephone number 
...................................................................................................... 
E-mail 
........................................................................................................................ 
REQUEST FOR SUMMAR YRESUL TS' 
Ifyou want to just receive a surnmary copy of this research please complete the t'ollo\\in(, 
details: 
Name offlic pcrson conipletim, the qLICStionnaire 
................................................................. 
Position of the person completing the questionnaire 
............................................. 
Company name 
...................................................................................................................... 
Company address 
......................................................................................................... 
Telephone number 
...................................................................................................... 
E-mail 
........................................................................................................................ 
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ATTEN(DIXC. o 
, 
Aide-ýWemoire 
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AIDE MEMOIRE 
Introduction 
According to the preliminary data analysis (and the analysis sent to you via email), 
we can indicate that: 
9A great number of respondents (70,6%) believe that internal audit has a role to 
play during the M&A process and also that their preferred role should be more 
proactive than post 
- 
mortem. 
* Although the majority of chief audit executives prefer to expand their roles during 
the M&A process, this survey reveals that almost a third of respondents continue 
to act "after the fact" and not proactively. Almost 35% acts as 'box checkers' and 
'internal control experts' although almost 90% prefer to act as internal consultants 
and risk based auditors. 
Also, their contribution to pre-acquisition stages (such as strategy development 
and due diligence) is low to moderate. On the other hand, data reveals that 
internal auditors prefer to participate earlier at pre 
- 
acquisition stages rather than 
audit after the fact on post acquisition audit projects. 
9A great number of respondents believe that internal audit can add value to the 
M&A process. On the other hand there is also an important part of respondents 
that are uncertain or disagree about the contribution and the value added of a 
possible expansion of internal auditing into a proactive process. This study 
provided some value added practices derived from the literature review. Except 
some practices like participation on teams, risk management and self assessment, 
the majority of respondents are uncertain or have no opinion about practices like 
computer assisted audit techniques, reduce external audit costs, making audit 
more Collaborative, bring business staff into auditing. 
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* Respondents indicated also some best practices and the level of involvement of 
their internal audit departments. 
From your point of view: 
a) Do you believe that internal audit has a role during the M&A process? 
b) What is the level of internal audit involvement at the various stages of an M&A 
projects in your organizations? 
"at is the reason of low to moderate level of internal audit participation on pre- 
acquisition stages (as evidenced also from quantitative data analysis of postal 
questionnaires)? 
d) Can you indicate important steps or best practices experienced from your 
professional and organisational experience? 
e) Apartfrom your current level of involvement, can you suggest a preferred role(s) 
for your internal audit department during the stages (especially pro-actives) of an 
M&A project? 
Do you believe that internal audit departments and practitioners possess the 
necessary skills in order to participate effectively during M&A projects? 
g) In the case of afiture active participation ofyour department in an M&A project; 
can you indicate also your preferred bestpractices or actionsfollowed? 
"at are the reasonsfor the gaps identified during the analysis ofpreliminary 
data? 
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From you professional experience can you provide us your view on possible 
prerequisites in order to bridge effectively the gaps identified through descriptive 
data analysis? 
k) Can you indicate, from your experience in your organizations, actions or best 
practices experienced (or prefer to experience in the future) from your company 
during the stages of an M&A projects (e. g. strategy development, due diligence, 
post-acquisition integration, post-acquisition audit)? 
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